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Abstract 
Xin Liu 
Submitted for the degree of Dphil International Relations 
 
Origins of Peasant Socialism in China 
The International Relations of China’s Modern Revolution 
 
More than six decades after its occurrence, China’s ‘peasant revolution’ of 1949 
remains an enigma. According to classical Marxism, peasants are passive ‘objects of 
history’ who must be transformed into industrial workers before they can become 
agents of revolutionary change. This line of argument is reinforced by much extant 
Sinology and historical sociology, both of which have treated Maoism either as a 
disguised continuation of peasant exploitation, or as a failed emulation of Stalinism. 
Contra these interpretations, this thesis argues that China’s peasant revolution was a 
real historical phenomenon which involved a previously unthinkable form of peasant 
political agency. To substantiate this argument, the thesis deploys Leon Trotsky's 
theory of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) which  posits social 
development as a non-linear process constituted via multi-societal interaction. This 
reveals that the origins and specificities of the Chinese Revolution can best be 
understood with reference to a 'combined development' emerging from China's long-
run and short-run interactions with variegated social forms.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis shows how China’s ‘peasant revolution’ remains an 
insurmountable paradox for the relevant literature, expressed in a shared problem of 
anachronism. Chapter 2 introduces Uneven and Combined Development as a theory 
of inter-societal causation that might overcome the problem by virtue of its non-linear 
conception of social development. Chapter 3 demonstrates how this inter-societal 
perspective is central to understanding the longue dureé ‘peculiarities’ of China’s 
development: the interaction of nomadic and sedentary societies made the Chinese 
peasants directly subject to a centralizing empire, configuring their political agency 
quite differently (and with quite different potentials) from that of their European 
feudal counterparts. Chapter 4 analyzes the specific intersection of the Chinese social 
formation with the universalizing dynamics of Western capitalism, an intersection 
which generated the context of China’s modern combined development. Chapter 5 
then provides a conjunctural analysis of how the revolutionary agency of the peasant 
came to the fore in China’s revolution in terms of a pattern of combined development 
that substituted  the peasantry for the weak bourgeoisie and nascent proletariat as the 
leading agency of a socialist modernization that fused anti-imperialist struggle and 
campaings for rural restoration and national liberation into a single process aimed at 
overcoming China’s backwardness. Finally, Chapter 6 shows how this argument 
resolves the Sinological debate on whether modern Chinese history is ‘China-made’ 
or ‘West-made’; for it reveals how the interaction of China’s premodern social forms 
with Western modernity co-determined the peculiarites of China’s modern 
transformation. It also provides a critique of extant Marxist historical sociology, 
arguing that it is built upon a mode-of-production analysis that tends towards falsely 
unilinear, ‘internalist’ explanations.  
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Does your Majesty understand the way of the growing grain? During the seventh and 
eighth months, when drought prevails, the plants become dry. Then the clouds collect 
densely in the heavens, they send down torrents of rain, and the grain erects itself, as if 
by a shoot. When it does so, who can keep it back? Now among the shepherds of men 
throughout the nation, there is not one who does not find pleasure in killing men. If 
there were one who did not find pleasure in killing men, all the people in the nation 
would look towards him with outstretched necks. Such being indeed the case, the 
people would flock to him, as water flows downwards with a rush, which no one can 
repress. 
Mencius: The King Hsiang of Liang  
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When hills bend, streams wind and the pathway seems to end, past dark willows and 
flowers in bloom lies another village. 
  Lu You ! !!!
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Conventions 
I have applied the Pinyin transliteration system to the text with a few arbitrary 
exceptions. Most Chinese and geographical names are translated to English in the 
Pinyin system such as Kangxi (), Mao Zedong (
	), Tianxia () and 
Shanghai (. However, in the case of some received names which were not 
officially translated in Mainland China or after 1949, I have maintained their more 
established names in other transliteration systafems such as Wade-Giles. For example, 
I use Chiang Kaishek () rather than Jiang Jieshi, Sun Yat-sen () rather 
than Sun Zhongshan. As for books and articles originally published in Chinese, I have 
provided their titles in Pinyin with my own English translation in the bracket 
afterwards. All the translations of Chinese materials can be found in the footnotes and 
the bibliography. 
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Chapter 1-Peasant Socialism: Situating the Chinese Revolution 
in World-Historical Perspective  
1.1 Introduction: The Chinese peasant socialism as a world-
historical riddle  
The Chinese Revolution has affected the second half of the twentieth century as 
dramatically as what the Russian Revolution has done to the first half of the century 
(Schurmann 1968: 36). The paradox of China’s revolutionary experience is 
significant not only for its profound world-historical impact, but also its multi-faceted 
implications on historical-sociological theories of social revolution: a socialist 
revolution has emerged from China’s vast peasant communities where there was no 
fully fledged industrial sector, capitalist social relations and working class 
organizations. Such a particular trajectory has posed great challenge to the enduring 
Marxist hypothesis that peasants were ‘rural idiots’ and ‘potatoes in a sack’ who play 
a ‘negative part’ in the historical drama of social development (Mitrany 1951; 
Duggett 1975: 160-161). The Chinese Revolution, unlike its Russia predecessor 
which imposed a socialist state upon the un-revolutionized peasants, has grown 
organically from the peasant communities in which the socialist state was firmly 
rooted; and in consolidating the peasant-based socialist regime, the Chinese peasant 
still played an active role with his and her identity represented in the new regime. As 
Lin Chun has noted, ‘Chinese socialism can best be grasped as a modern project that 
has sought to develop by its own means into its own unique type, always conscious of 
the other possibilities it has refused to emulate: that is, Soviet Style bureaucratic 
socialism as well as diverse forms of peripheral capitalism’ (Lin 2006: 1, 60). For 
many historical moments was China actively pursuing the Soviet as well as western 
models of socialism and industrialization, whereas she has later reinterpreted 
‘socialism’ and ‘democracy’ by differentiating itself from the Russian and the western 
experiences. The peculiar nexus between peasantry and socialism in the Chinese 
Revolution requires a world-historical explanation. 
  
However, the Chinese Revolution remains an enigma for a world-historical analysis is 
long overdue. In extant theorizations, some accounts have overemphasized the 
coercive elements deployed by the revolutionary leadership to establish nationwide 
control by reference to China’s prolonged tradition of ‘dictatorship’ (Moore 1966; 
Wolf 1969), whereas some others have highlighted from different angles the organic 
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and cooperative relationship with the rural communities created by the Communist 
Party during the anti-Japanese guerrilla war (known as the Yenan Period) (Johnson 
1962; Hinton 1972; Belden 1971). What the two strands of analysis have both failed to 
produce is an understanding of how the modern value of socialism and the 
organization of peasants were intertwined and rendered co-constitutive to generate a 
unprecedented socio-political order in China’s case. A common theoretical 
narrowness in these accounts is to treat the Communist Revolution as a simple project 
of state-rebuilding fuelled by nationalist ideologies, whereas having omitted the socialist 
perspective aspiring to creation of a new social order encapsulated in the practice of 
peasant-based revolution1. All these approaches have suggested that socialism existed 
as a marginal idea in the Chinese Revolution which has induced little change to 
China’s mundane and regressive past; also these explanations have allowed the role of 
nationalism belittling the meaning of socialism.  
Thus in this chapter, I will show by introducing through the extant literature that the 
above accounts’ explanatory difficulties are caused by a common problem of 
anachronism. Here, I will define anachronism as a problem caused by simplifying and 
reducing historical temporalities. Anachronistic analysis always involves overemphasis 
of a specific set of explanans without specifying their ‘historical socio-temporal context’, 
‘making it appear as a static, self-constitutive and reified entity’. The deeper 
methodology reason of anachronism is that a specific period of history in either the 
past or the present is ‘sealed off’ from broader historical development, being 
‘eternalized’ as ‘natural and resistant to structural change’. Also, ‘history appear to be 
marked, or is regulated by a regular tempo that beats according according to the same 
and constant rhythm’ of a certain reified system (Hobson and Hobden 2002: 6-15). 
Ironically, though historical sociology has promised to theorize the ‘historical 
specificity’ of social categories, they have also committed the mistake of anachronism 
in explaining the Chinese Revolution. On surface, it is because that they have treated 
the Chinese peasant or the traditional society as mundane, inactive and changeless. 
However, I will aim to show in this chapter that the real solution to the problem is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1"Assisted by the Realist framework of International Relations, Neo-Weberian historical-
sociologists, Theda Skocpol (1979) inter alia have interpreted the Chinese Communist 
Revolution as a task of rebuilding state-administration in a historically made anarchical space 
of geopolitical crisis (also Thaxton 1977: 24). "
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to debate on whether the Chinese peasant is progressive or not; rather, it is about 
solving a more fundamental methodological problem underlying all forms of 
anachronism in extant historical-sociological accounts; because anachronism is 
ultimately caused by ontological singularity as the most deep-seated methodological 
weakness in classic sociology which will inevitably lead to all forms of uni-linear notion 
of social development (Rosenberg 2006: 310, 2013: 186). This review will give the 
basis to introducing Uneven and Combined Development as an antidote to 
anachronism with its ontology of ‘interactive multiplicity’ which views social 
development as accumulative, multi-linear and spirally ascending.  
This chapter will first review some classic notions on the potentialities of socialist 
revolution in a peasant society on which Marxism holds a precarious position. It will 
show that classic Marxian theory of social development has not denied the plausibility 
of socialist revolution revolving around the peasantry whereas they look to the 
revolutionary leadership as the key agent that provides essential organizational and 
ideological energy to any peasant revolution. Thus the key question to be tackled is 
what particular modus operandi the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the CCP) has 
deployed to organize, politicize and militarize the peasants and under what historical 
circumstances these political manoeuvrings became effective. It will be shown that 
though existing authors have highlighted different aspects of the CCP’s state 
institutions crafted to mobilize and militarize the peasants, they have not succeeded in 
mobilizing world history as the key explanans to the peculiarities they have identified; 
instead, they have resorted to the internal structure(s) of the peasantry or the agrarian 
society to explain the peasant-based characteristics of China’s socialism which is 
supposed to be the explanandum.  As a result, those authors are unable to explain why 
the traditional peasant society has been historically incorporated to the socialist-
revolutionary project of the CCP, neither can they address the specificities of socialism 
in the Chinese case which should have been understood as a contradictory ‘social 
combination’ entailing multiple, intertwined social formations rather than a linear 
outgrowth of the traditional peasant society. On this basis, this chapter concludes by 
calling for an alternative theoretical framework of social transformation centred upon 
the conception of ‘social combination’, and Leon Trotsky’s theory of Uneven and 
Combined Development (hereafter U&CD) plays this role for it will activate a 
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conjunctural method of world-historical analysis predicated upon the ontological 
multiplicity of social development. 
 
1.2 The key question for modern China: Is Socialist Revolution 
conceivable in a peasant society and why is it necessary?  
Whether a revolutionary social transformation can emerge from a peasant society 
remains one of the most contested questions in the field of general theories of social 
revolution (Wolf 1969; Scott 1977; Paige 1975; Migdal 1974; Skocpol 1982 etc.). As 
Barrington Moore has stated, the ‘process of modernization begins with peasant 
revolutions that fail. It culminates during the twentieth century with peasant 
revolutions that succeed’ (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1982: 351). A long list of successful 
revolutions won on the basis of peasant organizations has elicited the great 
transformation of the peasant which has become the ‘subject’ rather than the ‘object’ 
of history-This is also regarded a zeitgeist of twentieth century’s world history (Skocpol 
1982). The Chinese Revolution is significant among other peasant revolutions not 
only because it was the first successful attempt to implant socialist property relations in 
the soil of peasant communities, but also that the theory and praxis of Maoism has 
inspired the rest of the national liberation movements in the Third World (D’Mello 
2009)2. In pre-1949 China, peasants constituted 75 percent of the total population and 
the agricultural sector produced approximately 65 percent of the national output 
(Feuerwerker 1983: 29). Fully fledged capitalist social relations was nonexistent and 
the number of workers was small. Agricultural production by 1949 was still in a large 
sense organized around scattered household units. China’s apparent backwardness 
makes the revolution a more paradoxical case for Mao and his CCP have transcended 
the longstanding myth upheld by some classic Marxist scholars that socialism is more 
likely to be achieved in societies with mature capitalism. It is thought that Marx has 
an ‘elemental belief’ in the ‘superiority and necessity of large-scale production’ that is 
sought first by capitalism and then by socialism on a higher level (Mitrany 1951: 26)3. 
With the peculiar strategies of political struggles such as ‘villages besieging cities’, the 
‘mass line’ and the Land Reform, Mao’s triumph in China has come to unsettle the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Notably, Maoism was also deployed as the praxis of some left-wing movements in the West 
during the Cold War, see RJ. Alexander, Maoism in the Developed World, 2001.  
3 On this score, see David Mitrany, Marxism Against the Peasant, 1951.  
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Stalinist notion of socialist development which exaggerates the determinism of forces 
of production (D’Mello 2009)4; Mao alleged that human capability could substitute 
material capability in China’s extremely backward situation as a shortcut to socialism. 
In this sense, the nexus between socialism and the peasantry presented by the Chinese 
Revolution has posed significant questions not only to the precarious status of the 
peasant in the Marxist theory of revolution, but also to the general understanding of 
the origins and nature of modern social transformation.  
Marx’s understanding of the role of peasantry in social revolution is marked by his 
famous analogy of ‘potatoes in a sack’ that highlights the short-sightedness, 
vulnerability and disorganization of the peasant population (Hobsbawm 1973). 
However, unlike David Mitrany’s charge based upon his selective reading of Marx’s 
works on the European experiences that Marxist theory is in nature ‘against’ peasants, 
an opening can be recognized in Marx’s theory for envisaging peasant revolution in 
the canvas of wider social formation (Duggett 1975: 160).  This opening lies not only 
in the feature of historicism of Marxism, but also Marxism’s nature as an unfinished 
and open-ended intellectual project. Marx himself has confessed that his 
understanding of peasant is limited to ‘the countries of Western Europe’ (Marx 2000: 
623) where the peasant would inevitably be ‘released from rural idiocy and turn into a 
proletariat or in some cases a bourgeois’. Thus ‘[p]easants seemed to him (Marx) the 
epitome of backwardness’ facing capitalism as an ‘all-conquering’ force of modernity 
(Duggett 1975: 161; Marx 2000: 623). Though Marx has emphasized the stagnation 
of economic development in the traditional agrarian economy, his attitude towards 
the role of peasants in social progress has long remained ambivalent across different 
cases he has addressed. It is notable that ‘[p]easants were most interesting for Marx 
when they were ceasing to exist as such, their expropriation from the land constituted 
‘the prelude to the history of capital’’ (Duggett 1975: 161). This point makes Marx less 
an apologist of capitalism predicated upon ‘the expropriation of the agricultural !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The Stalinist notion is nonethless a 'mechanical interpretation' of Marx's 1859 Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy which vaguely implies that the development of 
production forces turns preexisting social relations into fetters and preludes the 'era of social 
revolution' (D'Mello 2009). Stalin applies this interpretation to justify his China policy in the 
1920s that the bourgeois KMT needed to act as the interim leader of the Chinese Revolution 
before the stage of socialism, see Deutscher 1984.  
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producer’ (Marx 2000: 623). In the case of England, the disappearing of peasants was 
a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalist development that favours large-
scale production.  
However, to Marx, any socialist progression on that basis has to be predicated upon 
reversal of the status of peasants in the social property regime in which the 
disappearance of peasants in England did not have to be the sufficient condition. The 
potentially progressive role of the peasant in anti-capitalist struggles is first detected by 
Marx in France’s case.  In Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, it is shown that the 
French capitalist relations was not built upon a radical dispossession of the peasant, 
but the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the Monarch sustained by partly 
accommodating the peasant’s expectation (Marx 1852/2008; Duggett 1975: 168-170). 
French peasants supported Louis Napoleon with the hope that their private property 
right would induce the passage to bourgeoisie; whereas they then lost faith in 
Napoleon because the man has proved incapable of protecting them against ‘the 
consequences of trying to become petit-bourgeoisie’ (ibid). The political 
disillusionment of Napoleon’s state simultaneously led to disillusionment of the 
economic system, namely the private property regime on which the state erected (ibid). 
These double disillusionments have in turn conceived an anti-capitalist element 
among the French peasants. Though it is highly contested whether the so-called anti-
capitalism developed in opposing the Napoleon government had promised any 
socialist impulse which, in Marx’s sense, would promote the progressive growth of 
large-scale production, it is nevertheless conceivable in the French case that 
progressive class identity could be formed in the peasant communities under 
particular conjunctural circumstances, despite the relative stagnant production forces. 
Though the anti-capitalist impulse displayed in the French peasants could not be 
simply viewed as an incentive of socialist revolution, it is nonetheless conceivable in 
the French case that by cultivating antipathy to private property, the socio-political 
order of capitalism could be unsettled. This is why Marx has also looked to the East 
for possibilities of revolutionary transformation. Marx is certainly not more optimistic 
about the East, but he is ready to posit the huge peasant population in Eastern 
societies as a potential ally of the urban proletarian class for challenging capitalism 
(Duggett 1975: 173). This possibility lies in the element of ‘communal property and 
communal production’ possessed by non-western societies such as Russia and China 
13"
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(Marx 1973: 490; Duggett 1975: 174). Complexities of the Russian case arose from 
the dilemma that both the capitalist development and peasants in the communes were 
against the exploitative regime of Tsarism at a specific point when they could enter a 
temporary alliance. The contradiction, however, is that though communal property in 
Russia would present a potential counterforce to capitalism, the peasants’ small 
holding of land was nevertheless against the progressive logic of capitalism which 
entails large-scale production. Though it is imaginable in Marx’s picture that the 
peasant could be turned into a conscious class to achieve political victory of 
overthrowing Tsarism by allying with other classes, it is questionable though, whether 
the peasant could transcend the stagnancy of production force due to the condition of 
small landholding. Marx has implied that a peasant revolution could not necessarily 
overcome such weakness unless a superimposed state-power came to further 
revolutionize the peasant’s political agency. Marx has also suggested that once the 
anti-capitalist revolution triumphed in Russia, large-scale, rationalist production such 
as machinery could be ‘transplanted immediately’ to the peasants who was ‘troubled 
by many irrationally small plots’; thus socialism could grow out of the Russian peasant 
communities, and in transplanting machines to the socialist Russia directly, the 
capitalist stage of peasant dispossession could be ‘leap-frogged’ (Marx 1953; Duggett 
1975: 173-176).  
All the above review of the Marxist notion of peasant revolution could be summed up 
as follows. For Marx, it is fully conceivable in under particular historical 
circumstances that peasants could be politicized, mobilized and rendered a conscious 
class force for anti-capitalist revolution, as long as there are other classes assisting this 
revolution via a more complex process of social formation; this is because that 
capitalism itself is detrimental to the peasants’ original way of life. However, the 
underdevelopment of productive forces of agrarian society also presumes an 
excessively contradictory trajectory for the peasant to become revolutionary. Some 
additional methods may need to be deployed (e.g. massive use of state-violence) to 
alter the small-holding characteristics of peasant economy which is in conflict to the 
principle of large-scale production of socialism. This understanding leads to two 
further questions. First, where comes the particular historical conjuncture which has 
given rise to the revolutionary peasantry? And second, how was a certain political 
leadership formed in that conjuncture that turned the peasant away from their 
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congenital weakness towards a socialist end; and how was socialism reinterpreted in 
order to facilitate the course of a peasant revolution?  As Eric Hobsbawm has 
problematized, the primary question of peasant politics is about ‘the relation between 
microcosm and macrocosm’, because for the peasants, ‘[b]y themselves they cannot 
solve this problem’ (Hobsbawm 1973: 8). For Hobsbawm, the revolutionary agency of 
the peasantry is always formed outside peasant communities as part of a wider social 
movement (e.g. the 1960s nation-wide unrest in Peru), without which the peasants 
would lack both education and armed forces sufficient to politicize their discontent 
because ‘the normal strategy of the traditional peasantry is passivity’ (ibid: 12-13).  
Thus Hobsbawm has agreed with Marx’s proposition in The Eighteenth Brumaire that 
peasants ‘cannot represent themselves’ and must be ‘presented’ by others (ibid: 20). 
Hobsbawm’s engagement with the conception of peasant politics has ushered in a 
historically holistic perspective-that the conjuncture of peasant politics is ultimately a 
product of wider social formation in world history5. ‘Before looking at the peasantry, it 
is necessary to look at the whole society’ (Skocpol 1982: 373). This methodological 
principle is reinforced by Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol in different regards 
(Moore 1966: 426; Skocpol 1979, 1982, 1994); nevertheless there has been a wide 
consensus among these authors that ‘[a] holistic frame of reference is indispensible, 
one that includes states, class structures, and transnational economic and military 
relations’; and such a holistic explanation ‘can only be developed in conjunctions with 
explanations of other forms of peasant-based political protest (and its absence or 
failure) in various epochs of world history’ (Skocpol 1982: 373-374). How the ‘world-
historical context’ should be applied as the key analytical device is a crucial theoretical 
step that has to be taken before substantial causal mechanism of the Chinese 
Revolution could be eventually established; otherwise, it is difficult to theorize the 
wide social formation(s) in which the peasant has become revolutionary and the 
revolutionary modus operandi was formed to overcome the congenital weakness of the 
peasant. Now I will turn to the extant theorizations of the causes and consequences of 
the Chinese Revolution in both historical-sociological and Sinological accounts. I will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Despite this, Hobsbawm seems to have contradicted his own world-historical method in 
some of his remarks on China; for example, 'in the traditional politics of that country (China) 
peasant risings play an accepted and expected part in the end of one dynasty and the 
substitution of another' (Hobsbawm 1973: 17). 
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show that their inadequate utilization of world history has caused them the problem of 
anachronism and prevented them from understanding the peasant character of the 
Chinese Revolution and its specific meaning.  
 
1.3. Extant theorizations of China’s Peasant Revolution   
1.3.1 Always back to Jiashen: the peasantry as a passive object of history 
and the inescapable dictatorship   
The first strand of literature on the emergence of revolutionary China has placed 
heavy emphasis on weaknesses of the Chinese agrarian society due to which 
‘socialism’ is understood as a relatively empty term. The Chinese Revolution is 
explained by excavating the traditional agrarian structures in which the passivity, 
vulnerability and lack of cohesion of the peasant communities are regarded as the 
constitutive elements of China’s development. These traditional backward structures, 
according to these authors, include ideology, political institutions, developmental 
stagnation and landownership. Like R. Keith Schoppa has defined, the basic problem 
for the Chinese Revolution was ‘to construct a modern state bolstered by institutions 
and approaches that could engender the cohesion necessary for socio-political stability’ 
(Schoppa 2000: 238, my italics). Barrington Moore (1966) has depicted why the lack 
of cohesion had emerged in the traditional society. To Moore, this problem lies 
ultimately in China’s stagnant economic development characterized by ‘the absence 
of capitalism’ (Huang 1985, 2002; Brenner and Isett 2002).  
According to Moore’s influential Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), the 
social incohesiveness in China's agrarian society was caused by two historical 
conditions. First, the traditional petite-agricultural economy was organized around 
small households. Family was the basic unit in which production activities took place. 
Thus a peasant would hardly have any sustainable and cooperative contact with other 
non-family members in his or her community (Moore 1966: 208-213). Because of the 
enduring condition of overpopulation in the countryside, hungry peasants would 
always be in a competitive relationship with each other to bid for the gentry-officials' 
lands to cultivate. This situation deepened the cleavages between individual peasants. 
Second, the peasants also had very little connection to the state because the Imperial 
government's administrative power could hardly reach the grassroot level. For most of 
the time, peasants would only confront local gentry-scholars and low-ranking officials, 
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and they could easily perceive the corrupt and exploitative local notables as 
representatives of the imperial government (see Will, Wong and Lee 1991). Therefore, 
the highly incohesive structure of the rural society enabled the Communist Party to 
utilize the pre-existing cleavages to cultivate antagonisms between different groups, 
which were then framed into nationalist ideology to mobilize peasants on a national 
scale. Because the Chinese peasants were unlike their French counterpart who was 
able to raise formal request for property right, the Communist Party could easily 
launch organized revolts, political mobilizations and identity reconstruction by 
‘forg[ing] a new link between the village and the national government’, for which 
dictatorial government and tighter exploitation over the rural area were essential 
methods (ibid: 220-227; see also Schoppa 2000: 251-270).  
Here comes a difficult question for Moore’s account: though the incohesive rural 
society has provided the CCP with the platform for revolutionary mobilization, it 
nevertheless did not guarantee that the CCP had to do that and would be successful. 
Also, there is no theoretical and logical underpinning for the claim that by ‘forging a 
new link between the village and the national government’ the revolutionary state 
would necessarily become a backward dictatorial regime. For this problem, Moore 
builds his argument upon a sophistry that equates ‘the absence of capitalism’ to the 
necessary emergence of dictatorship. He has provided a long analysis of the power 
relation between the imperial state, the landed upper class and the peasant and 
regarded their correlation as the reason for absence of capitalism in China. Moore 
argues that the Chinese landed class, namely the gentry-scholars were highly resistant 
to some of the crucial elements of capitalism such as private property and profit-
oriented commercial activities. Such hostility came from the gentry’s non-economic 
access to landed property (Brenner 1977). Because the imperial government had to 
control a vast territory and population, long-distance control was thus extremely 
important to the maintenance of imperial order. For this reason, the imperial 
government made great effort to integrate the landed class into the state-bureaucracy, 
allowing office-holders in the bureaucracy a certain degree of corruption (Moore 1966: 
172). Thus office-holding would always lead to multiplying of wealth for not only 
gentry-scholars, but their whole family as well. As a result, wealthy families and clans 
were always in need of degree-holding officials to ‘substantiate' their ownership of 
landed property, whereas poor families also tended to support their children to take 
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the official examination, through which fortunes of the family was expected to be 
multiplied. Therefore, the gentry’s landownership was achieved and protected via 
office-holding rather than direct involvement in agricultural production. For Moore, 
this is why the Chinese landed class had no incentive to participate in market-oriented 
commerical activities6.  
Moore views the above conditions as the origins of non-democratic state-formation in 
China. For Moore, capitalist production has foregrounded the emergence of 
democratic polity in England, whereas ‘the absence of capitalism’ is understood as the 
sociological foundation for the recurrent emergence of dictatorial regimes throughout 
the Chinese history. The problem still is that Moore has provided no analysis of the 
process by which the CCP has succeeded in ‘forging a new link between the village 
and the national government’ whereas former political forces could not do this. 
Charles Tilly is certainly correct to argue that Moore has ‘said little about the actual 
mechanisms that translated a certain form of class power into a specific mode of 
government’ (Tilly 1992: 12, my italics).  
Other authors have attempted to identify some more specific channels through which 
the dictatorial state has been imposed upon the peasant. They have highlighted the 
degenerative role of the Confucian ideology and the agrarian production system. Two 
particular elements of the agrarian society are regarded responsible for the emergence 
of the Chinese dictatorship. First, according to Max Weber, Confucianism, which is 
regarded as the most enduring social consciousness dominating the Chinese society, 
lacks the fundamental ‘transcendental tensions’ by which capitalist modernity was 
conceived (Weber 1951: 226). Confucianism is understood as a set of moral codes 
followed by the mass of Chinese people in observing traditional values and practices. 
Through official infiltration, Imperial courts of all times had succeeded in creating a 
high degree of social integration predicated upon the belief in order and stability. To 
achieve order and stability, institutions such as the bureaucracy and the scholar-
examination were set up as to enable the individuals to realize self-perfection via 
fulfilling imperial obligations. And also because the logical structure of Confucianism 
lacks ‘determinate paradigms whose disproof could have led to theoretical upheavals !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For criticisms of China's state-bureaucracy and its inefficacy see Harry Harding, Organizing 
China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976, 1981.  
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within them’ (Anderson 1974: 543), the Scientific Revolution essential to Industrial 
Revolution in Europe could not take place in China to induce any capitalist 
production. Second, it has been widely held that the traditional agrarian society of 
China was short of the social property relations essential to the rise of capitalism in the 
West. The Confucian ideology is treated as a major barrier to the formation of private 
property relations and commercial activities for its tenet that ‘the poise and harmony 
of the soul are shaken by the risks of acquisitiveness’ (Weber 1951: 160). The 
fundamental material condition identified as responsible for the absence of capitalist 
elements, however, was the natural and ecological setting in which the ‘Asiatic mode 
of production’ or ‘oriental despotism’ was grounded (Wittfogel 1957). Because of the 
high aridity of land in the Asiatic societies, the state had to play a central role in 
organizing large-scale hydraulic projects. Resultantly, the state became the sole 
proprietor of all lands, and the line between public and private properties was blurred. 
In this sense, the non-progressive Confucian culture, and the state-bureaucracy were 
both super-structural institutions deployed by the state-class to relieve the material 
pressures upon the traditional economy.  
For all the above social conditions are treated as of transhistorical quality, it is hard for 
authors to distinguish the novel, progressive elements, socialism inter alia in the 
Chinese Revolution. Eric Wolf argues from an anthropological perspective that the 
endless peasant wars in history were all generated and predetermined by the 
oppressive landed property regime under which the peasant had little agency. Though 
the modern communist revolution has ‘reversed the structure of the Chinese society’ 
by organizing the peasants into the newly crafted state-apparatus of the People’s 
Republic (PRC), the enduring political and cultural legacies of the premodern society 
remains unchanged. The state is still the only ‘source of decisions’ and the ‘bearer of 
moral order’. The only difference was that the deeply ingrained moral codes of 
Confucianism was masked by Maoism, which to Wolf is no more than a modern 
expression of Confucianism displaying very little resemblance with Marxism. Both 
Maoism and Confucianism would justify the centrality of the state in bonding the 
peasant communities together via ‘moral suasion’. In both ideological systems,  
peasants were persuaded and even coerced into fulfilling their moral obligations 
subject to order and stability sought and imposed by the dominant political elites 
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(Wolf 1969: 154-155)7. Like Barrington Moore, Wolf is also unable to explain why 
and how the CCP has ‘reversed the structure of the Chinese society’. What they have 
both depicted is a dictatorial state as a linear outgrowth of China’s traditional society 
which came to power by exploiting the weak peasants using traditional methods. This 
argument has given rise to a longstanding thesis in the studies of Chinese Revolution-
that the communist revolution was far from providing any kinds of ‘liberation’. 
Instead, the communist state as the product of the revolution continues the historical 
recurrence of ‘domination after domination’. To Joseph Esherick, ‘[i]t makes far more 
sense to recognize that the revolution was not so much a process of liberation as a 
process wherein a new structure of domination was created to do battle with, to defeat 
and to replace another structure of domination’ (Esherick 1995: 49-50). Notably, the 
Communist Party’s official historian Guo Moruo has highlighted the nature of 
China’s traditional dynastic transition that almost any progressive political forces in 
Chinese history would be condemned to more exploitative and suppressive tyranny 
after the seizure of power. In 1944, Guo argued that the success of the Chinese 
Revolution had to be achieved by transcending the fate of ‘domination after 
domination’, which was termed the ‘Jiashen Paradox’ by him (see also Wolf 1969: 
103)8. 
What all the above arguments have reinforced together is the classic understanding of 
the nature of the peasantry that the peasant was the ‘object’ rather than the ‘subject’ 
of history. Also, they have all denied the revolutionary elements of the Chinese 
Revolution, not to mention the socialist aspect. This understanding of the Chinese 
peasantry is actually grounded in a broader philosophy of history that views China as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The CCP's inheritance of Confucianism could be found in its leader, Liu Shaoqi's short 
article 'How to be a Good Communist (Gongchandangyuan de xiuyang)' (1939), in which Liu 
argues Like a good communist is like a Confucian sage who becomes so by 'steeling' oneself 
and 'self-cultivating', see http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/liu-shaoqi/1939/how-
to-be/index.htm. The discontinuity here is that for writing this as part of the reason, Liu 
Shaoqi was purged during the Cultural Revolution.  
8 'Jiashen' refers to the year 1644 in traditional Chinese calendar. In that year, Li Zicheng, the 
great leader of Chinese peasant revolts in the Ming Dynasty, had very quickly lost his 
momentum after his troops overtook Beijing.  Guo used this story as an example in his '300th 
Anniversary of Jiashen' to call for alternative political leadership in the postwar period.  
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‘stagnant, slumbering, unchanging’ society in a ‘historyless’ situation; and only the 
penetration of a ‘dynamic, restlessly changing, historyful’ West could introduce 
progressive social forces capable of unsettling China’s self-constitutive structure 
(Cohen 1984: 57). This conception of Chinese society, as a discourse deployed by 
European intellectuals of the nineteenth century to justify colonialism, was revived by 
the American ‘China-watchers’ in postwar decades to explain the causes and 
processes of China’s modern development. Several interrelated theoretical models 
have been generated on this basis, including ‘impact-response’ (Teng and Fairbank 
1954), ‘change within tradition’ (Fairbank 1994, Reischauer and Craig 1965; Hsu 
1970), ‘dynastic cycle’ and sinology’s broader engagement with the Modernization 
Theory (Cohen 1984: 58). Despite their subtle differences, these authors are sharing a 
common narrative that China’s traditional society founded upon Confucianism and 
Asiatic mode of production has been reproducing itself on a self-sustaining basis. 
Politically, this narrative calls for western intrusions that introduce to China impetus 
for change. John King Fairbank has further argued that the Chinese Revolution 
would irrevocably reconcile with the ‘core tenets’ of the traditional culture, despite 
how revolutionary it appeared at certain moments. The weakness of the peasant imply 
that a revolutionary movement could only sustain when it suited the ‘core tenets’ 
which are thought to favour dictatorial regimes. The communist dictatorship was an 
outgrowth of the traditional peasant communities, due to which peasants who evaded 
the domination of old elites were again ‘implicated in a revolutionary process, 
indebted to a revolutionary party, and subordinated to a new revolutionary regime’ 
(Wolf 1969; Esherick 1995: 50).  
The dictatorial dimension, or the so-called ‘dark side’ of the CCP regime has become 
a starting point for many historians and theorists to address not only the nature of the 
revolutionary state-formation but also the post-revolutionary development including 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Having recognized the 
progressive dimension of the pre-1949 CCP regime, Mark Selden has still highlighted 
the similarity between the CCP and the KMT which seems to be structurally 
determined; he argues that the Yenan government encapsulated ‘repressive and elitist 
tendency’ as much as the KMT regime did (Keating 1997: 9-12). The dark side of the 
CCP was more consolidated in the People’s Republic which predetermined the post-
1949 calamities (Shapiro 2001; Dikötter 2010 etc.). Mao’s base-area did the same 
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thing as the KMT and warlords such as opium growing (Chen Yung-fa 1995: 263-
298), and it is widely held that there is no major difference between the CCP, the 
KMT and the Soviet Union given that their respective histories were so 
interconnected and interdependent (Wittfogel 1957: 137-157; Balzacs 1962; Barnett 
1967). More importantly, authors on this line also imply that China’s internal 
tradition of totalitarianism, which is deeply rooted in the ‘elite and folk culture’, sat 
comfortably with the Stalinist state institutions (Keating 1997: 11; Kong 2010).  
Challenges to the above approaches are dramatic on the empirical level. By 
highlighting the structural constraints the traditional society imposed on the Chinese 
peasants, these authors have only identified the historical continuity between the 
communist government and the pre-existing traditional governments; they have never 
come to an explanation of the particular national crisis (Hobsbawm 1973: 8) in 
response to which the CCP’s revolution took place. As for the consequences of the 
revolution, these authors have all failed to distinguish between the CCP’s regime and 
traditional imperial regimes because the broad variety of Chinese states in history has 
been reduced to a singular concept of dictatorship. In this regard, ‘socialism’ has been 
marginalized in their conceptualizations of the Chinese Revolution, which is 
understood as of only nominal significance; and for those authors who have 
highlighted the similarities between the PRC and the USSR (Balzacs 1962; Barnett 
1967), socialism/communism is rendered a synonym of dictatorship being repeatedly 
produced by the Chinese peasants throughout history. 
On the theoretical level, however, it is obvious that this stream of historical-
sociological and sinological studies are not speaking directly to the very problematic of 
the nexus between peasants and socialism posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Though all these authors have not made any clear statement to deny the socialist 
dimension of the Chinese Revolution, they certainly do not regard socialism as a 
significant aspect of the revolution. No one could deny that Mao and his colleagues 
have altered the traditional social property regime by promoting the Land Reform 
and collectivization, but should Mao’s reconstruction of rural social property relations 
be understood as a continuation or negation of the traditional agrarian society? 
Robert Brenner and Christopher Isett (2002), though they have not openly addressed 
the subject of socialist revolution, have provided a pessimistic vision of the Chinese 
peasant by highlighting their role as ‘the epitome of backwardness’ (Duggett 1975). In 
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the traditional agrarian society, argues Brenner, ‘[d]emographic growth and the 
subdivision of holdings diminished the size of the peasant’s productive base’ (Brenner 
1985: 60). For Brenner and Isett, the weak peasant in China enabled the main 
economic agents ‘direct non-market access to the means of their reproduction’, which 
was grounded in the state-sponsored landed property relations (Brenner and Isett 
2002: 613). As they have documented, the state had fixed the rent for political reasons 
by the mid seventeenth century, which had in turn divorced the landlord from direct 
economic production. Because landlords could not modify rent-rate according to 
‘supply and demand of the market’, neither could they remove peasants from the 
politically fixed tenancy, they had no incentive to get involved directly in organising 
agricultural production. Thus agricultural surplus extracted by landlords via the state-
bureaucracy had been channelled towards non-economic activities rather than 
market-driven activities such as technological innovation. And for the peasants, 
because they had not been dispossessed, their landed property served as a shield to 
market competition, rendering their market-driven activities contingent rather than 
necessary. And because peasants were shielded from market competition, they chose 
to protect themselves against decline in productivity and natural disasters by using 
various non-market means, for example raising large number of children which had 
then led to rapid population growth and the condition of overpopulation (Brenner 
and Isett 2002: 615-616). Brenner and Isett views the backwardness of Chinese 
peasant not only as barriers to centralized capitalist production, but also the very 
origin of intensive struggles between landlords and peasants for surpluses which then 
led to the periodic breakdown of state-bureaucracy and imperial order (Brenner and 
Isett 2002: 639; see also Perry 1980). His depiction of the degenerative nature of the 
Chinese peasant has strengthened the vulgar Marxian notion that there would not be 
any progressive social transformation without removing the peasant from their lands.  
In sum, the underlying assumption of all the above theorizations is that the Chinese 
peasant was too backward to produce transcendental forces for modern social 
transformation. Those who argue that the communist revolution was only a 
continuation of the millennium-long tradition of dictatorship (Moore 1966; Barnett 
1967; Wolf 1969) are building their narrative of the entire Chinese history upon the 
vulnerability and passivity of the Chinese peasant which is regarded as ‘static, self-
constitutive, autonomous and reified entity’ (Hobson and Hobden 2002: 7). Indeed, 
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by eternalizing ‘passive character’ of the peasant, these accounts have all suggested 
that there would be no substantial social transformation in China unless the peasant 
could be removed from the traditional production and turned into the capitalist wage-
labour. By rendering the peasant’s incentive and agency as immutable, these accounts 
have all built their analyses on an anachronistic basis. However, I will introduce a 
series contrasting understanding of the pattern of China’s traditional society which 
have also committed the same mistake of anachronism despite their different views on 
the characteristics of the Chinese peasant and traditional cultural values.  
 
1.3.2 The Chinese peasant as a ‘productive legacy’ for ‘socialist market 
economy’ 
The above explanations of the Chinese peasant society denies the possibilities of both 
revolutionary change and socialist orientation based upon the peasant population. 
The political inactiveness and economic backwardness are considered the major 
historical baggage. However, this view has been challenged by some anti-Eurocentric 
interventions which understand the Chinese peasant as a ‘productive legacy’ (Li 2008: 
318). The Webberian myth that Confucianism lacks transcendental tensions is 
repudiated by Chinese scholars by reinterpreting the meaning of Confucian 
principles. It is argued that Confucianism has no less ‘in itself the springs of a new and 
enormous vitality’ (Trevor-Roper 1965: 21) than western Christendom does9. Based 
upon a comprehensive textual analysis, Liu Xiaofeng argues that the ‘life-orientation’ 
of Confucianism seeks self-perfection rather than ‘order and stability’ as fervently as 
Christianity does. Confucianism is not as simple as an ideological system that aspires 
to subordinate individuals to imperial order; instead, it is a spirit envisioning that 
‘everyone would become a saint’ (Liu 2007: 96). In order to become a ‘saint’, one has 
to pursue self-perfection and political perfection in tandem with each other. The 
endless self-perfection will inevitably lead to the questioning and breaking down of the 
boundaries of pre-existing political forms. Thus the desire for political perfection and 
the awareness of the actual imperfection justifies the ‘spirit of revolutionism’ as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 For further critique of the point that Christendom conceived pro-capitalist forces exclusively, 
see Jack Goody, Reinassance: The One or the Many? 2010, and Samir Amin, Eurocentrism 2009. !
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ethos of the Confucian thought as a revolutionary idea (ibid)10. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to argue that Confucianism lacks the puritan notion of progression and 
was itself the ideological barrier to capitalist development. For Liu Xiaofeng, if in any 
sense Maoism is consistent with the Confucian tradition, it must be because that they 
both have displayed the spirit of revolutionism which aspires to self-perfection through 
political reformation. Thus Liu Xiaofeng’s reinterpretation of Confucianism suggests 
that China’s traditional ideology is irrelevant to the underdeveloped capitalist social 
relations, neither has it presupposed a dictatorial regime11. 
Apart from viewing Confucianism as a progressive agency of modern revolution, 
other authors argue from the perspectives of economic history and world-system 
theory that the peasant economy was no less productive than the pre-capitalist society 
in the west. It is recorded in Kenneth Pomeranz’s comparative economic historical 
study that China's economy had no less 'efficient markets for goods and for factors of 
production' than that of Europe. Unlike the conventional impression that the Chinese 
government exercised intensive state intervention and arbitary taxation, Pomeranz 
argues that the freeflow of factors on the Chinese market was in no smaller scale than 
that in Europe. For example, the Chinese land market was thought to be in a good 
condition of lassiez faire. 'The overwhelming majority of land in all parts of China was 
more or less freely alienable...the government gave up and recognized all tax-paying 
land as otherwise unencumbered'. Even if the Ming Dynasty had confiscated a great 
amount of lands during wars, those lands had soon 'drifted back towards private 
status'. The process of privatisation had come to the point that only three percent of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Liu Xiaofeng's arguement was originally raised to challenge the German sinologist 
Wolfgang Goebin who argued that Marxist revolutionary idea was adopted in China because 
most of the revolutionaries had been penetrated by thoughts of Chrisitianity, which, 
according to Goebin, possessed the revolutionary spirit that was nonexistent in Confucianism, 
see Liu Xiaofeng, Rujiao yu Minzu Guojia (Confucianism and the Nation-state), 2007: 96. 
11 Apart from Liu Xiaofeng's exposition of Confucianism as a ideological system ingrained 
with spirit of revolutionism, there has been a prolific scholarship aiming to uncover the benign 
and progressive aspects of the Confucian ideology. Great effort of textual and discourse 
analysis has been made to show that Confucianism has many elements that could be 
mobilised to accelerate entrepeneurial activities and capitalist growth, see for example 
Reischauer 1974; Tu 2000. !
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lands was possessed by the crown in the Qing Dynasty (Pomeranz 2000: 70). So contra 
Wittfogel's point that China was in lack of private property, Pomeranz has pointed out 
that almost all lands in the country were private and available for free transaction. In 
terms of the production activity, it is also shown that the traditional customary law 
had little effect on the tenancy. Most tenants were secured by their contracts to 
cultivate at their will (Pomeranz 2000: 71). Pomeranz has also highlighted that 
competitive market activities prevailed in the Jiangnan area, which was not interfered, 
but protected by the Qing state. 'The Qing state was very concerned to make sure that 
local marketplaces had multiple, competing buyers and sellers from basic items-until 
the 1850s, this was in fact the main goal of their system of licensing merchants and 
brokers' (ibid: 86).  
Pomeranz has taken to task the conventional wisdom that capitalism is the most 
productive mode of production that human society has ever created. As Giovanni 
Arrighi further argues on the same basis, ‘the tendency of Smithian growth to get 
stuck in a high-level equilibrium trap does not rule out the existence of even higher 
equilibria, attainable through suitable changes in the geographical and institutional 
environment in which the economy is embedded’; and for both Arrighi and Pomeranz, 
China’s unique developmental path is viewed as ‘a shift of the economy from a high to 
an even higher equilibrium’. The consequence of this developmental path is that 
‘China moved in a different direction than in Europe, because it became less, rather 
than more, capitalist in orientation’ (Arrighi 2009: 331, my italics). The productivity 
of the Chinese peasants has predetermined a mode of ‘socialist market economy’ in 
China which is predicated upon ‘accumulation without dispossession’ (Arrighi 2009: 
331; see also Cui 2012; Huang 2012).  
The present chapter have no intention to delve into the lengthy debate about whether 
the peasant economy in China is productive or not which could be driven both ways 
by selective utilization of data (e.g. Duchesne 2001, 2004). What remains problematic 
with the anti-Eurocentric approach is that it has produced no explanation to the very 
question posed at the beginning of the chapter: why and how could the peasant be 
mobilized to undertake a socialist revolution? A basic historical intuition indicates that 
the so-called ‘socialist market economy’ is not predetermined by the peasant economy 
no matter how productive it is. Notably, Arrighi and Sugihara have both touched 
upon a form of ‘short-range temporality’ through which the legacy of peasant-based 
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economy has become active again, though it is obvious that such recapitulation is 
subject to their understanding of the resurgence of Asia as a world-historical necessity 
based upon the industrious longue durèe (Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden 2005: 2-4). It is 
noted by the American sinologist, Maurice Meisner that only through Mao’s 
revolution and the Land Reform has China’s labour-intensive legacy been reasserted 
to ‘shape interactions within the region and with the world’ (Arrighi, Hamashita and 
Selden 2005: 3; Meisner 1989, 1999). Therefore, for all the above authors, their 
understanding of China’s past could not be easily translated to explanations of the 
emergence of socialist revolution in China’s peasant society. Using China’s past 
experiences to address its contemporary transformation is another anachronistic 
explanation that rules out broader conjunctural factors that co-determined the 
revolutionary development.  
 
1.3.3 Historicizing the peasant revolution: ‘peasant nationalism’ and the 
centrality of anti-Japanese struggle  
So far it remains questionable for both historical-sociology and sinology how a 
socialist revolution could arise from the peasant population, and what the nature of 
the particular socialism is. To transcend the problem of anachronism in the above 
analyses, the level of agency need to be highlighted with much greater historical 
details. Chalmers Johnson’s idea of ‘peasant nationalism’ is an important effort made 
to specify the particular conjuncture of the peasant revolution (Johnson 1962).  
The central argument of Johnson’s thesis is that the Sino-Japanese War played the 
most significant role in the rise of the Communist Party as a result of successful, 
nationwide peasant mobilization. The key strategy the CCP deployed to mobilize the 
peasants was constructing the discourse of nationalism or ‘national salvation’ (jiuguo). 
‘The Communists had…used patriotic and anti-Japanese appeals in their propaganda 
since the Manchurian Incident (1931)’ (Johnson 1962: 4). The promotion of 
nationalism was accompanied by other forms of military struggles in the power 
vacuum of the Nationalist government. After the Japanese armies began to ‘mop up’ 
(saodang) the northern villages, the discourse of national salvation was further 
strengthened as the hatred of Japanese invaders and their puppet governments grew. 
These forces have altogether ‘broken the hold of parochialism on the Chinese peasant’ 
(ibid: 5). Johnson has highlighted the Japanese factor as the most significant 
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conjunctural force that ‘forged a new link between the village and the national 
government’ (Moore 1966), before which the Chinese peasant was ‘indifferent to 
‘Chinese’ politics, being wholly absorbed in local affairs’ (Johnson 1962: 5). On this 
basis, Johnson has specified a variety of methods deployed for peasant mobilization 
which Barrington Moore has failed to capture without noting the Japanese factor 
(ibid: 31). To Johnson, the CCP’s nationwide success is attributed to its effective 
insertion of the nationalist discourse to mass peasant movements in the conjuncture of 
the War of Resistance. Like all the aforementioned authors, Johnson seems to have 
denied the ‘communist quality’ of the CCP’s propaganda (ibid: 4); he suggests that the 
CCP’s peasant revolution was in a large sense a continuation of the prolonged history 
of peasant rebellions comparable to the Taiping Rebellion (ibid: 14-19), but the anti-
Japanese war has enabled the CCP to act for more ambitious goals than the narrow 
economic interests of the peasant (ibid). Such nationalist propaganda based upon 
mass-mobilization against a common enemy has infiltrated the Chinese peasants with 
‘‘a state of mind’ with few tangible roots’ (ibid: 21). The specific fusion of communism 
and nationalism in China has created a ‘communist nation-state that was not 
subordinate to the Soviet Union’ (ibid: 8); thus accordingly, the nationalist 
conjuncture has set China, as well as Yugoslavia apart from the Russian communism 
(ibid: 156; see also Agursky 1987).   
Chalmers Johnson’s contribution is significant in the sense that he has highlighted the 
conjunctural factor of the anti-Japanese war. Indeed there is no denial that the power 
of the Communist Party grew dramatically through the wartime mobilization (see also 
Belden 1970; Selden 1971, 1989, 1995; Hinton 1972; Myers 1986). However, there is 
a major conceptual problem in Johnson’s account that he has reduced the conception 
of ‘communism’ to ‘nationalism’. Throughout his book, he has given no 
comprehensive analysis of the meaning of communism beyond its nationalist element; 
and he has completely ignored the tensions between the non-territorial, universalist 
appeal of communism and its nationalist political practices. Even in the section that 
deals with the meaning of the international communist movement, Johnson still 
asserts that the Communist ideology ‘had been subordinated to Russian nationalism’ 
that was ‘effectively camouflaged’ by the Soviet propaganda (Johnson 1962: 176-181). 
Thus in general, Johnson’s point is very straightforward that the Communist 
revolution in China was the old wine of peasant rebellions carried in the new bottle of 
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nationalism, which has in turn broadened the scope of the mass movement from 
defending economic interests to ‘national salvation’. Maurice Meisner is correct to 
contend that ‘neither the nationalistic appeals of the Communist Party nor the 
emergence of a mass nationalist movement made the social-economic grievances of 
the peasantry any less pressing or Communist promises of agrarian reform any less 
appealing’ (Meisner 1999: 39). It is certainly partial to argue that communism in 
China means nothing more than nationalism. The socialist collective property 
relations was instituted and enforced in both villages and cities after the anti-Japanese 
war when the nationalist element was much weaker; and it is also unfair to argue that 
because Mao cooperated with the landlords during the war for very practical 
concerns, his entire communist revolution was all about nationalism. Furthermore, 
China’s confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 1960s is not only because the 
Chinese communism was a nationalist project, but more importantly that there were 
substantial disagreements in the developmental paths of different versions of socialism.  
Even in terms of the concept of ‘nationalism’ itself, Johnson’s definition and utilization 
of it are of methodological problems. The major issue here is that ‘nationalism’ itself 
does not constitute a substantial mode of explanation, for it is a consequence rather 
than the cause of the revolution. Johnson has documented various military actions 
and political propaganda taken by the communists to mobilize the peasants, whereas 
he has never revealed the deeper reason why the communists were able to do that. 
Also, foreign invasions were countless in China’s history, why only has the Japanese 
one led to the ‘peasant nationalism’? As Jack Belden has correctly pointed out, the 
success of the CCP lies in the effective utilization of all external and internal 
contradictions of the Chinese society by a new group of leadership to ‘gain control 
over society and put into practice its own programme for saving that society’ (Belden 
1970: 3). The so-called ‘external and internal contradictions’ involved not only the 
national crisis inflicted by the Japanese invaders, but also some deep-seated structural 
problems that have been haunting the Chinese society long before the Japanese 
invasion. It was through evolving against the backdrop of those contradictions the 
CCP was able to have some organizational and ideological capacity at its disposal 
when the ant-Japanese war induced the anarchical space for ‘nationalist’ mobilization 
(ibid: 23); however, this cumulative development  was ignored in Johnson’s account. 
He argues that the communists were like ‘viruses growing on the surface’ before the 
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Japanese invasion, whereas it seems like that they suddenly became very skilful and 
smart in political manoeuvrings during the war.  
To sum up, Johnson’s emphasis of the anti-Japanese conjuncture has left two 
questions unanswered. First, what is the sociological meaning of communism in China 
apart from the nationalist aspect? And second, what is the broad world-historical 
context that enabled the CCP to successfully organize and mobilize the peasants in a 
nationalist fashion? Why are the two questions unanswerable by Johnson’s idea of 
peasant nationalism? The problem still lies in his understanding of the general pattern 
of social development in China. Johnson, like Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf, also 
holds the idea that the Chinese peasants were short of progressive energy that leads to 
substantial socialist transformation-what they did throughout history is endless peasant 
rebellions seeking narrow economic interests (Johnson 1962: 14-19). The Japanese 
invasion acted as an external factor that inserted nationalism as the only modern 
element to the premodern pattern of peasant rebellions without substantially altering 
the course of Chinese history. In this sense, Johnson’s anachronism makes little 
difference from those of Moore and Wolf. Though he has emphasized a certain short-
range temporality, he has nevertheless reduced all the rest of the revolutionary 
development to the formula of the past.  
1.3.4 Geopolitics and world time: introducing ‘the international’ without 
overcoming anachronism 
So far it has been shown that the common problem for the existing literature of the 
Chinese Revolution is the problem of anachronism caused by their over-emphasis of 
the causal pertinence of the backwardness of Chinese peasants. Because the so-called 
peasant backwardness is not properly situated in any world-historical context, it is 
treated as a transhistorical structure that underlay the recurrence of dictatorial 
regimes throughout history in which no socialist development could be envisaged. It is 
worth recalling the tensions in Marx’s original texts which recognize the anti-capitalist 
potentials in the peasant communities and the possibilities of bypassing the capitalist 
stage in Russia’s case (Marx 1953, 2000). These scenarios seem difficult for the 
aforementioned authors of the Chinese Revolution to understand because they have 
all failed to capture the wider ‘national crisis’ in which peasants were organized in 
conjunction with other social movements (Hobsbawm 1973; Skocpol 1982); and they 
have also failed to capture the inputs from other societies, such as the ‘transplantation 
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of machinery’ that could tilt the Chinese peasant movements towards socialism (Marx 
1953; Duggett 1975). The microcosm of peasant revolution needs to be considered in 
relation to the macrocosm of various forms of social development in a broader world-
historical context.  
Since the world-historical ‘macrocosm’ logically entails a dimension of spatial 
multiplicity, the discipline of International Relations, which takes political plurality as 
both its subject matter and explanatory device is supposed to shed lights on the issue 
of China’s peasant socialism which is posited as an issue of the co-constitution 
between the peasant society and other social forms. The logic of social revolution as 
an inter-societal formation is articulated by Theda Skocpol via her detailed critique of 
her teacher Barrington Moore’s intra-societal account (Skocpol 1973). Skocpol argues 
that ‘no society is free from foreign influences’, and ‘[t]he Chinese communists 
depended for the success of their revolution on ‘certain fortuitous 
circumstances…fortuitous in the sense that they did not derive from anything taking 
place in China itself’ (Skocpol 1973: 29). ‘International Relations’ is introduced by 
Skocpol as a theoretical perspective that ‘recognizes that large-scale social change 
within societies is always in large part caused by forces operating among them’ (ibid: 
29-30).  
In this sense, Theda Skocpol has moved one step forward from Moore by specifying 
the causal mechanisms of world history; ‘All modern social revolutions, in fact, must 
be seen as closely related in their causes and accomplishments to the internationally 
uneven spread of capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a 
world scale’ (Skocpol 1979: 19). Thus the issue of why the Chinese peasants have 
become revolutionary and socialist is converted into a question about the particular 
world-historical context in which the peasants became ‘autonomous’ to organize 
themselves. In Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China, the ‘world-historical context’ is conceptualized as the generator of 
interstate competitions and wars, which is similar to realist IR theory’s definition of 
international system (Skocpol 1979: 31). For Skocpol, the world-historical context or 
‘modernity’ consists of three ‘transnational networks’ which wields power on the 
global scale. These networks are ‘global spread of capitalism’, ‘interstate competition’ 
and ‘world time’. In order to reject the ‘purposive general theories of revolution’ 
which includes Marxism in her terms (Skocpol 1973: 16; 1979: 3-13), Skocpol argues 
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that the world-historical explanation of social revolution lies in the structural 
determinism of the above ‘transnational networks’. For her, social revolutions would 
only succeed in societies where pre-existing state-apparatuses were shattered by socio-
political forces generated by structural dynamics of the interstate system. The modern 
world-historical context is posited to have three structural effects. Global capitalism 
would frustrate ‘mass expectations’ and ‘give rise to widespread discontent and 
political violence that destroys the existing government’. Interstate competition would 
generate wars that exhausted the resources of a government and set it in rivalry with 
the dominant domestic class. 'World time' would produce possible ideological and 
organizational models for late-developing revolutionary forces to construct their 
leadership (ibid: 29). Thus for Skocpol, revolution would only ‘happen’ rather than be 
‘made’ in the sense that it only happened 'in countries situated in disadvantaged 
positions within international arenas' (ibid: 23). So to speak, the success of a social 
revolution rested upon two conditions: the 'administrative-military breakdown of 
preexisting states' and the occurance of peasant revolts under organized 'revolutionary 
leadership' (ibid: 287).   
For Skocpol, the backwardness of peasants was not hurdles but catalysts to the 
outbreak of revolution. This is argued on the basis of her comparative case-study 
involving both ‘method of sameness’ and ‘method of difference’. Though Skocpol has 
made the caveat that her study is supposed to be historically inductive, she has 
nevertheless presumed that the cases of France, Russia and China are those which 
belong to the category of ‘successful social revolution’ due to the involvement of 
peasants (Burawoy 1989). Skocpol has first deployed the method of sameness to argue 
that France, Russia and China were all backward agrarian societies where the state-
power was largely constrained by the dominant landed class. In Russia, despite the 
state-led industrialization, the Tsarist power could never manage to ‘override 
dominant class interests and enforce modernizing reform’. In both France and China, 
‘a politically organized and administratively entrenched landed class were present’. 
Because in these two regimes the dominant landed upper class was able to penetrate 
the central government with its ‘institutionalized political leverage at extralocal level’, 
reforming process enforced by the state would induce rivalry between the state and 
the landed aristocrats, which then set the Old Regimes in political crisis (Skocpol 1979: 
110). On this basis, Skocpol then deploys the ‘method of difference’ to compare the 
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three cases with the aborted revolutions in England, Germany and Japan to draw out 
the key pattern of successful social revolutions. She argues that whereas external 
geopolitical pressures were both present in the cases of Germany and Japan, they were 
both lacking the landed class with political leverage in the state to challenge the top-
down reforms, and the peasant communities with size and autonomy equivalent to 
those of France, Russia and China to energize a bottom-up revolution.  
When the peasant population was viewed as the reservoir of lower-class support for 
mass mobilization, social reorientations could only happen when the state-machinery 
of a traditional regime broke down under pressures from global capitalism and 
geopolitics and the peasant communities obtained sufficient autonomy for collective 
actions (Skocpol 1979: 14). Using this logics, Skocpol interprets the Chinese 
Revolution as a two-staged process. On the first stage, when China went under 
severely geopolitical exigencies in the 1890s, especially after her defeat to the Japanese 
navy in 1895, the Manchu elites in the central government began to introduce 
reforming projects in order to strengthen the state’s military capabilities. This reform 
had put an end to the reformer because many of the projects, inter alia the 
‘nationalization of railway’, were contradictory to the existing interests of landed 
aristocrats who were also deeply involved in the state-apparatus. Because the landed 
upper class possessed ‘political leverage’ in the imperial government, its resentment 
resulted in the breakdown of the Old Regime as a result of the 1911 Revolution 
(Skocpol 1979: 78-80).  
The second stage, according to Skocpol, is the process through which the Chinese 
peasants were liberated from the repression of state-administration, obtaining a degree 
of autonomy to develop its particular form of ‘mass-mobilizing state’. This is a result 
of both the Nationalist government as a weak state which had no substantial control 
over the whole territory, but also that the Japanese invasion that unsettled the existing 
state-structure (Skocpol 1979: 236-237). Skocpol has pointed out that the Long March 
of the Red Army, as well as the Rectification Movement were all significant formative 
moments in the making of the CCP’s mass-mobilizing strategy; and for her, those 
moments are significant in the sense that they created anarchical space for 
revolutionary social formation, whereas how and why the formation was possible in 
the newly opened space is described in detail without being directly addressed by her 
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theory. Now, it needs to be reviewed how Skocpol understands the socialist aspect of 
the Chinese Revolution. 
Whereas geopolitics is deployed as the central concept to explain revolutionism of the 
peasants, the aspect of ‘socialism’ is addressed by the concept of ‘world time’. For 
Skocpol, meanings of socialism or communism in the Chinese case are twofold. Firstly, 
she implies that the Marxist-Leninist ideology in Russia and China differed very little 
from Jacobinism in France which both served a functional role for ‘enjoining the 
revolutionary elites to proselytize and mobilize the masses for political struggles and 
activities’ (Skocpol 1979: 169-172). As for this function, Skocpol has echoed Chalmers 
Johnson that communism was only a discourse for mass mobilization that 
camouflaged the nationalist appeal. However, like Johnson, Skocpol has also not 
explained why ‘communism’ rather than anything else could serve the function of 
mass mobilization. She deployed the case of the Meiji Japan as a counterexample in 
which no equivalent ideologies were needed for the top-down restoration (ibid: 170); 
however this comparison is still far from clarifying what particular social aspect of 
‘communism’ was conducive to mobilizing the peasants, apart from emphasizing the 
consequence that it actually was.  
Skocpol has gone one step forward than Johnson to have illustrated part of the social 
meaning of socialism/communism in China’s case. For her, there is no much 
difference between the Chinese socialism and the Soviet model due to the structural 
factor of ‘world time’. In the 1950s China was eagerly transplanted the Soviet-styled 
‘rationalized state-administration’ because of two ‘international contextual factors’: 
the ‘political influence from the previously revolutionized Russia’ and the ‘enhanced 
possibilities in the twentieth century for the state-propelled national industrialization’ 
(Skocpol 1979: 266). In this sense, socialism in the Chinese case largely resembles that 
in Russia, which refers to large-scale centrally-planned industries. However, how did 
China and Russia differ from each other? Skocpol then deploys the concept of 
‘interstate competition’/geopolitics to explain the Sino-Soviet split. ‘The decisive 
break between the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union came as a result of China’s 
determination to develop her own nuclear capacity-the ultimate symbol and basis of 
independent, national strategic and military power in the postwar era’ (Skocpol 1979: 
276). So it was the changing balance of power that had freed China from the Russian 
tutelage in the 1960s so that China was able to pursue a more ‘balanced’ national 
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development (ibid: 269). Where did the balanced strategy originate? Skocpol returns 
again to the very internal structure of the pre-revolutionary agrarian society; ‘the rural 
economy of China had characteristics very different from those of Russian agriculture’ 
(ibid: 275) which was more compatible with a ‘mass-mobilizing state’ built upon a 
highly ‘politicized bureaucracy’ than the Soviet rationalist bureaucracy (Skocpol 1979: 
265). By this point, Skocpol has reconciled with her teacher Barrington Moore to re-
adopt an ‘intra-societal’ analysis by suggesting that ‘the economic legacies of pre-1949 
China help explain why the Chinese Communists abandoned Stalinist-style 
development plans’ (ibid: 275-280).   
Based upon this explanation, Skocpol’s understanding of the nature of ‘peasant 
socialism’ in China’s case could be summed up as a simple causation. Geopolitics 
rendered the peasant class autonomous in China by uprooting the pre-existing state-
administration, and from the autonomous peasant society arose the mass-mobilizing 
state, which, under ‘world time’, copied the Soviet model of industrialization; whereas 
the deep-seated structure of the peasant economy has eventually subsumed the Soviet 
model. To avoid anachronism, Skocpol has incorporated the dimension of multiple 
temporalities to produce more conjunctural explanations. However, the several 
temporalities she has been switching between are not really integrated in one coherent 
theoretical framework; instead they are in competition with and struggling to 
outweigh each other. Whereas geopolitics and world time are both significant 
temporalities of the twentieth century, how could geopolitical transformation, for 
example the possession of nuclear power redirect a developmental path which was 
previously set by the world time of ‘state-propelled national industrialization’? By 
allowing this outweighing, Skocpol is also to imply that the pre-1949 ‘longue agrarian 
dureé’ is of ultimate determinacy. In this sense, ‘the international’, namely geopolitics 
and world time is only treated as a field of externalities of the Chinese development. 
However, it is problematic to argue that the period of Soviet-informed 
industrialization was external to the course of the Chinese Revolution because 1) the 
Soviet penetration existed long before 1949 which has played a significant part in the 
making of the revolutionary state (Isaacs 1938; Godley 1987; Kirby 1991; van der 
Ven 1991; Chen 1990, 1993; Esherick 1995: 50), and 2) transplantating advanced 
industries to the revolutionized peasant communities was, in Marx’s original sense, an 
integral step taken to undermine the irrational small-holding elements in a peasant-
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based socialist revolution (Duggett 1975: 176). The short-range temporality of 
Sovietization was part of the internal character of the Chinese Revolution per se, rather 
than an external interference that temporarily confused the way.  
Even if Skocpol wanted to adopt the implicit internalist/intra-societal explanation, her 
analysis is still incomplete. Compared to Barrington Moore’s concept of ‘communist 
dictatorship’, her conceptualization of the Communist state as a ‘mass-mobilizing 
state’ is much more nuanced. There is simply no logical and historical necessity that a 
mass-mobilizing state has to emerge in an agrarian economy like China. To complete 
this causation, Skocpol has fallen into a sophistry that uses the consequence to explain 
the cause. ‘The revolution was successful when the massive peasants were mobilized’, 
whereas it cannot be argued that ‘the revolution was successful because the peasants 
were mobilized’. Instead of tracing the mass mobilization to deeper historical reasons, 
Skocpol has introduced an independent, weberian concept of mass mobilization, 
which defines it as the solidarity between the revolutionary leaderships and the 
rebellious masses formed in a specific revolutionary situation (Skocpol 1979: 17-18; 
see also Dittmer 1989: 141-142). As another weberian Lowell Dittmer has argued, 
‘mass mobilization was motivated partly by skillful organizational techniques, partly 
by the redistribution of expropriated landlord or rich peasant property’, it is crucial to 
know how the relevant ‘organizational techniques’ and ‘redistribution of property’, 
which many historians have depicted without explaining (cf. Schurmann 1968: 220-
297; Belden 1970; Selden 1971, 1989, 1995; Hinton 1972; Dittmer 1989), were 
historically developed.  
To sum up, a very significant theoretical question has to be raised. Why does Skocpol 
fail to explain the contradictory nature of the Chinese Revolution? Somewhat 
paradoxically, given Skocpol’s conscious application of the key concepts of 
International Relations to her case, she ultimately resorts to an interpretation of the 
1949 state as a linear outgrowth of the traditional agrarian society. When she has 
utilized a variety of conceptual devices, such as interstate competition and global 
capitalism to capture the ‘world-historical context’, she has by the end reconciled 
ineluctably with Barrington Moore to let the internal structure of a society over-
determine its state-formation. The explanatory role of ‘world history’ is thus 
tremendously marginalized in her account, remaining only as a pointer of ‘triggers’ of 
revolutions with no theoretical footing in the sociological explanation of the political 
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end-product. As a result, Skocpol’s analysis is equally guilty of ‘anachronism’ in the 
sense that her whole analysis of the revolutionary development is ultimately reliant on 
an abstract formula of the ‘pre-1949 Chinese economy’ which will still lead to a uni-
linear conception of social development. We still need to ask: why her application of 
International Relations (IR) is not able to rescue her from the same problem of 
‘anachronism’? What is wrong with the very IR she deploys? Why her synthesis of IR 
and historical sociology could not generate any difference? I will show in the next 
section that Skocpol’s use of IR is problematic because it has not challenged the 
‘ontological singularity’ in the notion of social development.  
 
1.4 Uni-linear history, ontological singularity and ‘anachronism’ in 
International Relations and historical sociology 
In all the above accounts, the problem of ‘anachronism’ is caused by relying too muc 
on a certain abstraction of structural properties of the peasant society to understand 
the cause and form of the Chinese Revolution, which contradicts fundamentally with 
Marx’s original view that the peasant could only be revolutionized by other classes in 
conjunction with historical crisis beyond the peasant communities. The wider 
‘national movement’ in which a peasant revolution could be activated, and the 
transplantation of large-scale production to the revolutionized peasantry to overcome 
the ‘irrational small-holding’ were both more historically specific conjunctures which 
are not predetermined by the internal structure of agrarian economy (Hobsbawm 
1973; Duggett 1975). In a word, peasants could become revolutionary to even 
transcend the capitalist stage before socialism only when the peasant rebellions were 
internalized to other social-developmental processes to obtain greater revolutionary 
energy and progressive impetus. Viewing the static and self-constitutive properties of 
the peasantry will inevitably lead to a unilinear notion of social development treating 
the present as a replication and reproduction of the past. 
To overcome the problem of anachronism parasitic on the uni-linear notion of social 
development, it is worth introducing the concept of ‘conjuncture’ as a category of 
‘multiple temporalities’ to understanding both the long-term stability and short-term 
fluctuation of social development (more on this in chapter 2).  John Ruggie has 
highlighted that the conjunctural timeframe, which entails ‘cycles of events’, underlies 
‘the processes that underlie actors, properties, and events’ (Ruggie 1998: 158). The 
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conjuncture made of historically contingent events and actors with shifting identities, 
would always lead to alterations of developments in the structure/epoch, which 
cannot be derived from the incremental growth of one single unit of actor inhibiting 
one social space from the very beginning. Thus only on the conjunctural level can we 
understand the cause of successful mass-mobilization, which, according to Skocpol, 
refers to the unification of revolutionary leaderships and the unconscious peasant 
rebellions. Without giving the conjunctural level a proper theoretical status, 
traditional social theories have treated the peasant’s political agency as changeless 
throughout history, which will necessarily give rise to a uni-linear conception of social 
development.  
Paradoxically, Barrington Moore has noted the interdependence between the 
contingent conjunctural events and the more stable temporality of longue dureé; he 
argues that ‘from the standpoint of Chinese society and politics, the (Japanese) war 
was an accident. From the standpoint of the interplay between political and economic 
forces in the world as a whole, it was scarcely an accident’ (Moore 1966: 224; Nisbet 
1969; Skocpol 1973: 29). Drawing upon this dialectic, Skocpol has further argued:  
[W]hat is required to release forces operating in the international field from 
the limbo of ‘fortuity’, is a gestalt switch, away from theories which treat 
social change (here, specifically, modernization) as a process ‘natural’, 
‘directional’, ‘continuous’, ‘necessary’, and ‘immanent’; to each and every 
society (here agrarian bureaucracy) considered, and toward a theory which 
recognizes that large-scale social change within societies is always in large 
part caused by forces operating among them, through their economic and 
political interaction (Skocpol 1973: 29-30). 
Ironically, the tension between ‘fortuity’ and ‘immanence’ has not been relieved by 
Moore and Skocpol for the problem of anachronism shown in the previous pages 
which has strengthened the notion that modernity and social change was a uni-
directional and continuous process constituted internally within a single social space. 
The immediate reason for this mistake is that the concept of ‘the international’ has 
been simplified as a timeless generator of geopolitical crisis that can only delay or 
accelerate the directional course of social change which is predetermined by the 
internal structure of a society. So based upon this internal-external division, 
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historically specific conjunctures emerging from ‘the international’ are regarded 
‘fortuitous’ and ‘contingent’, whereas Skocpol herself has recognized that 
‘contingency’ itself could not constitute a formal mode of social-scientific explanation 
if the ‘interplay between political and economic forces’ behind it are not understood. 
Skocpol’s consciousness about this notwithstanding, conjunctural factors generated by 
‘the international’ such as the Soviet influences on China are still viewed as 
‘contingent’ in relation to the more determinate pre-revolutionary ‘socio-economic 
legacies’. This is obvious in Skocpol’s comparison between China and Russia. The 
difference between the Chinese ‘mass-mobilizing state’ and the Russian ‘rational 
bureaucracy’ comes from the difference between the two economic systems, which, to 
Skocpol, are referring to structures crystallized at two isolated points of history12.   
Why is the realism-informed analysis of revolution unable to accommodate Skocpol’s 
own suggestion that internationally generated contingencies are the integral 
components of social revolution as a process of ‘economic and political interaction’ 
among societies? In the first instance, the problem needs to be examined in relation to 
the ontological premise of the entire discipline of International Relations 
overshadowed by realism. The subject matter of IR has been regarded by founders of 
the discipline as an category of non-progressive phenomena, which can never be 
penetrated by the progressive logic of domestic political life (Wight 1960). The 
conception of IR as a regressive field of endless power struggles is implanted in 
historical sociology’s analyses of domestic development (Gourevitch 1989; Jarvis 1989), 
leaving no room for theorizing the dimension of ‘social combination’ as an emergent 
property from international conjunctures. However, not only the theoretical premise 
of IR is guilty of having no ‘social combination’, classic sociology’s theoretical lacuna is 
also conniving in treating IR as a non-progressive realm of external pressures. Classic 
historical sociology, which is trapped by the problem of ‘methodological 
nationalism/internalism’, has no alternative theoretical devices at its disposal to 
challenge the non-developmental logic of the IR theories inserted to it. ‘In the classical 
sociological tradition we find dynamic theorizations of internal change over historical 
time; and we find comparative theorizations of external difference across cultural 
space…What we do not find, however, is a drawing together of these dynamic and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Michael Burawoy identifies this problem as 'frozen history', see Burawoy, M 1989, 'Two 
Methods: Skocpol versus Trotsky', pp. 769-770. 
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comparative moments of analysis in order to theorize a specifically inter-societal 
dimension of social change’ (Rosenberg 2006: 310-312, my italics). The theorization 
of ‘internal change over historical time’ presupposes a stagist and linear notion of 
development because every end-product at any moment of development is to be 
traced to another single point of origin on the same chronological axis. For this reason, 
‘comparative theorizations of external difference across cultural space’ is ultimately a 
comparison between systems crystallized at different single moments which are not 
historically connected (McMichael 1990: 389-391).   
Therefore, the absence of developmental logic in the realism-informed International 
Relations is the consequence of the absence of ‘social combination’ in the notion of 
social development of classic social theories, which conceive of societies as ‘being able 
to, if not having to, set in motion long-term developments from within themselves 
without being dependent upon inter-societal conditions’. Such ontological singularity 
of social development in these sociological approaches has made ‘the international’ 
representing ‘only facilitating or inhibiting modifications and complications of their 
own internal dynamics’ (Tenbruck 1994: 75-76). As a result the concept of ‘the 
international’ has been reduced to a set of a-social factors un-penetrated by the social 
logic of development and progression. This is why Chalmers Johnson’s intervening 
concept of ‘nationalism’ as well as Theda Skocpol’s concepts of geopolitics and world 
time have all failed to reclaim ‘social combination’ in the Chinese Revolution that 
accommodates the contradictory nature of the creation of ‘peasant socialism’ which 
cannot be addressed by those explanations relying narrowly upon the internal 
economic structure of the Chinese peasant communities.  
 
1.5. Conclusion: Towards an international theory of social 
development 
The peasant, which was originally an traditional class as both the owner of means of 
production and his own wage labour (Marx 1973: 408), has been conventionally 
regarded as a social force that plays negative part in the process of capitalist 
development with ‘non-economic access’ to surplus at his disposal (Brenner 1977, 
1985; Brenner and Isett 2002). The experience of England seems to imply that the 
removal of peasants is a significant step towards progressive large-scale production 
without which no further forms of social progression, inter alia socialism, could 
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subsequently take place. However, Marxism as a ultimate historical method believes 
in no generalization of stagist model of development which uses capitalist categories to 
understand non-capitalist societies; the way that socialist property relations were 
inaugurated in China’s peasant society is posing a historical and theoretical corrective 
to the dogmatic Marxist notion that socialism could only emerge from the basis of 
large-scale production of capitalism (Mitrany 1951).   
Paradoxically, extant theorizations of the Chinese Revolution are reinforcing the 
orthodoxy that the backward peasant could not generate progressive social 
transformation in China rather than providing any corrective to it. Those authors 
have done little to theorize the conjunctures of national crisis in which the peasant 
were driven to be revolutionary in broader world-historical formation (Hobsbawm 
1973); and their conception of ‘communist dictatorship’ demonstrates very little social 
characteristics of the revolutionary Chinese state apart from its undemocratic aspects. 
The sociological poverty of these accounts is due to the understanding of Chinese 
state-formation as a linear outgrowth of the ‘non-capitalist’ nature of the Chinese 
agrarian society. In reducing the contemporary state-form to the past, these accounts 
have committed the error of ‘anachronism’. It is also found that the same error has 
also occurred to the analyses mustered to challenge the Eurocentric understanding of 
China’s absence of capitalism, which has highlighted the ‘advanced’ aspect of China’s 
traditional economy, but is still reducing the present development directly to the 
preexisting structures. These approaches, though they are producing contrasting 
positions, have both been viewing China’s contemporary development as of historical 
necessity predetermined by the past experiences within China’s own socio-productive 
system. Though they have from time to time resorted to the interstate competitions 
and wars in ‘the international field’ as a ‘short-range temporality’ (Johnson 1962; 
Skocpol 1979; Sugihara 2005; Hamashita, Selden and Arrighi 2005), those 
conjunctural incidents were treated as external forces that facilitates or inhibits the 
regressive logic of peasant rebellions with no role in constituting the social whole of 
the revolution (Tenbruck 1994). As a result, their explanations to the Chinese 
Revolution lie ultimately in generalizations of the past of Chinese peasants, which 
makes them all fall into the problem of anachronism as a result of the common 
unilinear notion of historical development.  
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Therefore, an alternative theoretical framework needs to be introduced to account for 
the particular process of the Chinese Revolution which has internalized the 
mobilization of peasants in wider social formations that created revolutionary 
leaderships to not only represent the peasants, but more importantly utilize the anti-
capitalist elements of the peasant communities to transcend the stage of capitalism. 
This transcendence, as a consequence of the convergence of multiple social 
developments arising from particular intersocietal interactions, has resulted in a more 
complex version of ‘socialism’ that was tension-prone and contradictory from the 
outset. To achieve this theorization is, in the first instance, to refute the anachronistic 
mode of explanation that the backwardness of peasants or capitalism over-determines 
everything.  A conjunctural analysis that interrogates the concrete process in which 
peasant mobilization developed in tandem with other social formations is needed to 
shed lights on the end-product of China’s peasant socialism as a contradictory ‘social 
combination’. I will argue in the next chapter that Leon Trotsky’s theory of Uneven 
and Combined Development is an alternative theory of this kind which provides a 
socio-theoretical account of ‘multiple temporalities’ based upon a reconstructed multi-
linear, accumulative conception (spiral ascendance) of social development.  
 
1.6. Structure of argument and arrangement of chapters 
The remainder of this thesis will be divided in five chapters. Chapter 2 follows the 
discussion of the problem of ‘anachronism’ in International Relations to point out that 
the problem is caused not only by the lack of historical analysis, but also by the lack of 
a proper theory of social time with which the structuralist understanding of a society 
will not neglect the dimension of ‘social combination’ in theorizing social 
development. In the case of the Chinese Revolution, the backwardness of the 
peasantry and the mobilization of them represent two forms of temporalities that both 
need to be incorporated in theorizing the cause and nature of the revolution. The 
Braudelian school of historiography has noted the significance of ‘multiple 
temporalities’ in theorizing social development, whereas it lacks the dialectics of 
different temporal forms especially the relationship between epoch (longue dureé) and 
conjuncture. Thus its awareness of temporal multiplicity cannot provide theoretical 
grounds to the dimension of ‘social combination’ in understanding of social 
transformation.  
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Drawing upon the basic method and the ‘theory of history’ of historical materialism,  I 
will argue that a theory of social time should incorporate conjunctural analysis not 
only as a analytical procedure for historicizing particular concepts, but also as a device 
for capturing the spiral ascending character of human social development. On this 
basis, Leon Trotsky’s theoretical framework of Uneven and Combined Development 
(U&CD) is thought to have provided a conjunctural analysis which perceives spiral 
ascending development as an emergent property of ‘the international’. In this regard, 
I apply the generic concept of ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ to define the Chinese 
Revolution as a protracted process by which the leading elites of the Chinese society 
strove to transcend the concrete geopolitical and social crises generated by the 
condition of backwardness. With this idea, I will re-examine a number of auxiliary 
concepts that have contributed to the totality of ‘communist dictatorship’ in the 
following chapters.  
Chapter 3 examines the premodern origins of China’s historical condition of 
backwardness by illustrating the pattern of China’s long-term development formed 
before China’s encounter with the West. Contra the conventional notions upholding 
that the peasant society was inherently backward, I will show that the backwardness of 
premodern China has less to do with the internal property of the peasantry itself; 
instead, the backward condition was an evolving property arising from the interaction 
between nomadic and sedentary societies which gave rise to the specific political 
agency of the peasnat. The historiographical argument of the chapter consists of two 
parts. First, the Chinese premodern history was full of internal alterations and 
transformations rather than self-generated ‘dynastic cycles’. The sociological 
foundation underlying China’s premodern development is the uninterrupted co-
constitution between the sedentary agrarian society and the nomadic tribal society. 
Second, the internationally generated ‘wholesale transformation’ that foregrounded 
the pattern of China’s modern transformation was the ‘Tang-Song transition’ via 
which the state-bureaucratic class began to subsume the landed aristocratic class. The 
centralization, decentralization and military regionalization during the Qing Dynasty 
were unleashed from the development in which autonomous regional militarists 
sought to maximize their interests by maximizing their control of the state-
bureaucracy. Consequently, the political agency of the Chinese peasant has become 
that bolstering the centralized state-authority is viewed as essential to the peasant’s 
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wellbeing because local manors and landed aristocracies have been dismantled by the 
empire.   
Having identified the premodern origins of China’s backwardness, chapter 4 analyses 
the historical origins of China’s century-long ‘Revolution of Backwardness’. The 
analysis is set against the background of the classic debate in American Sinology on 
whether China’s modern history should be interpreted as ‘West-made’ or ‘China-
made’. It is noted that both understandings could not illuminate the ‘interactive’ 
dimension of the revolutionary development. Using the idea of U&CD, this chapter 
argues that the nature of nineteenth century’s social transformation needs to be 
understood as a process of national salvation driven by politically and militarily 
disunited elites who attempted to graft the technological and institutional end-
products of the advanced capitalist society onto the task of protecting their political 
and economic status defined in the premodern context. The consequence of the 
process was that increasing number of progressive social movements began to take 
place against the background of politico-military disintegration along regional and 
provincial lines on the eve of the twentieth century. This chapter will accentuate that 
the co-constitution and intersection of China’s pre-capitalist imperial crisis and the 
universalizing capitalist/imperialist modernity is central to understanding the 
incentive of China’s modern revolution.  
Chapter 5 continues to conceptualize Mao’s revolution as part of China’s century-
long ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ operated in a ‘substitutionist’ way. The concept of 
‘Revolution of Backwardness’ invites us to examine concrete interactions between 
China’s evolving political elites and the historically specific geopolitical pressures 
impinged by advanced capitalist societies. In doing so, several critical historical 
moments are identified to map out the ‘spirally ascending’ trajectory of Mao’s 
revolution. I will argue that Mao’s revolution, as a continuation of the ‘Revolution of 
Backward’ originating in the general crisis nineteenth century, was in nature a 
combined development synchronizing the restoration of rural society and anti-
imperialist campaigns in a single historical process. It took its roots by crafting its 
organizational and ideological structures in a nationalist fashion through the 
interaction with the Soviet Union and the Soviet-informed KMT in the 1920s. The 
unevenness between China and variegated forms of advanced industrial societies 
exerted substantial geopolitical pressures on the Chinese Revolution which mediated 
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the particular course of China’s substitutionist development: the peasant has been 
recreated into a novel agency of ‘guerrilla revolutionary’ in order to replace the 
incompetent bourgeoisie and worker for both a democratic and a socialist revolution. 
The chapter will also show that the nature of China’s peasant socialism has also given 
rise to a series of mutations in the aftermath of the 1949 Revolution under varying 
geopolitical circumstances.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by drawing a closure to the debate on whether the 
modern Chinese history was China-made (Sinocentrism) or West-made 
(Eurocentrism) in Sinological studies. It argues that the present explanation of the 
Chinese Revolution using Uneven and Combined Development will resolve the 
dichotomy by providing an international conception of social development. It is noted 
that the particular political agency of the Chinese peasant configured in the long-run, 
as well as Mao Zedong’s revolutionary response to the national crisis mounted in a 
particular conjuncture were both ‘internationally generated combination’ rather than 
any linear outgrowth of either China’s past or western modernity. Concerning that 
Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism are two forms of anachronism, this chapter will 
further argue that by overcoming this problem, the theory of Uneven and Combined 
Development can provide a substantial contribution to the method of classic social 
theory (the mode of production analysis inter alia) by replacing its ‘self-constitutive’ 
core with an interactive, dynamic and empirically generative ‘general abstraction’ of 
‘multi-societal interaction’.  
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Chapter 2-Uneven and Combined Development as a 
Conjunctural Analysis-Overcoming Anachronism by 
theorizing the Spirally Ascending Character of Social 
Development  
2.1 Introduction: Uneven and Combined Development and the 
problem of anachronism in social development 
Via a review of extant explanations of the possibility of China’s peasant revolution, 
Chapter 1 has demonstrated that those accounts could not properly understand the 
role of peasantry in the formation of China’s socialist revolution for the problem of 
‘anachronism’ plaguing their theories and methods. The problem of anachronism, in 
the mainstream interpretations of the Chinese Revolution, lies in the widely upheld 
conception of the ‘backward’ nature of the Chinese peasant. This condition of 
backwardness is addressed only by reference to an abstraction of the internal structure 
of China’s agrarian, and the character of the peasant was ‘sealed off’ from wider 
horizontal and vertical global transformation (Hobson and Hobden 2002: 9). 
Arguably, the condition of backwardness, which emerged from the comparison 
between early and late developing societies, is supposed to be a relational category 
dependent upon the socio-historical reality of interrelationships among different 
polities; whereas in practice, the relationality among various socio-political entities is 
never mobilized as an sociological device.  In IR theories, the mainstream conception 
of ‘the international’ is used only as a field of residues and externalities of domestic 
social development (Wight 1960; Rosenberg 2006: 329-332). As Justin Rosenberg has 
problematized, ‘[t]he geopolitical premise…drawing new life from every sociological 
shortfall, tends in the opposite direction-towards ever more abstract formulations of 
anarchy, as if it were a supra-sociological phenomenon’ (Rosenberg 2007: 454). For 
this problem, authors who deploy the explanatory category of ‘the international’ (e.g. 
Skocpol 1979; Gourevitch 1989) cannot avoid reconciling with the internalist analysts 
who explain away the nature of the Chinese Revolution as a linear outgrowth of the 
agrarian society.  
The pressing problem here is that if ‘the international’ could not be utilized as a 
sociological device for historical evolution and development, any intervention of IR 
would not help solving the problem of anachronism. The misconception of ‘the 
international’ can be dated to the scepticism about progressiveness to which the 
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disciplinary identity of ‘International Relations’ has been attributed (Carr 1939/2001; 
Schmidt 1998: 27). Realism, which perceives international activities as a realm of 
person-like states struggling for material power has been regarded as the ‘definitive 
tradition’ of International Relations, which, for various reasons, has been separated 
from all other forms of social developments of progressive logic. As the last chapter 
has indicated, mainstream IR’s lack of ‘developmental logic’ is not only a matter of IR 
being a-sociological, but more fundamentally a socio-theoretical problem about the 
ontology of social development (Tenbruck 1994; Rosenberg 2006, 2007, 2010). 
Without reconstructing the concept of social development as a multi-spatially 
determined category, any superadded lateral field concept of spatial plurality such as 
geopolitics or the condition of ‘many states’ could not alter the singular understanding 
of social development and its problem of anachronism. Therefore, the absence of ‘the 
international’ (socio-spatial plurality) in classic social theories and the absence of 
development in mainstream international theories are actually two sides of a same 
coin of the problem of ontological singularity of social development (Rosenberg 2006).  
Having recognized this problem, this chapter argues that Leon Trotsky’s idea of 
Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD), which has recently been 
reconstructed as the sociological basis of international theory by Justin Rosenberg 
(1996, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013) provides a theoretical antidote to 
anachronism in extant theorizations of the Chinese Revolution. The reason that 
U&CD can potentially do this is that with its inbuilt method of conjunctural analysis, 
U&CD can successfully accommodate the historical-materialist conception of ‘spirally 
ascending’ development by theorizing it as a social combination. The so-called spirally 
ascending nature of historical development has been captured by Fredrich Engels as a 
process determined by ‘innumerable intersecting forces’ and ‘an infinite series of 
parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant historical event’ (Engels 
1895/1972)13. Because the intersecting forces emerge from different times and 
different places embodying variegated ‘temporalities’, the particular ‘parallelogram’ 
they coproduce would necessarily involve reorientations and redirections from time to 
time, which has determined that the course of historical development is inherently un-
linear. However, an individual force of history would not only interact horizontally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See Fredrich Engels' Letter to J. Bloch in Königsberg, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1890/letters/90_09_21.htm 
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with forces of its own time-it also interacts and intersects with forces originating in 
other historical times and even its own patterns in the past. Therefore, historical 
development is also intrinsically accumulative based upon critical inheritance and 
negation of previous experiences.   
The model of ‘spiral ascendance’ like a ‘parallelogram of historical forces’ is not an 
empty metaphor. The particular causes of development, and the differentia specifica of 
its consequences all needs to be theorized with reference to concrete history-then it 
comes the role Uneven and Combined Development. As for the case of the Chinese 
Revolution, the world-historical riddle of ‘peasant socialism’ could be properly 
understood by U&CD as a peculiar consequence of ‘combined development’. By 
defining social combination as an interactive category, U&CD will not only provide a 
formal theoretical explanation to Marx’s unaccomplished envisioning of the 
possibilities of socialist revolution before or without capitalism, but in a more dialectical 
way go further to demonstrate the contradictory nature of building socialism in a 
backward society like Russia and China. The theoretical advance thus achieved will 
generate two positive results. For international theories, it enables theorizing 
variegated agential perceptions against the backdrop of the anarchical ‘deep-structure’; 
and for classic social theories, especially the vulgar misconception of ‘mode of 
production’ analysis, it enables progressive theorizations of heterogeneous social 
formations and developmental trajectories under global capitalism without losing the 
theoretical core of historical materialism.  
This chapter will develop the aforementioned argument in the following sections. I 
will first show in the next section that Leon Trotsky’s theory of Uneven and 
Combined Development has continued and completed late Marx’s enterprise of 
conceptualizing social development as a ‘spirally ascending’ process; this is manifested 
in Trotsky’s theorization of the Russian Revolution as a historical movement that may 
both ‘skip over stages’ and ‘fall further backward’. I will then show that historical 
materialism’s ability to envisage social development as a ‘spirally ascending’ process 
lies in the dimension of ‘multiple temporalities’ which Marx as well as a larger body of 
authors has implicitly drawn upon without formally theorizing. In this regard, I will 
further demonstrate why Uneven and Combined Development as a conjunctural 
international theory is able to theorize the problem of multi-directionality and spiral 
ascendance as an internal property of ‘social development’: this is due to the premise 
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of plurality and interactivity in U&CD’s ontology. On this basis, I will further 
demonstrate how U&CD can possibly resolve the problem of anachronism in both IR 
and social theories overshadowed by either the logic of anarchy or the logic of capital 
with its inbuilt method of conjunctural analysis.  
2.2 Social development as a ‘spiral ascendance’: from Marx to 
Trotsky  
As for the Chinese Revolution, the central question that is most attended to is the so-
called nexus between peasantry and socialism; in a country like China which has 
undergone a prolonged history of agrarian economy and rural insurrection, could a 
socialist revolution be reasonably envisaged without a proper working class that was 
conscious enough. A question posed in a similar way has directed Marx’s attention 
from Europe to Russia in his late years; ‘can the Russian obshchina, though greatly 
undermined, yet a form of primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the 
higher form of Communist common ownership?’ (Marx and Engels, Preface to The 
1882 Russian Edition of The Communist Manifesto). The potentialities of ‘bypassing the 
capitalist stage’ detectable in the Russian case have at face value unsettled early 
Marx’s materialist conception of social development. However, it is the coexistence of 
both formulations in Marx’s theoretical edifice that has posed a more complex 
question about the nature of Marx’s ‘theory of history’. How does Marx understand 
social development?  
Firstly, the question of revolutionary class-formation is ultimately a question of the 
correlation between a certain material condition and class identity. In historical 
materialism, it remains debatable whether class identity, or a wider state of ‘social 
consciousness’ could be directly derived from a certain material basis, especially 
‘forces of production’ under which an individual society operates. Ambiguities have 
arisen from the inconsistency in Marx’s statements dispersed in his writings on 
different stages. The one that does justice to a relatively rigid vision of the relationship 
between ‘the material’ and ‘the social’ could be found in Marx’s seminal statement on 
the origin of social revolution in the preface of his A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859). As Marx argues,  
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of 
social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
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their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material 
productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations 
of production or–this merely expresses the same thing in legal term–with 
the property relations within the framework of which they have operated 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these 
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. 
The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure (Marx 1859/1977). 
 
The opening and ambivalence of this text is both stimulating and bewildering at the 
same time as it poses further questions of both historical and theoretical significance. It 
is central to this statement that the unfit between forces of production and 
superstructural relations ushers in the so-called ‘era of social relations’; but it is 
nevertheless unwarranted even by Marx’s own empirical studies that this process 
would take place necessarily and in any universal forms. For example, Marx’s early 
observation of the 1848 Revolution in France (The Eighteenth Brumaire and Louis 
Bonaparte) serves as a testimony to the possibility of abortive class formation and social 
revolution facing ‘changes in the economic foundation’ (Marx 1852/2008). The 
French case that monarchical state-structure with its root in the inarticulate and 
unorganized peasants allied with the French bourgeoisie under capitalist development 
has later been rearticulated to espouse the Gramscian thesis of ‘passive revolution’, 
which addresses the historical paradox that tensions within capitalist ‘production forces’ 
incur no socio-political upheavals (Cox 1979: 166; Anievas and Allinson 2010: 471-474; 
Gray 2010).  
 
The logic of ‘passive revolution’ can be understood as a process by which a society 
entered a new epoch of social development (e.g. capitalism) without radically 
displacing the pre-existing class relations and state-structure. More significantly, this 
logic, on a more general level, is central to Marx’s analysis of the nexus between the 
peasant and social revolution beyond the experience of England. For late Marx, ‘it was 
Russia from which news of revolutionary came’ whereas revolutionary activism had 
largely been exhausted in western Europe (Shanin 1983: 7). Central to the Russian 
experience was the plausibility of progression into an era of anti-capitalist revolution 
without displacing the traditional peasant class. The Russian peasants and their 
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communes, for late Marx, was not much a barrier of backwardness to social 
progression, but more a carrier of ‘the collectivist tradition of the majority of Russian 
people’ (ibid: 12). Such a tradition to which the Russian populist (narodnik) held fast 
‘assumed the ability and desirability of Russia ‘bypassing the stage’ of West-European-
like capitalism on its way to a just society’. The element of communal property 
relations in Russia, perceived by narodniks such as N. Chernyshevsky and P. 
Chadayev as ‘uneven development’, produced a proletarian class which was more 
resistant to capitalism (ibid: 9). As the Russian populism withered in the 1880s, Marx 
began to develop more nuanced thoughts of the Russian peasant-communes, which 
has then culminated in his Letter to Zasulich in which the role of the peasant was 
understood in a world-historical context of global capitalism.  
 
Central to the letter is Marx’s awareness of the paradoxical fate of the Russian 
commune in the context of global capitalism. ‘The very existence of the Russian 
commune has been jeopardized by a conspiracy of powerful interests, crushed by the 
direct extortions of the state, fraudulently exploited by the ‘capitalist’ intruders…’, 
whereas on the other hand, ‘if revolution comes at the opportune moment, if it 
concentrates all its forces so as to allow the rural commune full scope, the latter will 
soon develop as an element of regeneration in Russian society and an element of 
superiority over the countries enslaved by the capitalist system’ (Marx 2000). What 
Marx has offered here is not any linear anticipation, but a vision of configuration of 
possibilities that effects of ‘regeneration’ and ‘degeneration’ could both take place as a 
result of the historically situated conjuncture14; ‘for either one to prevail over the other 
it is obvious that quite different historical surroundings are needed’ (Marx 2000: 623; 
see also Knei-Paz 1978: 592-594). The ‘historical surroundings’, as Marx understands, 
refers to not only the wider social milieu of capitalist development that generated 
pressures on the peasants, but also a world time of socialist revolution in which the 
‘peasant chorus’ was sung; without this, ‘the proletariat’s solo song, becomes a swan 
song, in all peasant countries’. To turn the Russian commune into ‘a major vehicle of 
social regeneration’, it is significant that ‘a grass root framework for ‘large-scale 
cooperative labour’ and the ‘use of modern machinery’ both needed to be introduced 
(Marx 2000; Shanin 1983: 14-17).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 By regeneration, Marx is more likely to mean ‘skipping over stages’. 
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So far, it can be argued that late Marx has given great historical nuances to Eastern 
experiences, Russia inter alia, as a latent alternative to the western archetype of 
capitalist development. ‘One must descend from pure theory to Russian reality’ (Marx 
2000, italics added). The question, however, is whether Marx’s historicization of the 
Russian case has contradicted his materialist notion of social development set out in 
his earlier writings. The ambivalence here is that though Marx has highlighted the 
co-determination between the ‘economic foundation’ and the ‘superstructure’ in his 
early writings, there has never been specification of the mechanism in which the two 
categories correspond with each other. Marx’s materialist conception of social 
development has never indicated that change in social relations would automatically 
grow out from the progression of productive forces, neither does it mean that 
productive forces (e.g. technology) should be deployed as the main index of social 
development15. Reading history in a materialist way does not assume recourse to 
rump material settings taken as the first step to analyze concrete social formations. As 
Derek Sayer has correctly argued, Marx’s materialist conception of history and his 
critique of Hegel imply not a method that reduces everything to the material, but an 
ontology based upon ‘a prior denial of the very existence of the ideal as a separable 
entity’, according to which ‘[c]onsciousness is precisely not a thing in itself’, but the 
relationships of living individuals to their external environments. This means that the 
material basis in most historical case constitutes only the ‘determinant in the last 
instance’ rather than the sole driver of history. Though the material premise is set as 
an objective starting point, the social significance of the material could only be 
constructed when ‘purposeful actions’ is taken against it upon the basis of living 
individuals’ subjective perceptions developed out of the complexity of human 
activities (Sayer 1987: 86-88). The epitome of ‘the material’ as ‘the determinant in 
the last instance’ could be found in the classic Marxist interpretation of the variety of 
concrete forms of social movement. As for mechanisms of different political 
mobilizations, historical materialism has no ready-made theoretical axiom that 
explains away how and why a specific social movement revolves around a certain 
discourse (e.g. environmentalism, feminism, nationalism and aestheticism etc.); !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 On the folly of technological determinism see Daniel Bensaid’s critique of structural 
Marxism, 2009: 43.  
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however historical materialism would set for more concrete historical explanations a 
materialist starting point, that is, in most cases, social movements as an important 
expression of working class politics, are derived from the antagonism between the 
worker and the employer as a fundamental materialist condition (Lebowitz 2003: 
179)16. Diverse social values, such as environmentalism and feminism, though they 
are predicated upon the worker-capitalist contradiction, are not deducible from it. 
Therefore, ‘the material’ as ‘determinant in the last instance’ means that the 
abstraction of material forces can in no sense be reasonably deployed to pinpoint the 
nature or the direction of a certain social development; instead, it only sends out 
invitations to further historicization of a particular conjuncture underneath a general 
material condition, in which the nature of social development is to be understood as 
another form of historical movement.  
 
So what is the conceptual category Marx has deployed to indicate social 
development? Looking back at our previous consideration of late Marx’s observation 
of the multi-directional Russian fate as well as early Marx’s emphasis on the 
revolutionary leadership of ‘the communists’ in The Communist Manifesto, I will argue 
that to Marx, the historical-materialist notion of social development is defined as the 
evolution and transformation of human agency from lower to higher forms. In The Communist 
Manifesto, Marx avows that social revolution would not happen automatically in 
tandem with the growth of productive forces unless the proletariats from all strata of 
society are mobilized to form a revolutionary class17. In turning the scattered workers 
who were originally in conflict with each other for short-sighted interests to 
revolutionary proletariats, class struggle would be immediately turned into political 
struggle, which as a historical task should be taken by ‘the communists’, the trade 
union and other undertakers of revolution who are able to educate workers in a 
socialist direction. It is also noteworthy that for early Marx, if the experience of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 As for Michael Lebowitz, the origin of the diversity of ‘New Social Movement’ is that ‘they 
(the workers) are immiserated is why workers constantly attempt to satisfy more of their social 
needs’ (Lebowitz 2003: 179). These social needs could be ethnical, environmental, familial, 
religious and aesthetic which all appear non-materialist. 
17 Trotsky in his writings has further noted that this process involves not only the formation of 
communist party as a political tool for educating the workers, but also the process that 
workers themselves reveal their identity and belonging. See Knei-Paz 1978.  
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bourgeois revolution had introduced any progressive forces, it was because that it has 
replaced corrupted old social forms such as feudalism, provincialism and superstition 
with relatively progressive ones such as private property, nationality and 
enlightenment (Loewy 1981: 3). The conception of social development as evolving 
human agency is generalized in The German Ideology which argues that historical 
development was started off by man labouring against his natural constraints, 
through which social relations began to differentiate in size and depth. ‘Division of 
labour’, as Marx defines in the text, is the miniature of how human agency gets 
increasingly complicated over time. The centrality of human agency in Marx’s entire 
theory has become more obvious in Marx’s late writings such as Critique of Gotha 
Program (1875) which has placed heavy emphasis on spontaneity of the workers as a 
force that bursts out of the capitalist system and reverses its terms (Marx 1970).  
 
If the process of the evolution of human agency, including its sequencing of stages, 
could be corresponded to the general material setting of a society with ease, the 
tension between the Russian (or maybe Chinese) experience and many vulgar 
economic-materialist determinisms18 would be much relieved. Historically, however, 
it is easily noticeable that a variety of mutually propelling, but also logically contested 
social processes as well as political practices, which, by definition all fall into the 
‘superstructural’ phenomena are always coeval against a relatively static backdrop of 
material condition. This is simply because that development, such as social revolution, 
can only take place in a conjuncture when perception of human agency has changed;  
whereas such change in human agency is always present in a ‘spirally ascending’ 
form (Anderson 1979: 529-532). How is the spirally ascending nature of social 
development manifested in concrete historical process? Here comes Leon Trotsky’s 
systematic extrapolation of this ‘theory of history’ from the case of the Russian 
Revolution (Trotsky 1980). Trotsky’s reformulation of social development has 
accommodated almost every single pattern of change concretized in Marx’s historical 
writings, which have all been organized as concretions of the general theory of 
‘Uneven and Combined Development’ (U&CD). For example, In Trotsky’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For example the Stalinist mechanistic understanding of social development, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm, (last access 
10:54am, 20th Feb, 2013).  
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exposition of the Russian spiral ascendance, one can first see Trotsky’s recapitulation 
of the problem of ‘passive revolution’ recognized by early Marx. That the Tsarist 
state, with its complicity with European capitals, rendered the Russian bourgeoisie 
un-revolutionary was an epitome, alongside the French case, of the process by which 
monarchical state-structure managed to dissolve the counter-forces generated by 
capitalist development (Trotsky 1980: 6-7). The bourgeoisie’s ‘incapacity of political 
action’ prefigured the possibility of ‘skipping over stages’ in a dialectical way-that 
Russia could move onto the stage of proletarian revolution with a more ‘youthful’ 
proletarian class that revolutionized the Russian peasants (ibid: 8). Like Marx who 
conveyed profound uncertainty about the status of Russian peasant, Trotsky has also 
warned against the danger of a revolutionary proletarian state sliding further 
backward towards some ‘degenerative’ political form (Trotsky 1936/2009). Since the 
victory of the Russian Revolution came too quickly, there was a risk that the worker’s 
state might operate without corresponding maturation of working class identity19.   
 
Therefore, it could be seen that there is an intellectual progression from Marx to 
Trotsky through which the spirally ascending nature of social development has 
become more and more explicit and theoretically fundamental. Whereas Marx’s 
understanding of such nature of social development is detected in his various 
historical writings, this theme is inherent in Leon Trotsky’s theoretical formulation, 
namely, the idea of Uneven and Combined Development. How could Trotsky’s 
idea of U&CD reinterpret the spirally ascending nature of social development as an 
‘emergent property’ of human social development rather than a series of empirical 
aberrations that would do nothing but problematizing the theoretical unfit between 
‘the material’ and ‘the spiritual’, ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’ and ‘the 
infrastructural’ and ‘the superstructural’? To answer this question, a 
characterization of the theoretical quality of Trotsky’s theory needs to be made. I 
will then show in the following sections that this quality lies in the inbuilt method of 
conjunctural analysis that is central to both historical materialism and the theory of 
U&CD. But first of all, a brief review of the nature of the problem of ‘spirally 
ascending development’ is in order. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 As for the thesis of the Soviet Union as a deformed worker’s state, see Marcel van der 
Linden 2007, Western Marxism and the Soviet Union, pp. 103-106 
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2.3 The premise of ‘multiple temporalities’ and conjunctural 
analysis in historical materialism 
What is the theoretical and methodological nature of the notion of spiral ascendance? 
This has to be understood in terms of tensions between Marx’s emphasis on the 
spontaneity of ‘subjects’ of history in documents such as The Communist Manifesto and 
Critique of Gotha Program and his caution about perseverance of the deep-seated 
structure of a society characterized by production. Whereas the workers were invited 
to pursue the proletarian dictatorship to facilitate the transition from capitalism to 
communism, it is nevertheless alerted by Marx himself that ‘[n]o social order is ever 
destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been 
developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before 
the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the 
old society’ (Marx 1970: 21). What can be questioned here is whether there is an 
hidden ‘level of analysis’ between the impervious material structure and the 
multiplicity of agential practices which seem only intelligible by pure description. To 
Marx, this question appears as a matter of ‘levels of concreteness’ at face value. It is 
noted in German Ideology that whereas a certain ‘mode of production’ as a general 
category that characterizes an epoch (for example capitalism) always demonstrates 
some ‘common traits and characteristics’, it is itself ‘segmented many times over and 
splits into different determinations’ (Marx 1970a). ‘Mode of production’ stands only as 
a ‘rational abstraction’ that enables comparisons of operations of production in 
different conjunctures, because ‘the object of historical materialism cannot be 
production in general, but the specification of determinate modes of production’ 
(Bernstein and Delpechin 1978: 3, my italics; Anderson 1979: 417). The implication of 
this statement is clear that in order to understand the variety of one general mode of 
production, one needs to deploy the method of concrete historical analysis after 
having recognized the generic organizing principle of a certain epoch.  
 
This methodological principle is formally set out in Marx’s Grundrisse based upon the 
dialectic of ‘concretion/abstraction’. The analytical procedure of historical 
materialism, in Marx’s sense, will necessarily involve a conjunctural timeframe that 
entails the notion of multiple determinations and the method of historical 
concretization. On one hand, Marx argues that social analysis should always start 
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from some ‘general abstractions’, for example, ‘population’. General abstractions are 
always ‘chaotic conceptions’ which involves little flattening causal mechanisms. When 
moving from the abstract to the concrete, or ‘thinner abstractions’, the analyst will 
confront a set of more direct and simple determinations, since ‘[t]he concrete is the 
concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations’ (Marx 1973). Having 
concretized the general abstraction by theorizing the correlation of determinations, 
one will replace the original ‘chaotic conception’ with ‘a rich totality of many 
determinations and relations’ when one retraces to the concept of the population as a 
whole.  
Moving from the level of abstraction to the level of concretion is not only an analytical 
procedure, but is determined by the accumulative nature of social development, due 
to which a certain ideal-type needs to be historicized in the context of different 
historical conjunctures. Some analytical concepts that seem general and 
transhistorical at first blush always predate the existence of particular social relations 
they are deployed to analyze. These general concepts, in Marx’s sense, could easily 
explain less developed forms of society which they originally referred to; but when 
these concepts come to the more developed sets of social relations in the 
contemporary time, they may imply more ‘many-sided connections and relations’ they 
did not mean to express at the start (Marx 1973). No matter where a concept is 
derived from, the complexity of social relations it entails varies from case to case when 
its use is extended to wider historical scenes. Being unable to historicize a conceptual 
type, one is then trapped by the mistake of anachronism. To Marx, The bourgeois 
economists’ ahistorical understanding of historically specific concepts such as division 
of labour is a classic example of this fault. ‘Proudhon doesn’t understand!’ In his early 
correspondence with PV. Annenkov Marx criticizes Proudhon strictly for that he has 
mistaken bourgeois forms of economic relations, such as division of labour for 
‘universal reasons’ by which the developmental logic of history is ruled out. Proudhon 
fails to understand that the so-called economic categories rendered ‘eternal law’ by 
him are only the conceptual expression of ‘real relations’ that appear historically in 
the temporary bourgeois society. Proudhon’s history, which is no more than an 
artificial ‘dialectical phantasmagoria’ only takes place ‘in the nebulous realm of the 
imagination and soars high above time and space’ (Marx 1975). Due to the underlying 
problem of anachronism, Proudhon’s use of economic categories has not only lost 
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sight of the spatio-temporal specificity of those concepts, but also ruled out the 
emancipatory vision of the future eclipse of bourgeois economic order.  
 
So if Marx’s analytical procedure of moving from the rational-general abstraction to 
the concretion and then back to an enriched totality means not only different levels of 
analysis, but also the demand for addressing the historical realities of social 
development, the level of conjunctural analysis should mean much more than only a 
level of greater concreteness. The so-called conjunctural timeframe should enable 
theoretical understandings of the spirally ascending characteristics of social 
development in Marx’s conception. To achieve a definition of ‘the conjunctural’ as a 
sociological category, I will now take a glance at how this level of analysis was 
operationalized and interpreted by historical sociologists.  
 
Fernando Braudel has outline a dialectical understanding of the epochal and the 
conjunctural as two differential temporalities in terms of not only their lengths, but 
also their different sociological meanings. The epochal, namely the timeframe of longue 
dureé, refers to a historical understanding of ‘the structure’ which is defined as ‘a reality 
that persists through time’ (Braudel 1960: 6). The accumulative nature of longue dureé 
involves a notion of ‘conditionality of history’ which assumes that once things 
happened (no matter how contingently they did), their effects would build into 
‘environments in which a change in one variable is associated with a change in 
another variable’ (Stinchcombe 1968: 31)’. Whereas the epochal timeframe stresses 
more on the nature of history as ‘a sum of days’, there is another form of temporality, 
‘the conjunctural’ that unfolds as ‘the cycle, and even the ‘intercycle’ of events. A 
conjuncture may embrace a decade, a quarter of a century or the classic half-century 
of Kondratieff’, which needs to be specified in terms of the additional determinations 
the very period of time has introduced to alter the pattern of the epochal time. In line 
with Braudel’s logic, John Ruggie has further conceptualized the conjunctural 
timeframe as a depiction of ‘the basic units in social time as cycles or some other 
representation of temporal movements’. The conjunctural time thus denotes temporal 
movements that occur in the form of processes that ‘underlie(s) actors, properties, and 
events’. Ruggie gives the example of post-war ‘baby boom’ in American demographic 
history as an epitome of the causal role of conjunctural time. The ‘baby boom’ was 
certainly a result of the combination of numerous social forces that developed in 
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uneven pace in the aftermath of the Second World War. Once such a conjunctural 
move took place, its effects would reach into the pattern of world population on the 
systemic level (Ruggie 1998: 158).  
 
So Braudel has extended Marx’s general understanding of the conjunctural time as 
either a level of concretion or a notion of multiple determinations to a specific form of 
historical reality vis-à-vis the epochal time. To Braudel (and Ruggie), the general 
pattern of the longue dureé is largely constituted by the conjunctural movement of 
history because of the accumulative nature of historical structure. This dialectics of 
epoch and conjuncture underlies Marx’s method of moving from the abstract to the 
concrete and then back to the ‘enriched totality’. The reason that ‘the conjunctural’  is 
constitutive of ‘the epochal’ is understood by Braudel as a matter of ‘multiple 
temporalities’. ‘[T]here is no guarantee that a social and economic correlation will 
move at the same pace’, reports Braudel, ‘[o]n the other hand, two such correlations 
must not be formulated to the exclusion of others more difficult to measure. Sciences, 
techniques, political institutions, mental tools, and civilization also have their rhythm 
of life and growth, and must be included in the new ‘correlative’ history’ (Braudel 
1960: 5). Drawing upon the same logic, Robert Marks has also interpreted the 
conjunctural phenomenon as the intersection of multiple historical processes; ‘[a] 
conjuncture happens when several otherwise independent developments come 
together in ways that interact with on another, creating a unique historical moment’ 
(Marks 2007: 31). However in Marks’ account, the emergence of a conjuncture is 
viewed as contingent.  
 
Here the problem becomes whether the Braudelian notion of ‘multiple temporalities’ 
can really stand as a explanation to Marx’s notion of ‘spirally ascending’ development. 
It is clear that Braudel and the Annales School has recognized the heterogeneity of 
historical movement in form, for example, the ‘conjuncture’ is a collection of historical 
contingencies and accidents which could not be derived from any abstract form of 
epochs. It is nevertheless unclear whether the dialectics of epoch and conjuncture can 
explain the historical origins of the differentiation of social time. As for Robert Marks, 
his category of ‘contingency’ or ‘accidence’ could not by itself constitute a mode of 
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explanation (Skocpol 1973: 28)20; and no Braudelian accounts have explained why 
‘the conjunctural’ as a particular historical reality has emerged, despite their effort 
made to describe the variety of conjunctural phenomena and the multiplicity of social 
time. If the conjunctural timeframe is regarded as a specific form of historical reality 
that will build into the creation of the more generalizable ‘epoch’ as a ‘rational 
abstraction’, the socio-historical origin of a certain conjuncture needs to be explained 
in the first instance in order to reveal the more deep-seated explanation underlying 
‘multiple temporalities’. For example, as Giovanni Arrighi and Sugihara Kaoru have 
identified, the East Asian longue dureé of ‘industrious revolution’ and internal market 
dynamics could only operate in the modern time with the catalyst of interstate 
competitions and social revolutions in the region as a ‘short-range temporality’ 
(Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden 2005: 2-4; Sugihara 2005: 78); it is nevertheless 
unknown why the short-range temporality came into effect in the postwar 
conjuncture, neither is the sociological nature of the short-range temporality theorized 
within the framework of Braudelian historiography .  
 
Since the idea of ‘multiple temporalities’ exists as more a historical description than a 
sociological explanation, it is in a larger sense a strategy of entailing more levels of 
concretion rather than denoting any ‘theory of history’. Needless to say that only the 
notion of ‘multiple temporalities’ could not shed lights on the spirally ascending 
nature of social development in historical materialism. Here is the problem. It is a 
relatively easier task to understand Marx’s notion that social concepts vis-à-vis relevant 
historical realities are being constantly enriched by reference to Braudel and 
Stinchcombe’s idea of accumulative and conditional historical development (Braudel 
1960; Stinchcombe 1968); whereas it is still a unfinished task of explaining why social 
development is spirally ascending as what Marx implies. To resolve this problem, it is 
pressing that the deeper mode of sociological explanation behind ‘multiple 
temporalities’ needs to be revealed so that the meaning of conjuncture could be 
understood in relation to the problem of ‘spiral ascendance’. As Marx’s method of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Viewing history as either a ‘contingent butterfly’ or an objective structure is the line that 
separates the mega and meso/micro levels of historical analysis which seem to be 
unbridgeable, see Lawson and Hobson 2008: 428.  
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political economy has suggested, we should always start from a ‘general abstraction’ 
around which secondary ‘chaotic conceptions’ could be organized. Now, the question 
has become what exactly should the so-called ‘general abstraction’ be in our 
theorizing of social development? I will now turn to Leon Trotsky’s theory of Uneven 
and Combined Development to show that what makes his idea a formal theorization 
of the spirally ascending nature of social development in historical-materialist terms is 
his identification of the generic ‘rational abstraction’ (Rosenberg 2006, 2007, 2010; 
Rosenberg in Rosenberg and Callinicos 2008 etc.).     
 
2.4 Uneven and Combined Development, conjunctural analysis and 
social development as an emergent property of ‘the international’  
So far a brief summary of the procedure of Marx’s conjunctural analysis could be 
made. In the first instance, a generic ‘rational abstraction’ needs to be made from 
which multiple determinations could be historicized. In further historicizing the 
constant enrichment of the original abstract concept, one also explores the particular 
trajectory of development which unfolds in a spirally ascending manner. What should 
our ‘rational abstraction’ be?  
 
In History of the Russian Revolution, the locus classius of the theory of Uneven and 
Combined Development, Trotsky’s analysis of the peculiarities of Russian’s historical 
development interrogates the possibility for not only capitalist but also socialist 
transformation in Russia’s context. Necessarily, the first question Trotsky needs to 
address is what ‘general abstraction’ he would start from. This generic category, as 
what Marxs has suggested in German Ideology (1970a), has to be an organizing principle 
that demonstrates ‘common traits’ of human activities tending towards social 
revolution; whereas on the basis of those ‘common traits’, a roadmap for historicizing 
and theorizing concrete causal properties of individual determination could also be 
generated. Identifying this abstraction wrongly could easily lead to reified causal 
formula which are displaced from their spatio-temporal conditions. Like in the case of 
the Chinese Revolution, authors starts from ‘dictatorship’, ‘nationalism’ and 
‘peasantry’ which are all historically specific categories with no general implications. 
Alternatively, Trotsky starts off his analysis by disposing of all those temporally 
bounded categories; he identifies the basic condition of Russia’s modern revolution as 
a state of ‘backwardness’ which is an concrete expression of the intersocietal 
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relationship between Russia and the outside world. Thus unlike all the structuralist 
treatment of the so-called ‘Russian uniqueness’, the basis of Trotsky’s Uneven and 
Combined Development is a relational category whose concrete causal properties 
have emerged from interactions between variegated societies. These interactions 
involves societies of both the turbulent nomadic pressures from the East (the Tartar 
yoke) and the ‘wider, staggered process of European industrialisation’ from the West 
(Trotsky 1980: 2), which have altogether created a field of determination known as 
‘the international’ (Teschke 2005; Rosenberg 2006, 2007).  
 
Let us first consider the theoretical status of ‘the international’ as a general 
abstraction. I will argue that this conception is firstly a sociological and materialist 
category, and because of this, it is a ‘concrete abstraction’ that enables ‘non-deductive’ 
concretions progressively. To demonstrate the sociological and materialist nature of 
‘the international’, the so-called ‘value analogy’ made by the contemporary 
interlocutors of U&CD is worth considering. Marx’s analysis of the capitalist social 
relations is predicated upon a theory of surplus value that unravels the objectified 
exchange value under which ‘socially necessary abstract labour-time’ exists as the 
social form of value in a capitalist society (Marx 1977, 1992; Rosenberg in Rosenberg 
and Callinicos 2008: 91-92; Glenn 2012: 78). But what lies behind surplus-value in a 
capitalist society, according to Rosenberg, is a more fundamental fact that the 
exchange of commodities is conditioned by social relations. ‘A crucial element’ of 
Marx’s analysis is ‘already present, in nuce, in every instance of exchange’ though it 
becomes more significant in a capitalist society (Rosenberg in Rosenberg and 
Callinicos 2008: 92). 
 
This element, being the ‘inversion and reification’ of social relations ‘latent in all 
exchange relations’, is a general abstraction based upon the understanding of concrete 
causal properties of different human exchange relations. As labour against the 
material world is the first act of human society to Marx, the process of ‘objectification 
of human agency’ is thus a concretion of ‘labouring as the first human act’ which is 
obviously a sociological and materialist category. However, the idea of ‘objectification 
of human agency’ could in the meantime be used as a ‘general abstraction’ which 
provides a roadmap for historicizing evolving human activities as derivatives of ‘the 
first human act’; for example, it is immediately theorizable that the making of wage 
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labour which has prefigured the social form of surplus-value or even the capitalist 
state is predicated upon ‘objectification of human agency’, whereas the concrete 
formation of wage labour is never presupposed by the value theory per se (Marx 1992: 
117).  
 
So in this sense, is ‘the international’ defined as ‘multisocietal interaction’ a 
sociological, materialist and concrete abstraction? The answer is yes. First of all, the 
statement that there are more than one societies whose interactions constitutes human 
development is not only a general theoretical stance, but also a concrete analysis of a 
basic aspect of human social development, which according to Justin Rosenberg refers 
to the ‘non-simultaneity’ and ‘internally staggered’ character of social development 
(unevenness) as a historical reality; for example some hunter-gatherers began to settle 
down earlier than others (Rosenberg 2010: 182-183). In the Russian case, this general 
abstraction is set out by Trotsky as below,  
‘Russia stood not only geographically, but also socially and historically 
between Europe and Asia. She was marked off from the European West, 
but also from the Asiatic East, approaching a different periods and in 
different features now one, now the other’ (Trotsky 1980: 2).  
What this abstraction has suggested is not a definite characterization of Russia’s 
developmental path, but an guideline for analyzing individual processes of interaction 
including that among Russia, the nomadic East and the advanced Europe. The result 
of this is clear that Trotsky has discovered two historical processes which were both 
internal to the Russian development. On one hand, ‘[t]he history of Russia’s state 
economy is an unbroken chain of efforts – heroic efforts– aimed at providing the 
military organization with the means necessary for its continuing existence’ through 
which the Tsarist exploitation over the peasants intensified; on the other hand, ‘[a]s a 
result of this pressure from Western Europe, the autocratic state absorbed a 
disproportionately large share of the surplus product’ which has resulted in the 
congenital weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie (Trotsky 1973: 20-23, see also Trotsky 
1980: 4-7). Now, ‘the international’ as a rational abstraction that enriches itself by 
inviting endless concretizing analyses of one interactions after another has succeeded 
in finding the conjunctural register of the Russian longue dureé. Whereas Marx has not 
specified how to reveal the so-called ‘multiple temporalities’ apart from historical 
description, Trotsky has made it more tangible on a theoretical level by specifying 
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‘intersocietal interaction’ as the departure for conjunctural analysis. As a result, 
Trotsky’s conjunctural analysis has organically ascended to a more generalizable level 
of epochal analysis that characterizes Russia’s premodern condition as 
‘incompleteness of feudalism’, ‘formlessness’ and ‘lack of cultural monuments’ 
(Trotsky 1980: 2). Again, this characterization never stands as Theda Skocpol’s 
understanding of China’s ‘pre-1949 economy’ that will over-determine the subsequent 
social formation (Skocpol 1979: 265-266); it invites a new round of historical 
concretization along the line of ‘multi-societal interaction’.  
Here the ontology of interactivity enables a theoretical understanding of the origin of 
‘the conjunctural’ without rendering it a field of unintelligible contingencies. In 1825 
the Dekabrist uprising took place under the pressure of ‘European bourgeois 
development’ which expressed bourgeois incentives without abandoning the 
traditional ‘caste domination’. Decades later, serfdom was overtaken by wage labour 
via the peasant reform (1861) favourable to the noble castes’ capitalist interests. These 
momentous events that took place at very specific geopolitical locales had started off 
the formation of Russian proletarian class against the double exploitation of domestic 
‘noble capitalists’ and foreign capitals. Then Trotsky goes down to the short decade 
from 1905 to 1917 for micro-level explanation to the outbreak of the revolution. That 
the Russo-Japanese War tottered the Tsarist government, that the bourgeois 
revolutionary force, which was congenitally dependent upon foreign powers got 
discredited as the leadership of the revolution after 1905 had both prepared the 
historical circumstances under which the proletariat was to give ‘a programme, a 
banner and leadership’ for not only the peasant class but also the entire revolutionary 
movement (Trotsky 1980: 8). Within the short eleven years Russia’s revolution had 
transformed from a democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution ‘placing the 
Communist Party in power’ with the bourgeois class descending to conservatism 
(ibid). Where did this conjuncture come from? First of all, these ‘fortuitous events’ 
were all derivatives of either Russia’s ‘revolution of backward’ taken to withstand the 
‘external whip of necessity’ or geopolitical relationships that unsettled preexisting 
governments, which in Barrington Moore’s words, consequences of ‘the interplay 
between economic and political forces in the world as a whole’ (Moore 1966: 426; 
Skocpol 1973: 29). Because such an interplay is both the historical expression and the 
ontological premise of the structural/epochal property of ‘backwardness’, the 
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unexplainable ‘limbo of fortuity’ becomes co-constitutive with the generalizable 
structure/epoch (Skocpol 1973: 29).   
Still, the more important question is how the conjunctural analysis elicited by Uneven 
and Combined Development can in the meantime provide a theoretical grounding to 
Marx’s historical-materialist notion of ‘spirally ascending’ development. Certainly, as I 
have shown in the first section, Trotsky’s identification of contested historical 
orientations is remarkably comprehensive. The dynamics of spiral ascendance is 
captured by a cluster of auxiliary concepts which are all inbuilt in Trotsky’s idea of 
‘combined development’. According to Trotsky, the compression of early and late 
developmental forms at the national level assumes two contradictory consequences of 
‘skipping over’ and ‘being thrown backward’ that both oppose stagist accounts of 
social development. As Trotsky moves on to historicize, the effect of ‘skipping over’ 
was so dramatic in Russia’s history that ‘at the level of the seventeenth century, 
Russian industry in its technique and capitalist structure stood at the level of the 
advanced countries, and in certain respects even outstripped them’ (Trotsky 1980: 6). 
Nevertheless the effect of ‘being thrown backward’ was also notable especially in terms 
of development of human agency, that ‘the social character of the Russian bourgeoisie 
and its political physiognomy were determined by the condition of origin and the 
structure of Russian industry’ which was highly dependent on the complicity between 
the Tsarist government and foreign industrial and bank capitals. This dependence 
rendered the Russian bourgeoisie ‘politically isolated and anti-popular’, which was 
immature to reproduce the bourgeois revolution of English or French kind (Trotsky 
1980: 5, 7). More importantly, for Trotsky, the two processes of ‘skipping over stages’ 
and ‘sliding further backward’ are never processes that took place one after another; 
they were generated simultaneously as both predicates of social development, and 
they prefigured each other. As for the Tsarist state which were ‘compelled to make 
leap under the external whip of necessity’ from its own ‘backward culture’ (Trotsky 
1980: 3; Knei-Paz 1978: 178), it produced not only a weakened bourgeoisie but also a 
‘power vacuum’ of capitalist social relations which enabled the proletariats to seize 
state-power. The demise of the revolutionary bourgeoisie and the rise of the ‘youthful 
proletarian class’ were both featured in the inter-revolutionary conjuncture between 
1905 and 1917 in which the revolutionary leadership of Russia was radically 
restructured (Trotsky 1980: 5-7).  
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The co-constitution of ‘skipping over stages’ and ‘sliding further backward’ as two 
predicates of ‘spirally ascending’ development has been further elaborated in 
Trotsky’s analysis of the post-revolutionary state-formation concerning the 
maintenance of worker’s agency in the Soviet state. Unlike Lenin who emphasizes the 
possibility of ‘skipping over stages’ as a natural result of the accumulation of 
contradictions of global imperialism, namely the ‘weakest link’ (Althusser 1967: 21-24; 
see also Resch 1992: 60-64), Trotsky argues that the possibility itself has in the 
meantime preluded further ‘impossibility’ in the sense that the revolution itself, even 
in Lenin’s own sense did not emerge automatically from accumulated contradictions; 
instead, its crisis was conceived in the particular agency, namely the ‘avant-garde’ 
party mustered to utilize those contradictions. The organizational structure of the 
avant-garde party, which to Lenin was only a ‘technical’ method for controlling the 
party’s membership, was viewed by Trotsky as detrimental to the awakening of 
‘working class consciousness’. Such organizational structure ‘could not stem the 
growth of political and revolutionary consciousness among the workers but its 
consequence would be to sever the party from its growth’ (Knei-Paz 1978: 181, italics 
added). In a deeper sense, the dispute between Bolshevism and Menshevism is 
regarded by Trotsky as a matter of whether the workers or the revolutionary party 
should occupy the centre of the revolutionary leadership. The status of the worker 
could be jeopardized by the possibility of ‘skipping over stages’, because in a backward 
society like Russia, revolutionaries were always tempted to ‘find a short-cut to success’ 
rather than ‘undertaking the difficult but necessary task of surmounting the distance 
between objective class interests and their conscious, subjective assimilation’ (ibid: 
192-197). In this sense, the development of ‘skipping over stages’ that was realized by 
the particular agency of ‘avant-garde party’ via a ‘simplification of revolutionary 
tactics’ simultaneously has prefigured the development of ‘sliding further backward’ of 
the loss of working class identity, which has finally resulted in a ‘deformed worker’s 
class’ as well as a ‘revolution betrayed’ (Trotsky 1936/2009). In all the above 
formulation, it is obvious that Trotsky has recognized the spirally ascending nature of 
social development in historical materialism.  
Has Trotsky captured all these forces simply with summate analytical skills or are 
those processes organic derivatives of the theory of Uneven and Combined 
Development? The latter is certainly the case, but the reason for that does not lie in 
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those concepts deployed by the theory of U&CD. It lies in the ontology of 
‘multisocietal interactivity’ and its philosophical premise. Why social development as a 
‘historical reality persisting over time’ conveys a spirally ascending tendency as part of 
its accumulative nature? This is grounded in Trotsky’s dialectical understanding of 
‘identity’ and ‘non-identity’. In the Aristotelian logic of syllogism, logical inference is 
expressed as a formula that is stripped of all historicity: if A=B and B=C, then 
A=C=A. Here A is regarded as a timeless category definable by reference to a fixed 
quality (A=A) (Trotsky 1942: 18; Rosenberg 2012: 6-7). The problem is that the 
immense different properties between the two objects in comparison is systematically 
ignored, with some key similarities singled out in abstract forms. In this sense, 
Trotsky’s dialectical method has identified ‘A≠A’ as the starting point, concerning that 
all statements of ‘A=A’ are all abstracted from concrete historical realities.  
The ‘margin of tolerance’ where exists the immense difference between two objects 
matter dramatically when history unfolds in an accumulative form. At the moment 
when A=A could stand as an abstraction, the margin of tolerance could only be 
historicized without being theorized; however, it does not mean that the difference, 
which might even be infinitesimal within the margin would not flow beyond the time 
and space in which the abstraction of A=A stands. As Rosenberg has summarized,  
‘At key points, by dint of this accumulation, ‘tolerance’ is finally exceeded. 
At these points, incremental quantitative difference passes over into 
categorical qualitative change. And then the first premise of dialectical 
logic–A≠A–comes into its own.’ (Rosenberg 2012: 7-8)  
Here the ‘spatio-temporal partiality’ of abstract concept presupposes that ‘change can 
and does always flow unpredictably from the growing impact of determinations 
originating in the marginal(‘spatial’) non-correspondence of ‘A’ with ‘A’’ (ibid: 8, 
italics added). The unpredictable nature of  social change is theoretically immanent in 
interactions among multiple societies. The most extreme case is that,  
‘[E]ven if two instances of some- thing were completely identical, they 
would still not actually be each other. And, co-existing therefore, they 
might potentially affect each other. Thus, over and above any qualitative 
multiplicity of properties (variation), the quantitative multiplicity of being, 
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(the condition of more-than-one) has a potential significance of its own.’ 
(Rosenberg 2012: 13)  
Thus in Trotsky’s philosophical premise, the unpredictability of historical 
development is internal to not only the accumulative nature of the longue dureé, but 
more importantly the lateral field of interactive multiplicity, in which the 
heterogeneous properties in the ‘margin of tolerance’ have brought in further 
determinations that give rise to the so-called ‘cycles of events’, the conjunctural 
temporalities. Since stagist notions of historical development, such as that socialist 
revolution could only emerge after successful bourgeois revolution, is based upon an 
abstraction of ‘successive categories’ from a concrete history (e.g, England), whereas 
each category in that history bears immense properties different from that in other 
histories (e.g. France and Russia), not to mention the additional differential properties 
interpolated to the course of development via interactions with other societies. 
Therefore, at key moments when qualitative change emerges due to accumulated 
quantitative difference within ‘the margin of tolerance’, ‘the rigid assumptions of 
formal classification and comparison (A=A, etc.)’ will be unsettled inevitably, and it is 
allowed instead to ‘model the pro- cesses of change in continuity whose effects 
repeatedly ‘smash the limited boundaries of classification’’ (Rosenberg 2012: 9).  
 
Therefore, with ‘multisocietal interactivity’ postulated as the ontology of ‘the 
international’ in Uneven and Combined Development, the Braudelian conception 
of ‘conjunctural analysis’ as a specific form of temporality has become theorizable 
which emerges from the interactions of social forms coexisting and accumulating in 
the epochal/longue dureé structure. With ‘conjunctural analysis’ as an inbuilt method 
of U&CD, the spiral ascending nature of social development, which is captured by 
Karl Marx with ‘intuition of historicism’, can be theorized as an emergent property 
of ‘the international’. In what follows, I will open the problem of anachronism in 
contemporary International Relations Theory and social theories informed by both 
the ‘logic of anarchy’ and the ‘logic of capital’ to the scrutiny of Uneven and 
Combined Development. I will then propose that to transcend their common 
problem of anachronism, they needs to start from the ontology of ‘multi-societal 
interactivity’ rather than ‘anarchy’ or ‘capital accumulation’.   
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2.5 Conjunctural analysis, IR and classic social theories  
2.5.1 U&CD and the ‘anarchy-problematique’ in International Relations 
Firstly, let us see why the discipline of International Relations which rests upon the 
concept of anarchy has committed the error of anachronism. IR was born to criticize 
the utopian design of the post-WWΙ international order that aspired to create a 
‘harmony of interests’. In order to address the pressing political question of his time, 
Edward Carr, the founder of realist IR claimed assertively that ‘power’ is ‘a decisive 
factor in every political situation’ (Carr 1939: 301). The international life could hardly 
be penetrated by human reason, benevolent education, international law and 
interstate coordination such as the League of Nations as a result of the anarchical 
condition (ibid: 232-263). By drawing a hard line between the domestic and the 
international, IR thinkers came to recognize the empirical particularity of the 
discipline as a distinctive field of causality that cannot be penetrated by the 
development in domestic life. In Martin Wight’s early query on the absence of 
international theory, the international life was depicted as the ‘untidy fringe of 
domestic life’ which entails no more than ‘the system of balance of power’. (Wight 
1960). ‘There is a basic distinction between international and domestic politics to be 
made’, says Wight in an apocalyptic tone, ‘that international politics are less 
susceptible of a progressivist interpretation’ (ibid: 42). Wight’s reservation about 
plausibility of progression in the international system populated by self-referential 
states, was further accentuated by the effort made to theorize the ‘uniqueness’, or the 
so-called ‘theoretical hardcore’ of international politics. In Hans Morgenthau’s 
formulation of ‘political realism’, which was thought to be the guiding principle for 
understanding the logic of both interstate relations and foreign policy, Morgenthau 
starts by postulating ‘the international’ as a law-dominated realm of human activities. 
As he argues, ‘politics…is governed by the objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature’; and because ‘human nature…has not changed since the classic 
philosophies’, ‘novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a 
defect’. Morgenthau has strongly suggested that realism as a study of endless power 
struggles would ‘never be outmoded and obsolete’ (Morgenthau 1985: 8-12).    
Though the post-war birthmark of IR is historically specific enough to circumscribe 
the explanatory scope of anarchy, the specific temporality is always forgotten when 
theorists come to universalize the causal mechanism of realism. Anarchy is viewed as 
69"
"
"
69!
the epochal condition under which modern international history unfolds; on this basis, 
a number of auxiliary concepts and causal mechanisms have been misattributed to the 
anarchical epoch. It is argued that the absence of overarching authority in the 
anarchical world has reduced the functional roles of the state-actors to a common self-
helping tendency that dominates their behavioural logic, which is either security 
maximizing or power maximizing (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). It is further 
argued that the states acting in the logic of self-help are inclined to reach a situation of 
balance of power among each other. Though realist thinkers have made a lot of 
recapitulations to acknowledge the heterogeneity of agency, with the above causal 
mechanisms misattributed to the anarchical epoch, they still could not avoid 1) 
constantly deriving their understanding of agency from anarchy as the only relevant 
structural determinant; and 2) viewing the ‘abnormalities’ caused by human 
heterogeneity on the agency-level as deviants lying beyond the consideration of 
international theory. As Morgenthau argues in this chapter on political realism, 
‘[d]eviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the 
personal psychopathology of the policy maker may appear contingent only from the 
vantage point of rationality…It is a question worth looking into whether modern 
psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would 
enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of 
pathology of international politics’ (Morgenthau 1985: 4-6). Waltz makes it more 
explicit that though the levels of analysis of individual thinking and domestic politics 
(the first and the second images in his own terms) ‘describe the forces in world 
politics’, those could by no means predict the result of the operation of forces in world 
politics if they are not examined in the third image, namely the level of interstate 
system (Waltz 1959: 238). For both thinkers, irrational conducts by policy makers, as 
well as events that departed from rational calculation of power and interests in 
relation to material capabilities are all pathological phenomena external to the normal 
operation of international system and practices of foreign policy. Once such things 
occurred, for example like the Indochina War waged by the United States, it created 
nothing but bitterness to the irrational practitioners of it, which would then add up to 
counter-currents in both theory and practice that helps to normalize state-behaviours, 
leading irrational actors unexceptionally to the consequence of ‘balance of power’ 
despite the variances of individual intentions at the beginning. After the end of the 
Cold War, Waltz has announced more specifically that ‘a relative harmony can, and 
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sometimes does prevail among nations, but always precariously so’, and the thawing 
of the Cold War implied not only long peace, but more likely ‘latent conflict to boom’, 
because ‘despite changes that constantly take place in the relations of nations, the 
basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic’ (Waltz 1993: 59, 78). 
To Waltz, the interregnum conjuncture in the post-Cold War era cannot falsify his 
theory because balance of power as a corollary of anarchy will emerge sooner or later 
as long as the human societies continue to live in the anarchical epoch (Waltz 2000: 
27).  
Realist theorists have adopted two major strategies to explain away the empirical 
anomalies they have confronted. The first strategy is to announce that ‘balance of 
power’ will come as the only result of any ‘times of uncertainty’ (for example, ‘placid 
times’ such as the post-Cold War era, see Waltz 1993: 78). It is argued that ‘units in a 
self-help system engage in balancing behaviour’ under the enduring epochal structure 
of anarchy, and irrational states who fail to engage in balancing strategies will finally 
be penalized, disciplined and normalized by the system (Waltz 1993: 71-79). The 
problem is that this timeless law of the anarchical epoch can never tell when exactly 
the moment of ‘balance of power’ will be. Another strategy usually deployed by 
realists to modify their theory is to reduce or over-specify their scope of analysis. 
Theorists under the rubric of realism have come to argue that the state’s balancing 
behaviours are also determined by a series of contingencies such as perceptions of 
threat, domestic political processes, cultures and institutions (e.g. Walt 1987; Zakaria 
1992; Christensen 1996; Schweller 2006). This strategy has directly resulted in 
theoretical degenerative-ness in a philosophy-of-science’s sense, and gives good reason 
for questioning ‘whether there is still anybody a realist’ (Legro and Moravcsik 1999) or 
how small and specific the scope of empirical referents realism is addressing (e.g. 
Vasquez 1997)21.  
The problem of anachronism is ultimately caused by a series of ‘successive categories’ 
that is rendered universal law of the anarchical condition. As realists conventionally 
believe, anarchy will cause ‘self-helping’ power struggle between states which tends to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Notably in John Vasquez’s critique of realism in 1997, he argues that realism could not 
survive a Lakatosian reappraisal as a progressive research programme because realism has 
failed to maintain a consistent ‘hardcore’ of its theoretical assumption.  
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create ‘balance of power’. Stanley Hoffman has pointed out correctly that the 
balancing mechanism of the anarchical international system is an abstraction of a very 
specific period of history which was contingent on a conjunction of factors. ‘The 
model of the realists is a highly embellished ideal-type of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century international relations. This vision of the golden age is taken as a norm, both 
for empirical analysis, and evaluation’ (Hoffman 1959: 351). The spatio-temporal 
specificity of the ‘golden age’ is inherently allergic to the generalizing attempt made to 
establish the causal necessity between anarchy and self-helping state-behaviours. Paul 
Schroader has further demystified the realist concept of ‘balance of power’ by showing 
that secondary states in the international system did not always balance against newly 
emerging hegemonies in the first instance; for example, when the Napoleon War 
broke out and the French hegemony began to overrun Europe, small states chose to 
bandwagon or hide themselves from the hegemonic expansion on the early stage 
(Schroader 1994: 120-121). Both authors have indicated that anarchy epochal feature 
of the international system produces different conjunctural developments through 
which actors of the system have conveyed heterogeneous rather than homogenous 
behavioural logics.  
However, historians like Schroader have not propounded any alternative theoretical 
frameworks that transcends realism’s anachronism. What Schroader has suggested is 
that historians should turn away from the neo-realist paradigm and return to concrete 
historical methods (Schroader 1994: 147-148). In this sense, constructivism’s effort 
made to instate the ‘transformative logic’ by reconstructing the structure-agency 
relationship of ‘the international’ deserves attention. Drawing upon Emile Durkheim’s 
theory of social differentiation, John Ruggie argues that what matters more for social 
studies is not the systemic framework, but the form in which different social 
constituents associate with each other, which captures the ‘social facticity’ rather than 
metaphorical abstractions that stand off social reality. ‘The possibilities for individual 
action in the short run, and collective evolution in the long run, were to be accounted 
for by the changing forms of social solidarity’ (Ruggie 1986: 131, my italics). With the 
case of the transformation from the medieval to the modern international system 
which is deemed ‘the most important contextual change in international politics in 
this millennium’, Ruggie argues that the fundamental difference between the two 
modes of international system is that sovereignty and territoriality were perceived in 
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different ways in spite of the common structural condition of anarchy. Whereas ‘the 
institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional 
domains’ exists as the temporal character that distinguishes modern international 
system from previous structures, the feudal system of Medieval Europe was marked by 
a multi-layered system of interwoven allegiances and stratified jurisdictions in which 
the feudal ruling class could ‘travel and assume governance from one end of the 
continent to the other without hesitation or difficulty’ simply because of the 
overlapping and mutually inclusive private property rights and authority (ibid: 141). 
Like other constructivist theorists, Ruggie argues that what sets different epochs apart 
needs not be changes in the deep-seated structure of a system (anarchy), rather, it can 
be changes in ‘inter-subjectivity’, which, for Ruggie, refers to the way that ‘the 
constituent units (of the system) are separated from each other’ (ibid). Alexander 
Wendt, as well as Ruggie is fully aware that the structure of anarchy needs to be 
perceived by the state-actors as common knowledge. That is to say, though the 
absence of overarching arbitration as the structural reality in international system is 
real and objective, its effects on human practices on both the agential and the systemic 
levels depend on the way it is reinterpreted by its constituents in the form of ‘systemic 
culture’. With a particular set of terminologies, Wendt has further subdivided the 
meaning of anarchy into three auxiliary categories, which are theorized on a lower level 
of abstraction. Those famous terminologies for systemic cultures (Kantian, Lockean and 
Hobbesian) are sustained on the basis of three types of ‘inter-subjectivity’ constituted 
as collective identities of structural stability (Wendt 1999: 246). Once these systemic 
cultures have arisen, they have become social realities that enable and constrain 
agential practices regardless of the existence of individual cases of disagreement. 
Wendt has retold Rousseau’s story of stag-hunt as an example of how collective 
identity and systemic culture change, when one hunter happens to lunge at the hare, the 
consensus of the group begins to change from a cooperative culture to a distrustful 
one. In this process, the meaning of conjunctural analysis is twofold. One is the 
awareness that historical contingency could result in structural transformation of 
systemic culture, such as the accident betrayal of one hunter. However, ‘contingency’ 
alone cannot constitute any theoretical explanation. As for John Ruggie, it is 
misleading that the common perception of the meaning of sovereignty and 
territoriality were merely a product of inter-subjective construction as if it was 
negotiated among elites (Teschke 2003: 31). The other aspect of their conjuncture is 
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that there exist different forms of systemic cultures (e.g Hobbes, Kant and Locke) , 
these modes of collective identity all seem to have remarkable structural stability. 
Apart from Giddens’ theory of structuration which is deployed by Wendt as a 
metaphor rather than a ‘substantive social theory’ (Wendt 1987: 359), transformation 
between different cultures is not theorized. Therefore, though there is a shared 
awareness of ‘multiple temporalities’ under the epoch of anarchy, there is no 
theorization of the emergence of the variety of conjunctural developments in relation 
to the epoch of anarchy. The reason for this is that constructivism and realism have 
both taken ‘anarchy’ as their starting point, whereas the concept of anarchy, namely 
the condition of ‘a world without overarching authority’ is by no means a sociological 
and materialist ‘concrete abstraction’; also, it assumes no accumulative logic in a 
historical sense. To resolve this problem, we certainly needs to adopt a sociological 
and materialist starting point as the ‘rational abstraction’ to begin with. The problem 
is, does the sociological-materialist starting point have to be ‘the logic of capital 
accumulation’? 
 
2.5.2 U&CD and the problem of capital/capitalism  
The non-sociological and non-materialist characteristics of the concept of anarchy 
and its problems demonstrated above have called forth a social approach to 
reconceptualizing the phenomenon of geopolitics. Recent studies have attempted this 
by defining geopolitical competition as a political expression of capital accumulation 
on the global scale (Harvey 2003; Callinicos 2007; Pozo-Martin 2006; Ashman 2009). 
‘Capital accumulation’ is taken by these authors as the point of departure, the 
‘rational abstraction’ by these authors to address the pertinence of geopolitical 
competition, especially the persistence of interstate system after the Cold War which is 
regarded by Kenneth Waltz as a result of anarchy (Waltz 1993, 2000). Alex Callinicos 
has provided the most general theorization of the interplay between the logic of 
capital and the phenomenon of geopolitical competition-because ‘many 
capitals…jointly control the means of production from one another’ and ‘their 
competitive interaction…places units of production under systematic pressure to 
maximize profitability and to accumulate’, capital accumulation would eventually 
manifest itself on the international level in the form of inter-imperialist competition. 
The rise of industrial capitalism (McNeil 1982) has made capitals ‘increasingly 
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dependent on the support of their nation-states for the prosecution of their interests’, 
thus ‘both economic and geopolitical rivalries brought about a growing 
interdependence of state and capital, as a result of which the process of inter-state 
competition became subsumed under that between capitals’ (Callnicos 2007: 540-541). 
Like Michael Mann who has recognized that geopolitics predated capitalism but is 
conducive to capital accumulation (Mann 1988: 126-127, 136-138), Callinicos has 
placed great emphasis on the functional dimension of geopolitics in relation to capital 
accumulation. Thus the ‘logic of capital’ is the rational abstraction deployed in his 
work. A similar formulation in line with Callinicos is Samantha Ashman’s 
understanding of the uneven and combined quality of social development as an 
expression of global capital accumulation, ‘[f]or those parts of the world that are 
forced into capital’s orbit via colonialism, the colonial state needs to be seen as a 
variant of the capitalist state-indeed as a remarkable example of the fusion of 
economics and politics’22, and ‘in sum, capital can be seen to introduce a single logic, 
but one which results in diverse forms’ (Ashman 2009: 38)23. 
 
Here comes the tension in these works, though geopolitics as well as postcolonial state-
formation are both external to the making of capital accumulation, they are 
nevertheless regarded as functionally coterminous with the logic of capital by the 
above authors24. As a result, modernity is further equated to capitalism, which implies 
an epoch in which capital remakes the world in its own image into capitalism. Can such 
an equation stands? As many other authors have noted with greater nuances, when 
capital as well as other forms of modern life strives to render other social forms fully 
conducive to its own logic of reproduction, counter-currents would emerge as an 
inevitable consequence (Dirlik 1997; Anderson 1998; Charabarty 2000: 47-71; Lin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Positing colonial states as variants of capitalist states with no way out of it also jettisons 
Trotsky’s ‘normative desire to emulate the bourgeois culture of Western civlization’, see 
Shilliam 2009: 69-70.  
23 A typical example of this is David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism which views Deng 
Xiaoping’s Reform project as of no other consequences but capitalist accumulation leading to 
dispossession of labours. 
24 For the historical critique of Callinicos’s thesis, see Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher, 
2007, ‘The Changing ‘Logics’ of Capitalist Competition’, in Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 565-580 
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2006, 2012; Wang 2004, 2011 etc.). As for the logic of capital, Dipesh Charabarty’s 
identification of the ‘two histories of capital’ has crudely repudiated Callinicos and 
Ashman’s thesis that geopolitics and post-colonial states are subsumed by capitals. 
The ‘History 1’ of capital accumulation involves the process by which capital posited 
its antecedent as part of its life-process; whereas there has also been ‘History 2’ in 
which capital accumulation confronts its antecedent that ‘does not belong to its life 
process’ and ‘does not contribute to the self-reproduction of capital’ (Charabarty 2000: 
62-64). Similarly, within the general process of modernity is the wave of 
postmodernism conceived as part of ‘the multiplicity of historical trajectories’ that 
proclaims to ‘dethrone the modern’ (Dirlik 1997: 3-4). For example, when backward 
societies are industrializing themselves in a state-led way facing ‘external whip of 
necessity’, what is being implanted in those societies is actually industrialism rather 
than capitalism. Political elites in backward societies who pursued radical and speedy 
industrialization under geopolitical pressures could not be easily viewed as capitalism 
even though capital accumulation was promoted from time to time by these elites. For 
instance, the formation of developmental state was ultimately a geopolitically defined, 
rather than capital-defined project. The legacies of state-led development in many 
societies are not only that the state is in charge of industrialization by disciplining and 
weakening the civil society (Gray 2011: 584), but also that the state is held accountable 
for provision of social service and welfare to the workers (see for example Bian 2005: 
127-135). Needless to say, these two traditions are contested and the latter will 
conceive potential antidotes to capitalism25. Furthermore, in pursuing 
industrialization rather than capitalism, backward societies mobilized not only socio-
political elements conducive to capitalism, but also vernacular and native elements 
which are conducive to industrialization but counteractive to capitalism. This is what 
Giovanni Arrighi and Sugihara Kaoru have recognized as China’s industrious 
revolution based upon the thorough mobilization of human resources rather than 
capital. The interaction between western capitalism and East Asian societies has not 
remade East Asia in the image of the former; instead, it has driven some of those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 For analyses of anti-capitalist antidotes in late-developing industrialization, see Kees van 
der Pijl, ‘Is the East Still Red’ in Globalization, 2012; Lin Chun, The Transformation of Chinese 
Socialism, 2006 and Li Minqi, The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World-Economy, 2008 
etc.  
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societies further away from becoming self-sustaining capitalist systems by stimulating 
them to pursue an alternative approach to industrialization on the basis of ‘thorough 
utilization of human resources’ that differs sharply from ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (Sugihara 2005: 81-92)26. Therefore, it is arguable that reading 
geopolitics and state-formation in the image of capital accumulation, one is likely to 
view everything as an linear outgrowth of capital accumulation no matter they have 
recognized the different origins of capital and geopolitics or not; by doing this, the 
spirally ascending logic of social development is ruled out in the sense that the telos of 
modern transformation is only capitalism no matter how many additional concepts 
have been deployed to ‘furnish the particularities’ of it (Rosenberg in Rosenberg and 
Callinicos 2008: 87-89). 
 
Viewing this problem in the perspective of Trotsky’s dialectics, it can be told that the 
problem with Callinicos et al. is the conflation between capital and capitalism. Capital 
accumulation as an general abstraction of a form of human activity is theorized at the 
expense of immense historical properties which might or might not be conducive to 
the logic of capital; whereas capitalism as a historically specific conjuncture refers to a 
state that major social forces were facilitating the process of capital accumulation. 
This conjuncture involves ‘the expropriation and partial eviction of country 
population’27, the rise of new manufacturing centres against the old feudal towns, the 
eruptive supply of gold and silver in America (Pomeranz 2000: 264)28, and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 It has to be noted that Sugihara has placed too much emphasis on the dimension of 
thorough absorption of labour into industrialization, whereas Arrighi has more 
comprehensively addressed the dimension of protecting the labours and redistributing surplus 
among them.  
27 For example, Robert Brenner has documented the crucial role of contingently changing 
demographic pattern in England that has enabled the social property relations conducive to 
capitalist development, see Brenner 1985 and Brenner and Isset 2002. 
28 It needs to be noted that in terms of the origins of capitalism, Pomeranz’s thesis should not 
be treated as fully antithetical to that of Robert Brenner. The discovery of the circum-
Caribbean periphery produced enough labour-intensive industries that came to replace their 
equivalents in England (Pomeranz 2000: 264). The nature of some industries determines that 
they have to be produced in a labour-intensive way and cannot be easily capitalized. Thus the 
social property regime that enabled capital-intensive industries and the discovery of overseas 
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removal of feudal check on usury and merchant capitals (Marx 1992: 527). More 
specifically, to be a capitalist society means to enable self-sustaining reproduction of 
capital. In the capitalist conjuncture, ‘[s]truggles over domination and exploitation 
that historically have been inextricably bound up with political power’ have been 
turned into ‘distinctively economic issues’ (Wood 1981: 67). Since the workers are 
fully dispossessed of their means of production, ‘[t]he owner of labour power must 
therefore appear continuously in the market as the only means within capitalism of 
securing material reproduction’. Labour therefore needs no normative commitment to 
the economic exploitation that used to be maintained politically in the pre-capitalist 
society; the ‘brittle bond of the callous cash nexus which is liable to snap in recession’ 
will suffice to maintain the capitalist system on a self-sustaining basis (Burnham 2006: 
38-39). With economic exploitation instituted as a private realm of social activity, the 
political sphere yielded to politicians and bureaucrats has become able to appear 
‘public’ that is justified, moralized and fetishized by modern dogmas of democratism 
and legalism, which are more insidiously conducive to private capitalist accumulation 
in social-functional terms (Woods 1981; Rosenberg 1994: 124-129)29. These all mean 
that capitalism which in reality refers to a historically specific conjuncture only in 
which major social forces serve the function of capital accumulation is in theory 
abstracted as a universal narrative (Chakrabarty’s History 1). Historically, however, 
such an abstraction cannot rule out the existence of social forces reactionary and 
antithetical to capital accumulation (History 2) which were temporarily silenced in a 
capitalist conjuncture. Certainly, it is highly imaginable that at key points, those 
counter-forces operating ‘within the margin of tolerance’ would build into qualitative 
change of anti-capitalism because of the accumulation of these forces and interactions 
among societies.  Therefore, both capitalism and capital accumulation cannot 
constitute a rational abstraction as a valid point of departure as they may rule out the 
spirally ascending logic of social development. ‘The international’, which is 
understood by Leon Trotksy as a field of interaction of multiple social forms, has to be 
the starting point of ‘rational abstraction’. To study the peculiarities of national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
replacement of labour-intensive industries are two necessary temporalities that co-produce the 
formation of capitalism in England.  
29 The manifestation of such role of the capitalist state can also be seen in David Harvey, New 
Imperialism, 2003.   
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histories is not to study the way in which a particular society is recreated by the logic 
of capital, but to clarify this society’s relationship with the global context of which global 
capitalism is only a part (Lin 2012).  
 
2.6 Conclusion: Uneven and Combined Development as a 
conjunctural international theory  
To understand China’s peasant-based socialist revolution is not only to transcend the 
Stalinist mechanistic notion of economic determinism, but also to break free from the 
orthodox narrative of ‘succession of categories’ built upon abstraction of the classic 
case of England-Both modes of explanation are epitomes of the problem of 
anachronism which rules out the imagination of multiple trajectories of social 
evolution. To probe for possibilities of alternative developmental trajectories, both 
Marx and Trotsky has looked into the Russian case for roots of socialist revolution 
without capitalist mode of production. Whereas Marx has demonstrated his ‘theory of 
history’, namely social development as a spirally ascending process via concrete 
historical analyses, Trotsky has organized the notion of spiral ascendance into a 
dialectics of ‘skipping over stages’ and ‘sliding further backward’. This particular 
nature of social development in both of their works manifests itself in historically 
specific conjunctures that seem to have deviated from the structural tendency of 
development.   
As Braudel has recognized ‘the epochal(longue dureé)’ and ‘the conjunctural’ as two 
distinctive forms of historical realities, it has become questionable how the two forms 
of realities are theorizable in relation to each other. To render the two forms of social 
time co-constitutive, Trotsky starts by conceptualizing social development as 
inherently a process of multi-spatial interaction, in which the epochal-structural 
dimension of development is treated as a creation of multi-societal interaction (e.g. 
backwardness in the Russian case); and because interaction among societies is 
immanent, to understand the effect of a certain structure one always need to study the 
concrete processes of interaction which would altogether generate a ‘cycle of events 
(conjuncture)’ only via which could the product of a social development be theorized. 
Furthermore, according to Trotsky’s dialectics of identity and non-identity as the 
philosophical premise of U&CD, the stagist notion of social development which is 
understood as a ‘succession of categories’ would be unsettled inevitably due to the 
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accumulative and interactive properties of social development; whereas ‘spiral 
ascendance’ could be theorized as an emergent property of ‘the international’.   
The implications of U&CD are twofold. Firstly the starting point of socio-theoretical 
formulation needs to be a sociological and materialist concept which presupposes the 
logic of historical accumulation; thus the logic of anarchy, which assumes none of 
these qualities should not be treated as the abstraction where further historical 
determinations are to be derived. Secondly, it needs to be further noted that the 
starting point as a rational abstraction should enable one to envision social 
transformation that unsettles pre-existing causal orders because the immense historical 
difference ‘within the margins of tolerance’ ignored for abstraction will inevitably lead 
to qualitative change due to the accumulative and multi-spatially interactive logic of 
social development, the logic of capital should also be repudiated as the generic 
‘rational abstraction’ because it bears the danger of ruling out spirally ascending social 
development by viewing everything as conducive to capital accumulation.  
A recapitulation further to the above methodological consideration needs to be made 
before we proceed with the substantive analysis in the next chapter. By dropping both 
‘anarchy’ and ‘capital’ as the departure of rational abstraction of modern Chinese 
development, I will by no means suggest that the logic of capital and capitalism as a 
global phenomenon is no longer relevant to understanding the history of modern 
state-formation in general. It is true that capitalism’s status as the zeitgeist and general 
temporal context of human time ever since the Industrial Revolution cannot be 
discounted. However, in conventionally speaking of the ‘general problems and issues 
of capitalism’, one can by no means assume that the word capitalism by itself 
constitute any independent mode of explanation. One can never deny that the 
operation of capitalism as a world-historical system is dependent, parasitic but also 
contingent upon a series of conjunctural factors such as geopolitical competitions and 
various national socio-political struggles, but what kind of deeper, theoretically active 
‘organizing principles’ are those conjunctural factors subject to? The answer can 
certainly not be the logic of capital per se which only narrowly assumes the motive of 
endless need for surplus value. From the points of view of U&CD, the deeper 
organizing principles, with which one can understand the role of capital and the 
nature of capitalism by putting them into place, is the rational abstraction of 
‘interactions among societies’ from which the uneven and combined texture of human 
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society beyond the time of capitalism has arisen as an emergent quality of multi-
societal coexistence. Therefore, the rationale of U&CD is not to deny the significance 
of capitalist mode of production in the making of modern history, but to reveal the 
deeper theoretical underpinning of the concept of capitalism knowing that capitalism 
alone is by no means an independent mode of theorization.  
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Chapter 3 The Premodern Origins of the Peasant’s Political 
Agency in China: Uneven and Combined Development and the 
Specificities of China’s ‘Condition of Backwardness’  
3.1 Introduction: empire, bureaucracy and decline of the dynastic 
order 
From this chapter, I will begin to develop a reinterpretation of the Chinese Revolution 
by critically engaging a few auxiliary concepts under the framework of Uneven and 
Combined Development (U&CD). The present chapter explores the origins of 
China’s modern revolution as a historical condition arising from China’s longue dureé 
development via which the specific political agency of modern Chinese Revolution 
has been conceived. In Leon Trotsky’s understanding of the possibilities of the 
Russian Revolution, Russia’s proletarian class-formation was not cast simply as a 
solution to social crises in short-run conjunctures, but a response to some more 
enduring ‘historical peculiarities’ including ‘the incompleteness of Russian feudalism’ 
and its ‘formlessness’ and ‘poverty of cultural movement’ perceived as Russia’s 
‘condition of backwardness’ in the modern age (Trotsky 1980: 3-4). The significance 
of such longue dureé analysis lies in a society’s particular political agency for modern 
transformation as well as the specific trajectory such as the possibility of ‘skipping over 
stages’ (Lin 2006: 24). In China’s case, the basic context of its modern revolution is 
characterized by the dominant discourse of ‘national salvation’, ‘self-strengthening’ 
and ‘awakening of identity’, which was consistently drawn upon by elites and 
revolutionaries to justify their reformist and revolutionary projects ever since the Self-
strengthening Movement of the 1860s (Chen 1970; Schwarcz 1986; Fitzgerald 1996; 
Wells 2001; Mitter 2004). When the 1949 state of PRC was founded, Mao said little 
about communist doctrines but that ‘the Chinese people has henceforth stood up’. 
This shows that the legitimacy of China’s century-long revolution is determined by the 
extent to which the revolution could successfully address the ‘condition of 
backwardness’ of the Chinese society30. The historical paradox of China, however, is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 It is easy to see that the theme of ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ draws great 
continuity between different generations of the CCP’s leadership. President Hu Jintao (in 
office during 2002-2012) argued that the task of the CCP is to realize the great rejuvenation, 
see http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/15839806.html (last access Dec. 12th, 2012); also 
president Xi Jinping made his first public address to the media on the same topic, see 
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that the task of national salvation was undertaken by the peasant rather than the 
bourgeoisie or the worker in other previous experiences. Social condition that has 
given rise to such historical specificity is not a pre-given structural property, but a 
constantly evolving social reality which has emerged from the longue dureé 
development. Now, I will first show the problems of the extant explanations of 
China’s long-term, premodern development, and how U&CD could possibly 
overcome these problems.  
Conventional explanations plagued by anachronism view China’s condition of 
backwardness as an internal property of the structure of the Chinese agrarian society. 
The role of the Chinese state-bureaucracy has been widely regarded as the very factor 
that has over-determined China’s ‘absence of capitalism’. Joseph Needham has 
attempted to tackle his own riddle by showing that China’s state-bureaucracy was the 
major barrier to technological and industrial progression. Needham’s argument is 
twofold. On one hand, the oversized Chinese state-bureaucracy provided civilians 
with the ultimate entry to property ownership and capital accumulation, driving them 
all towards the official examination rather than other careers; on the other hand, the 
power of state-bureaucracy had undermined the social status of merchants by exerting 
considerable institutional and ideological pressure on them. Chinese merchants were 
therefore given no substantial social power, thus there have never been functional 
equivalents of western city-states in China because the merchants were never able to 
form a merchant-class (guilds in the West). The absence of all these conditions was the 
genesis of China’s scientific backlash, so have there been no driving forces for 
industrialization and capitalist development which was premised upon the rise of 
merchant class and the legal recognition of private property in the West (Needham 
1969: 183-185)31. Robert Brenner and Christopher Isett have extended this argument !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/29/c_113852724.htm (last access Dec. 12th, 
2012). For more on this point see Lin Chun, 2006, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism, pp. 60.  
31 Economists have already attempted to explain the Needham question. See Justin Yifu Lin 
1995, ‘The Needham Puzzle: Why the Industrial Revolutions Did Not Originate in China?’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 269-292. Lin argues that modern 
technology requires specially trained scientists for ‘experiment cum science’ whereas 
traditional technology only needs talented artisans and farmers which would naturally emerge 
from a large population.  
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to come to terms with the thesis of ‘China’s non-capitalism’. They argue that China’s 
rural structure had constituted a social property regime that enabled ‘extra-economic 
way of surplus extraction’, which had in turn blockaded the peasant and the 
landlord’s way into complete market competition (2002: 614). Such an argument has 
preluded the conclusion that the Chinese Revolution has generated nothing but a 
‘dynastic cycle’ of recurrent dictatorial states if the basic structure of agrarian society 
cannot be replaced by capitalist social relations (more on this in chapter 1). This mode 
of explanation has dramatically simplified the meaning of the Chinese Revolution by 
treating it as an linear outgrowth of China’s past experiences. This line of argument 
may also imply that to revolutionize China’s traditional society is to replace the 
agrarian economy with a set of capitalist social relations; such an argument will in 
turn reduce the meaning of the Chinese Revolution to the simple idea of 
modernization or even westernization (Fairbank and Teng 1979; Bergere 1986). For 
sure, such arguments cannot possibly understand specificities of the Chinese peasant’s 
political agency.  
Why China’s ‘condition of backwardness’ could not be understood as a simple matter 
of ‘backward dictatorship’ or ‘absence of capitalism’ which was self-generated within a 
‘dynastic cycle’? This is mainly because such absolute notions of China’s premodern 
development would prevent understanding of the nature of the Chinese Revolution as 
an epochal leap-forward from China’s past. Their common method, by viewing 
‘backwardness’ as a inherent property of the Chinese society, could hardly prelude an 
idea about the Communist Revolution radically altering the traditional social 
relations. This problem has suggested that the meaning of China’s backwardness, as 
well as the nature of China’s premodern development will need to be reexamined 
from the vantage point of modernity, rather than the premodern history as a self-
constitutive cycle. Regarding the revolutionary spirit of ‘national salvation’ that has 
run through the entire course of China’s modern revolution, backwardness refers to 
the concrete condition that set China and her ruling elites in crisis of survival even 
before they came to encounter the capitalist West (ibid). Disparity in material power 
between China and the West could not be easily translated into a collective perception 
of ‘crisis of survival’ because even China did not have the European capitalist 
development, it does not necessarily mean in practice that China could be easily 
conquered by western powers. Furthermore, loosing battles to the West had to be 
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perceived as threatening to the existence of the Qing Dynasty otherwise no reform or 
revolution would have been incentivized. Therefore, the question of China’s 
backwardness should be reframed as this: what specific social structure of the Qing 
state has constructed the meaning of the very ‘crisis of survival’ for the Chinese elites 
and their traditional polity?   
In order to specify the crisis of China’s traditional state, Philip Kuhn’s Rebellions and Its 
Enemies in Late Imperial China (1980) has highlighted the significance of the Qing 
Dynasty as a conjuncture of deviation from the traditional pattern of Chinese history 
which needs to be viewed separately from the periodic breakdown of the traditional 
state. ‘[A] more profound process that is leading Chinese history irrevocably out of its 
own paths and producing basic changes in social and intellectual organization’ was 
underway in the period of Qing (Kuhn 1980: 2-6). According to Philip Kuhn, there 
was an enduring tendency in the traditional society that the landed upper class, which 
served as the ‘vital link between the bureaucracy and the local communities’, could 
always ‘made possible the reintegration of the traditional state in a shape similar to 
that of its predecessor’ (Kuhn 1980: 3). The Qing Dynasty is the first historical period 
during which the traditional ‘re-integrative’ state-formation facilitated by the landed 
aristocrats after dynastic breakdown was no longer possible. It is clear that the Qing 
Empire had been in a prolonged history of decline before foreign political control 
came to erode China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Kuhn suggests, the 
internal disintegration of the Manchu rule began to take place ever since late 
eighteenth century. From then on, China had remained ‘on the brink of a new era of 
political breakdown and chaos’ with the Imperial court reduced to impotence (Isaacs 
1938: chapter 1).  
Under these circumstances was the rationale and imperative of China’s modern 
revolution perceived in a specific way which is irreducible to both ‘reproducing 
dictatorship’ or ‘reproducing western capitalism’. Mao Zedong’s revolution has grown 
directly from the non-existence of effective central authority. Mao’s revolution is 
characterized by its telluric characteristics, its tight connection to China’s peasant 
communities and its unusual strategy of ‘villages besieging cities’ (Schram 1969; 
Schmitt 1967; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Deutscher 1984; Anderson 2010). Mao 
might not be too familiar with Marx and Lenin’s original texts, but he was certainly 
familiar with the Chinese classic The Outlaws of the Marsh, which told the story of 
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former imperial officials setting up their own ‘counter-state’ against the Imperial court 
in remote mountainside to ‘enforce justice on behalf of the heaven (titianxingdao)’ 
(Hobsbawm 1994: 79). It is undeniable that the burgeoning tendency of local 
militarization created against the backdrop of agricultural decline has provided Mao 
the space, method and workforce to set up his revolutionary model. Needless to say 
that the numerous ‘red soviet powers’ and the ‘base area’ were all built in the same 
arena where the late imperial state and the successive Kuomintang regime failed to 
establish effective control. Mao’s revolution started from the power vacuum and social 
incohesiveness left by China’s traditional state, and the extent to which it had filled 
the vacuum underlay its orientation, alteration and consolidation (Perry 1980; 
Tiedemann 1996).    
The question has then become twofold: First, what is the sociological meaning, say, 
the particular syndrome of the traditional social production system as the condition of 
backwardness which is consistently posited by China’s modern revolutionaries as an 
imperative of ‘constructing a modern state bolstered by institutions and approaches 
that could engender the cohesion necessary for socio-political stability’ (Schoppa 
2000: 23)? Second, why did a peasant revolution emerge for resolving such a 
problem?. As for the origins of the power vacuum and social incohesiveness, Harold 
Isaacs has rightly remarked on a very general level that ‘[t]he backwardness of 
Chinese economy was determined primarily by the stagnation of productive forces 
over a lengthy historical period’ (Isaacs 1938: 2). In a more comprehensive sense, the 
‘stagnation of productive forces’ is not a simple matter of China’s ‘absence of 
capitalism’ but more specifically a structural unfit between the organization of 
agricultural production and the political system designed to sustain an empire of 
continental size in the Qing Dynasty. As I will attempt to further prove, this ‘unfit’ has 
produced one fatal consequence for the Qing emperors: whereas the geopolitical 
composition on the Inner Asian frontier urged the Qing state to enlarge the 
bureaucratic system which was already oversized, the state-bureaucracy became 
increasingly difficult to sustain itself with revenues extracted from an agrarian 
economy that was over-exploited by the state itself32. More significantly, this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32!This argument seems similar to some of the critiques of the bureaucratic-rentier status of 
the Chinese state (Moore 1966). Nevertheless, if the paramountcy of the state-bureaucracy is 
viewed by those authors as the origins of China’s backwardness, I will argue that this was 
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contradictory structure of the Qing Dynasty has given rise to the political agency of 
China’s peasant as a potential generator of revolutionary energy under the condition 
of backwardness: because the imperial state had dismantled the local landed 
aristocracies, the state became the sole agent which could provide social welfare to the 
vulnerable small-farming peasants, the decentralizing tendency in state-authority 
would give rise to the revolutionary potential of the peasantry aspiring to regeneration 
of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. The peasant’s conception of justice was thus 
encapsulated in the idea of constructing a ‘universal sovereignty’ rather than the 
European ‘parcellized sovereignty’ (Anderson 1974: 397; Bloch 1978: 142-149); this 
particular political agency has foregrounded Mao’s idea of ‘people’s sovereignty’ and 
the nexus between peasant empowerment and national unification in the modern time.    
In this regard, this chapter aims to provide not only a reconstruction of the 
historiography of China’s pre-capitalist development from which the condition of 
backwardness originated, but also an example of the wider application of the 
framework of Uneven and Combined Development beyond the confine of the ‘mode-
of-production analysis’ (Rosenberg and Callinicos 2008). On the empirical level, I will 
attempt to re-periodize China’s premodern development based upon the Kyoto 
School’s thesis that the rise of the state-bureaucracy marked the ‘early modernity’ 
(kinsei) in Chinese history (Miyakawa 1955; Konan 1992: 10; Miyazaki 1992: 153)33. 
This understanding is justified on the basis that the situation of political disintegration 
underlying the evolution of modern revolution was itself a consequence of the 
development of the state-bureaucracy that had reached its zenith in the Qing 
Dynasty. The state-bureaucracy was a specific source of social power that came to 
organize the society only after a specific conjuncture of history (the Tang-Song 
transition) as a consequence of the interaction between the frontier nomads and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
never a transhistorical condition that could by itself constitute any sociological explanation. 
The state-bureaucracy only began to overpower other social forces in the Chinese society 
after the Tang-Song transition as a result of commercial growth, monetary innovation and 
frontier wars in the Song Dynasty. Once the paramount state-bureaucracy was in place, it 
began to be over-expanded in the subsequent episodes facing very specific nomad-sedentary 
geopolitics.  
33 For western debates on the conception of ‘early modernities’ , see articles in the special issue 
of Daedalus vol. 127, no. 3, 1998.  
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agrarian society. The spatio-temporal specificity of the state-bureaucracy and its 
world-historical significance as the origin of China’s ‘early modernity’ proves the 
existence of epochal transformation in premodern China which has precipitated the 
formation of the peasant’s political agency in China before the western intrusion. 
Thus this argument will in turn reject the model of ‘dynastic cycle’ that views 
premodern China as non-evolutionary bearing no potential for modern 
transformation (Cohen 2003: 49-51).  
 
3.2 Uneven and Combined Development and pre-capitalist social 
transformation: theorizing the spirally ascending pattern of 
China’s longue dureé development  
The problematique of state bureaucracy is broadly viewed as a property of China’s 
‘feudal’ or ‘oriental’ mode of production perceived as changeless and non-
evolutionary (the model of ‘dynastic cycle’). In existing literature of China’s 
premodern development, the centrality of Chinese state-bureaucracy as a pre-existing 
condition of China’s development/non-development has been accentuated in the 
works of  Joseph Needham, Barrington Moore, Robert Brenner and Christopher Isett, 
and the leading Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong34. Moore has famously argued 
that the imperial state was sustained on the basis of a reciprocal relationship between 
the gentry and the emperor. In contrast to their European counterparts, Chinese 
landlords had their interests vested in the ‘façade of administrative centralization’, 
because on one hand population pressure has created more hungry peasants to bid for 
lands35, on the other hand the state had to control over a continent that stretched 
wider than the sum of all European states. Thus the Imperial bureaucracy had 
emerged as the only plausible means of control, which was sustained and refreshed 
through the official examination. The consequence of this correlation is that Chinese 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 See Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, chapter 4, ‘Chaxugeju’, 1992; 
and China’s Gentry: Essays on Rural-Urban Relations, chapter 1-2, 1953.  
35 Philip Huang has provided important analysis on the relationship between demographic 
pattern and capitalist development. His basic argument is that China’s agricultural 
development has fallen into the trap of growth without development because of the 
involutionary pattern, which means that marginal output per unit of land is diminishing as the 
input of labour increases. See Huang 1985, 1990, 2002.  
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landlords protected by the state bureaucracy was detached from direct control of land, 
and the state’s role as the sole proprietor was exercised via taxes rather than feudal 
rents, which distinguishes China’s state-bureaucracy sharply from European feudalism 
(Moore 1966: 166-167).  
However the decisive role of the state-bureaucracy is in the meantime taken for 
granted and de-historicized in these accounts with its origins and variations 
unexplained. Empirical challenges are twofold. First, the landlord’s dependence on 
the state-bureaucracy for indirect extraction of surplus was not a transhistorical 
phenomenon; it was instead a product of a specific correlation of temporalities which 
requires deeper socio-historical explanation. Second, other forms of extraction such as 
coercive feudal rent did exist from time to time in tandem with the expansion of state-
sanctioned taxes; for example, it is recorded that manor economy was prevalent in 
Song China. What are the deeper socio-historical reasons that explain the correlation 
of the two forms of social power, and why did the feudalist elements in Chinese 
manorialism eventuate into ‘manorialism without feudalism’ (Elvin 1972: 69)?  
To solve this problematic have some Marxist historians attempted to erase the 
structural distinction between the Chinese pattern and the European version of 
feudalism by generating more inclusive conceptual frameworks. This attempt, 
however, is in a greater sense made to sustain the mode-of-production analysis rather 
than to give more historical nuances to the specific causal properties in the Chinese 
case. By conflating tax and rent to one unified category of ‘pre-capitalist surplus 
control’, Wickham argues that the premodern Chinese state was a variant of 
feudalism within which there was no antagonism between tax and rent and the state 
and the landed aristocracy (Wickham 1985: 172-175 passim)36. This argument has 
somehow justified Barrington Moore’s emphasis on the interdependence and 
coordination between the state and the landlords as the property of one longstanding 
social structure, rather than a spatio-temporally specific configuration of different 
forms of social power (ibid). The tension in Wickham’s argument, however, lies in his 
recognition of the historical emergence of the interdependent structure between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Barrington Moore has also noticed the local power of landlords as a result of 
landownership, whilst he seems to have reduced it to the paramountcy of state power; see 
Social Origins, 1966, pp. 162-177.  
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state-bureaucracy and the landed class which began to take form only since the Tang 
Dynasty, and his persistent use of the concept of ‘feudalist mode of production’. Tang 
was a critical turning point in Chinese history that the ideological autonomy of the 
aristocratic class remained on the early stage of the dynasty, and began to be 
systematically assimilated by its involvement in state service which had dissolved not 
only great aristocratic families in the north, but also small land-holding militias in the 
south, forming a ‘universal bureaucratic-gentry stratum’ in which the landowners’ 
power was anchored (ibid: 172-173). After the turning point in Tang, the scenario 
depicted by Barrington Moore appeared in the Qing Dynasty at the height of 
bureaucratisation of landownership. Wickham’s historical analysis has echoed a more 
comprehensive reappraisal of the periodization of Chinese history-the ‘Kyoto School’ 
which identifies the Tang-Song transition as the genesis of China’s modern history. 
The leading author of the Kyoto School, Naito Konan has argued in his historical 
essays that what set the premodern Chinese history apart is the Tang-Song transition, 
before which ‘the monarch did not have absolute power over the aristocrats, even in 
the Chin-Han (Qin-Han) period’ (Miyakawa 1955: 537; Naito 1992). In the post-Song 
era, China began to differ from ‘the military feudalism of Japan and medieval Europe’ 
because of the decay of aristocratic class and the rise of despotism founded on a team 
of professional bureaucrats. Concerning the rise of the state-bureaucracy as the most 
ground-breaking historical development in China’s history, it is arguable that there 
must be more than one concrete determinations underlying such transformation on 
the political level; however, the existence of those conjunctures in this case can by no 
means be explained by the concept of mode of production itself. Why?  
Firstly all these attempts of relaxing tensions could not explain why tax and rent, 
exerted respectively by the state and the landlords as two separate modes of ‘extra-
economic exploitation’, were constantly in changing relationships with each other, 
and the alliance between the state and the landed gentry was not as consistent as 
Barrington Moore describes (Wickham 1985: 173). Secondly, by thus extending the 
conceptual scope of ‘feudalist mode of production’, it becomes increasingly 
questionable whether the concept of ‘mode of production’ could be validated by so 
many variants; and whether the emergence of a paramount state-bureaucracy in Song 
was a historical necessity or linear result predetermined by China’s internal logic of 
development. Though Wickham and the Kyoto School have both identified the 
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historical transformation that combined rent and tax within one coercive system, they 
have provided no theoretical explanation to the existence of such combination in 
which the rise of state-bureaucracy would be understood as part of spirally ascending 
development of Chinese history rather than a linear result of it. Concerning this 
problem, I now turn to the role of Uneven and Combined Development and the 
broader debate on its theoretical status in the study of pre-capitalist China.  
Leon Trotsky’s idea of Uneven and Combined Development is certainly a powerful 
antidote that unpack the idea of mode of production in the international perspective. 
As Justin Rosenberg has noted, interactions between two societies will gradually lead 
to qualitative change in the long-run by accumulating incremental change; this 
interactive character of accumulative development has presupposed a spirally 
ascending trajectory of world history, meaning that social development would 
periodically deviate from the pre-existing direction though it is predicated upon the 
past experience (Rosenberg 2012: 9-11). This notion is epitomized by Trotsky’s 
understanding of the origins of Russia’s backwardness constituted by the ‘combined 
development’ of Russia’s long-term interaction with both the capitalist West and the 
nomadic East. Notably, though Russia’s backwardness revealed itself more sharply 
when it encountered the pressure from the advanced European society, some 
components of this condition had been created long before the penetration of 
capitalist geopolitical pressures in a much broader longue dureé accumulation. The 
condition of backwardness, which would be reconceptualized as a potentially more 
favourable condition for socialism in future conjunctures, was generated geo-culturally 
in Trotsky’s sense. ‘Russia stood not only geographically, but also socially and 
historically, between Europe and Asia’ (Trotsky 1980: 5)37. This particular location 
perpetuated Russia’s  interaction and engagement with social forms from both the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Trotsky’s treatment of Ancient China is slightly problematic in terms of his own conception 
of uneven and combined development. ‘The Ancient civilizations of Egypt, India and China 
had a character self-sufficient enough’ (Trotsky 1980: 4). If unevenness is understood as the 
‘most general law of the historic process’ which enters and reconstructs itself in the process of 
combined development, China’s case could in no sense be viewed as ‘self-sufficient’; in this 
sense such a conception of premodern China runs the risk of falling Eurocentric (Hobson 
2011). Justin Rosenberg’s effort made to raise U&CD from the national-level concretion to a 
trans-historical category of ‘general abstraction’ attests to this point (Rosenberg 2006, 2010).  
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East and the West, thus the ‘Tartar yoke’ and the western geopolitical pressures, as 
well as the developmental paths they represented had both entered the state-
formation of Tsarism, crystallizing in the ‘incompleteness of Russian feudalism’ 
known for its ‘formlessness and poverty of cultural monuments’ (ibid). This argument 
shows that the condition of backwardness arose from a concrete historical process 
registering ‘differentiated, interactive temporalities of development within a wider 
social formation’ (Rosenberg in Rosenberg and Callinicos 2008: 101). This ‘wider 
social formation’ indicates two further points. First, backwardness is never reducible to 
any mechanism attached to a certain causally enclosed ‘mode of production’; and 
second, backwardness was not an unchanged condition existing synchronically with 
China’s premodern history, it emerged in a non-linear and accumulative manner 
which has necessarily entailed ‘qualitative transformation’. Notably, the Kyoto 
School’s argument that China’s modern era (kinsei in Japanese, jinshi in Chinese) 
started from the transition from Tang to Song when landed aristocracies began to give 
way to state-bureaucracy in exercising socio-political power (Miyakawa 1955; Naito 
1992: 10)38 indicates that there have been remarkable ‘wholesale transformation’ in 
premodern China before the encounter with western capitalism. However, the Kyoto 
School’s identification of premodern China’s ‘wholesale transformation’ has not been 
sufficiently theorized in their own account; and this is what U&CD will promise to do.  
 
3.3 Unevenness: the nomad-sedentary interaction and the North-
South Divide 
3.3.1 The nomad-sedentary unevenness: origins of the centralization of 
social power 
Before examining the historical conjuncture in which China’s premodern ‘wholesale 
transformation’ was conceived, I will first analyze the major differential social forces 
whose constant interactions have co-produced the ‘international conjunctures’ of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Though the Kyoto School has been repeatedly referred to by western scholars (e.g. 
Timothy Brook et al. 2005), works of these Japanese sinologists have not been systematically 
translated to English except for a few introductory notes. My discussion of this part of 
literature is based upon a ten-volumed collection of their works in Chinese, Riben xuezhe yanjiu 
zhongguo shilun xuanyi (Selected Translation of Japanese Scholars on China), Zhonghua Shuju (Chinese 
Book-house), Beijing 1992.  
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China’s premodern development. These forces include the engagement between the 
frontier nomadic societies and the agrarian society and that between the militarized 
northern states and the southern commercial world. When one refers to ‘China’ as a 
geo-cultural entity, the first question that requires clarity is the range and scale of such 
an entity. Geographically, one may easily identify the diverse forms of ecological and 
socio-productive systems spanning the whole Eurasian continent where boundaries of 
the Chinese state has been drawn differently throughout history (Lattimore 1951; 
Perdue 2004). Thus it is significant to understand in what way the various geo-cultural 
forms had been hung together through a certain set of political arrangements, and 
such political arrangements and its underlying correlation of social forces have co-
determined the longevity of Chinese civilization (Elvin 1973: 22). It is noticeable that 
the centralized state-apparatus created by the northern nomadic polities in their 
prolonged history of military expansion has served a critical role in national 
unification; but in what kind of socio-historical milieu was the centralized state 
constituted?   
The nomadic society as a pre-capitalist form of society is widely known for its life-style 
predicated upon mobility and military readiness rather than fixed property. It is noted 
that nomadism is a form of society with ‘geographically extensive military action’ and 
relatively underdeveloped civil administration (Lattimore 1962: 480-491; Mann 1986: 
9). ‘From the beginning, the Manchu rulers organized their society to make war’ 
(Perdue 2005: 547). Nomadism as a militarily driven social form is marked by its 
‘formlessness’ and ‘poverty of cultural monuments’ (Trotsky 1980: 4). The reason for 
this character is the nature of pastoral production and the living conditions of the 
nomadic societies, whose rise and fall was contingent upon the periodic change of 
aridity in pastoral fields (Khazanov 1968: 200). The high degree of mobility of 
nomadic tribes has made the idea of private property underdeveloped; but this does 
not mean that individual producers of a nomadic society were directly controlled by 
the state as a personified central proprietor. Marx argues that ‘what exists is only 
communal property, and only private possession’ (Marx 1973: 489, my italics). This 
does not mean that the redistribution of property in tribal societies was ‘communal’-
The entire landed property of one society was owned by the state in an abstract form, 
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whereas the possession of landed property was supported by a series of military and 
political institutions controlled by the state (Natsagdorj 1967: 266-272)39 . 
The ecological and environmental hardships faced by the nomadic tribes compelled 
their political and military organizations to seek further sources of agricultural surplus 
from adjacent locations such as cities, towns and broader areas of sedentary society. 
Bountiful resources and higher level of economic development in their sedentary 
agrarian neighbours came to make towns and cities with fixed landed property ‘the 
centre of warfare’ (Marx 1973: 489-495). So even though shortlived peace between 
the nomads and the settled communities could be founded upon specific political 
arrangement such as the tributary system, open warfare between the two different 
social forms became prevalent as a result of a series of structural-material constraints 
caused by ecological crisis (Matin 2007: 430-432). The intensive geopolitical 
engagement between the nomadic tribal and the settled agrarian polities had given 
rise to two contradictory and mutually propelling processes, namely the 
‘nomadization of agriculture’ and the ‘sedentarization of nomads’  which had made 
state-formation in the aftermath of nomadic conquest a complex process. In 
‘sedentarization of nomads’, the centralizing landownership of patrimonial state was 
contradictory to the parcellized private property regime prevalent in sedentary 
agricultural economies. Concerning the endurance and prevalence of tribal societies, 
the premodern Chinese history revolved around the central theme of how the 
militarily triumphant nomadic polities attempted to utilize the economically and 
culturally advanced elements of the sedentary society to sustain their state-held 
military machinery and corresponding social relations. As for ‘nomadization of 
agriculture’, settled agrarian societies attempted to borrow the militarily advanced 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Academician Sh. Natsagdorj’s seminal paper ‘The Economic Basis of Feudalism in 
Mongolia’ (1967) has documented the various forms of property relations coexisting under the 
state-monopoly in the nomadic tribes. On a more generalized level, however, it could be 
summed up that the way the complex relationships of property was maintained was in nature 
‘bureaucratic’ and ‘centralized’. ‘Rent’ is paid to ‘the supreme owner of the land, the state, in 
the person of the emperor’ in the form of ‘one-on-hand’ which is functionally equivalent to 
public service to the state and tributary tax (Natsagdorj 1967: 281).  
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elements of nomadic tribes to protect their own existence. Let us see how the 
‘medieval’ Chinese history (Eberhard 1965: 22)40 unfolded in such a matrix.  
Growing in parallel with its nomadic neighbours, the Chinese agrarian society took its 
root in the loess regions of the continent, originating in both the northern Yellow 
River Valley and the southern Yangzi Delta. Wet mashes, heavy rainfall and relatively 
more favourable conditions for agricultural production made these regions ripe for 
irrigated rice-growing economy. Because of the relative advantage in soil fertility and 
richer supply of agricultural surpluses, agrarian communities concentrated on the 
loess lands of the continent have long been ‘the primary focus of Chinese history’ 
(Lattimore 1951: 27-33). Output of agricultural production in those regions was 
largely determined by climatic and ecological changes, whose uncertainty impelled 
the ancient Chinese agrarian communities to introduce significant technological 
innovation. Archaeological evidences have demonstrated that Chinese metallurgy had 
reached a high level of development in the pre-imperial era. The technique of copper 
minting was invented in the Great Bronze Age and reached the height in the Shang 
Dynasty (B.C. 1000). Hydraulic projects in all scales were constructed in the Yellow 
River Valley under a state-supervised corvee labour system. Private ownership and 
unrestrained exchanges of lands existed widely (Fairbank and Goldman 2006: 29-45). 
On this basis, the cultural and political identity of Middle Kingdom (Zhonguo) was first 
conceived in the formation of China’s earliest polity as a geographical 
characterization of the loess heartland of irrigated agriculture, and the Zhou (Chou) 
Dynasty was the first carrier of this identity. The Zhou Dynasty has in a large sense 
resembled European feudalism founded upon unstable political coalitions between 
Dukes and Lords in northern and central plains similar in form to feudal fief under 
the mandate of the Imperial Overlord (Tianzi). However, the Zhou Dynasty and its 
feudal mode of society have eventually collapsed under the intensive onslaughts of 
Rong and Di nomadic tribes from the northern frontier. The collapse of the Zhou 
Dynasty immediately resulted in intra-systemic conflicts between warlords and 
aristocrats who were in the meantime proprietors of agricultural lands. The Spring !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The term ‘Medieval China’ is used by Wolfram Eberhard to refer to China’s history of 
feudalism originating in 400 BC (Eberhard 1965: 22-27). It needs to be noted that Eberhard 
defines feudalism broadly as a form of ‘society of basically agrarian character with two clearly 
separated social classes: a ruling and a ruled class’ (ibid: 27).  
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and Autumn Era and the Warring State Era that took place after the collapse of Zhou 
were a time that China’s political scene was populated by aristocratic warlords who 
engaged in ‘political accumulation’ through which their economic surpluses could 
only be extracted via political domination and conquest over their counterparts. The 
aristocrats in this course were identified along the lines of blood and ancestral 
lineages. It was against this backdrop that the earliest Confucian culture emerged, 
which taught people that individual practices of benevolence (ren) and justice (yi) would 
suffice to accommodate the ‘will of heaven’ (tianyi) defined in accordance to the ritual 
customs of family/clan-based kingdoms (Wang 2004: 163). During the time, activities 
from which Confucius’ understanding of benevolence and justice was derived were 
mostly ceremonies and rites held by Dukes and Kings in the Warring State period, 
which have all been documented in Analects as the generic texts of Confucianism 
(Schwartz 1985: 58). Through these activities and their implications, Confucius taught 
that political legitimacy could be achieved through the sound coordination between 
one’s personal moral practice and the practice of ancestral ritual (li) and music 
education (yue), thus Confucianism did not need any external, objective reference to 
indicate its moral validity at its founding stage. The early physiognomy of 
Confucianism mirrored the aristocratic families’ role as the key agency in China’s pre-
imperial social life. The families’ presiding of politics, as Benjamin Schwartz has 
precisely noted, drew a sharp contrast between the western view of justice expressed 
by Plato and Aristotle and Confucianism, which believes that political order could be 
derived from, and justified on the basis of the hierarchical order of family; and the 
derivation that distinguishes the Chinese cultural tradition with the western one is 
traceable in Confucius’ acknowledgement of the ‘economic role of the family’ which 
predetermined the socio-political structure of Chunqiu and Zhanguo polities and the 
rationale behind their political accumulation (Schwartz 1985: 69-70).  
The Warring State competition, which closely represented the feudal form of political 
accumulation in Europe has by the end diverged from the European experience 
dramatically.  The reason was that in each of the warring states, a tendency of 
centralization and bureaucraticization of social and economic power unfolded in 
tandem with the power of lineage-based aristocracies. The most critical factor that 
supervened into the intra-systemic competitions among warlords and aristocracies was 
the enduring impact of the nomadic tribes radiating from the northern frontier. The 
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nature of war-readiness of nomadic tribes stood as the enduring ‘external whip of 
necessity’ hanging over the head of the sedentary agrarian societies in the loess plain. 
However, both forms of society were in the meantime bequeathing each other with 
‘privileges of backwardness’ in different aspects. For the nomadic society that was 
backward in terms of economic productivity and politico-cultural maturity, the 
agrarian society was always an attraction of landed resources and cultural heritages 
(Lattimore 1962: 415-416). For the agrarian society with advanced agricultural 
production and much richer cultural legacies, the nomadic society was where 
knowledge of military organization and war techniques were obtained. Through this 
interaction, the early Chinese state-formation has produced rich socio-political 
legacies that in Mark Elvin’s terms were essential to the sustainability of a sizable 
empire (Elvin 1973). In military terms, pre-imperial aristocratic warlords benefited a 
lot by borrowing martial cultures, drilling techniques and use of weapons from 
nomadic tribes. With the techniques of cavalry, crossbow and archery taken directly 
from the nomadic societies, the war machinery of the warring polities became more 
efficient and formidable (Elvin 1973: 42-48). In politico-cultural terms, the nomadic 
pressure forced a bureaucratic dimension into existence in the state structure of pre-
imperial polities; whereas hydraulic projects emphasized by Wittfogel was just one 
minor reason for the rise of paramount state-power. The state-dominated corvee 
labour system was widely applied in recruiting soldiers to fight both nomads and other 
warring states. The centralizing tendency in the states in contact with the nomadic 
society amplified social unevenness on the North-South plane of the Chinese territory.  
 
3.3.2 The North-South Unevenness: South China as an economic 
attraction to warring societies 
Agricultural production in northern and southern parts of China differed greatly for 
their respective ecological and socioeconomic conditions. Such difference across 
regions generated an additional plane of social unevenness operating in combination 
with the nomad-sedentary geopolitical composition. North China is covered with dry 
wheat-millet area where growing season is shorter due to long winter and limited 
rainfall, whereas in the south, the ‘moist rice-growing areas’ are normally double-
cropped and even tripe-cropped (Fairbank and Goldman 1998: 5). Because of the 
relatively more favourable climate and natural setting, social groups in the south were 
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more likely to have richer agricultural surpluses at disposal. This situation had, as a 
result, turned into a higher degree of division of labour and commercialization in 
southern urban areas. Landed aristocrats were one of the most predominant social 
and political forces that ran into sharp contradiction with the state-power from time to 
time. Rich landlords in the south expanded their possession of estates not only by 
buying more lands, but more importantly by rendering free peasants ‘bondaged to the 
soil’ under the system of private services which were in conflict with the state-held 
official service (Elvin 1973: 71). Northern societies, facing harsh geopolitical exigencies 
from the nomadic frontier and the relatively lower agricultural productivity, were 
always more developed in military organizations and warring techniques largely due 
to their enduring technical and institutional exchanges with frontier nomads. The 
north-south unevenness thus became the structural condition that compelled northern 
polities to incorporate the southern societies to their projects of political unification by 
force.  
Interactions between the nomadic and sedentary societies on the northern frontier 
sharpened the North-South contrast by creating different political forms. An overview 
of the dynastic history immediately tells us that most united polities took their roots in 
the north where ancient polities were dominated by a strong military class of ‘power 
broker’ with leverage in the state. Though in overall, the formation of aristocratic 
power in both the north and the south incurred tensions between the landed class and 
the state-bureaucracy due to enduring military threat from external societies, the 
extent to which the state-bureaucracy could be enforced was by all means greater in 
the north, where there were not many ‘landlords’  (Miyakawa 1955). On the contrary, 
imposing state-bureaucracy and methods of centralized administrative control on the 
southern communities was a difficult task for northern empires for the greater 
influence of local landed aristocrats whose power was achieved on the basis of higher 
degree of centralized agricultural production (Ebrey 1978: 26).  
Whereas the higher agricultural productivity and better-developed commercial 
centres have long been a source of revenue for the northern martial polities (see Abu-
Lughod 1989: 156), the difficulty in transplanting state-bureaucracy to the south had 
rendered the coexistence and equilibrium between the personalized state-power and 
the aristocratic families unstable. Conflicts could easily occur between the southward 
imperial expansion and southern landlords’ effort to restore economic and social 
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autonomy. Patterns of the North-South interaction were diverse. In some occasions, 
there could simply be open warfare between northern colonizers and southern 
defenders. In other cases, southern landed aristocracies could strategically decide to 
ally with or rally to the northern invaders, seeking to have their interests vested in the 
state-bureaucracy. On the early stages of the imperial history, there had also been 
from time to time independent kingdoms in geographical isolation (Ebrey 1978), 
whereas after the Song Dynasty, intensified taxation over the southern agrarian 
society resulted in mushrooming sectarian societies and rural militarization underlying 
the imperial decline in Qing (Kuhn 1980: 10). In a long-term perspective, the North-
South contrast was increasingly deepened because of higher agricultural productivity 
and more prosperous commercial activities in the south which endured as an 
attraction to northern imperial powers. Therefore the incompatibility between the 
northern imperial political system and southern aristocratic families sowed the seed of 
centrifugal decline in state-authority alongside the extraordinary expansion of China’s 
imperial state; however it also means that from time to time there could also be a 
reciprocal relationship between the northern and southern social forces underlying 
many centralized empires in their heydays.  
 
3.4 Combination: the dialectics of nation-state and empire 
3.4.1 Qin-Han: early empires established upon the equilibrium between 
landed aristocracies and state-bureaucracy 
Now I will turn to the historical conjunctures of ‘combination’ in which the 
aforementioned social forms have generated spirally ascending development. The first 
unified empire in Chinese history was the Qin (Chin) Dynasty, which was not much 
predicated on common cultural awareness but military domination. The Qin Empire 
originated in a kingdom in the Warring State era (476-221 B.C.) situated at the 
contemporary Shaanxi province next to the Inner Asian frontier. Strictly speaking, the 
Qin state was not at the heartland of loess region where agricultural economy was the 
most prosperous. The main secret of Qin’s success was traceable to its close contact 
with frontier nomads through which Qin’s military capacity and organization had 
been substantially developed. In the early years of Qin, the intensive attack from the 
Rong barbarians made Qin’s state-structure increasingly centralized especially in 
military terms. It is noticeable that the Qin state has conveyed a much stronger ‘non-
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Chinese characters’. The culture of the Qin society was dominated by imperial 
militarism which repudiated ‘traditional mores, proper relationships and virtuous 
conduct’ (Bodde 1986: 31-32). The Qin state stood as a formidable force that had 
swept across northern China by the second century B.C. much because of its 
deviation from Confucian principles and successful repression of aristocratic families. 
With the noticeable insertion of nomadic elements to its state-structure, the Qin state 
had carried out a series of reform to liquate the aristocratic landed class first within its 
own domain. In 350 B.C, Shang Yang, the Qin chancellor launched the agrarian 
reform that removed the traditional ‘longitudinal and horizontal paths (qian and mo)’ 
held by the noble landlords to separate cultivated fields, making land plots in flexible 
size and exchangeable on the market. This reform had not only attracted a larger 
number of landless peasants from other states to join the Qin Empire, but also further 
reduced the impact of landlords. Shang Yang’s agrarian reform made the landlords 
less capable of tying the peasants to the land by rent, whereas enabling the state a 
broader basis of tax by freeing the peasants from the landlords’ feudal mode of control 
(ibid: 35).  
The Qin Empire (B.C. 221) was by all standards a brutally coercive system. Though 
the Qin Empire represented a radical effort made by the nomad-inspired northern 
warlords to unify the country, it has never succeeded in uprooting the stronghold of 
the aristocratic families and the stateless military ‘power brokers’ who could cooperate 
with any aristocrats. The most serious criticism of Qin’s reign was about its ruthless 
extermination of China’s cultural heritage especially the family-centred agrarian 
tradition. The corvee labour system was extended by far, taxes over agricultural 
production was high and the eradication of Confucius doctrines were violent. The 
Qin chancellor Li Si ordered the burning of Confucian classics because the family 
values it proclaimed ran counter to the imperial need of power-centralization (Lewis 
2007: 18). Qin was put to the end by a contingent revolt headed by corvee labours, 
and after Qin’s collapse a number of armed aristocratic families resurfaced to 
dominate the political scene for a short period of time.  
The second unified empire in Chinese history, the Han Empire (202 B.C.-220 A.C.)  
emerged by assimilating the aristocratic families through either direct conquest or 
exchange of noble privileges for domination. The Han Empire continued Qin’s 
expansion of state-bureaucracy and military centralization largely because of the need 
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to resist ensuing military threat from a greater nomadic military threat from the 
Hunic tribes, also known as Xiongnu on the Inner Asian frontier. Xiongnu underwent a 
process of militarization and unifcation of nomadic tribes, turning into a military-
bureaucratic empire thirsty for ‘external revenues to counterbalance the militarization 
of the society and the growing size of their courts’ (Di Cosmo 2005: 188-190). The 
Han Empire’s reaction to the geopolitical exigencies from the nomadic tribes had in a 
way demonstrated the interplay and coexistence between lineage-based families and 
state-bureaucracy. In the early stage, the Han Empire was adopting the policy of ‘he 
qin’, namely the inter-dynastic marriage with Xiongnu to lock the nomad into the Han’s 
state-structure, forming a ‘bipolar world order’ on the frontier which was still in a 
large sense predicated on the dominance of the ruling Liu family. Because the inter-
dynastic marriage could not successfully withhold the nomadic invasion, the Han 
emperors began to pursue more active military engagement with the nomadic frontier 
(Di Cosmo 2005: 215). In doing so, the Han emperors, as well as his Liu family began 
to beware of the necessity to bureaucratize the state and military forces in order to 
expand and regularize their size and capacity. When the role of the Liu family was 
weakened and undermined by the role of state-bureaucracy, the tension between the 
state and other aristocracies had arisen again. During the reign of Emperor Wudi, the 
Han Empire implemented a series of policies to exercise patrimonial power over the 
landed aristocrats via the state-bureaucracy (Lewis 2007: 63); and it is also recorded 
that the Han emperors relied more heavily upon bureaucratic officials in decision-
making and the throne was checked by the officials substantially (Bielenstein 1980: 
143-145). The Confucian ideology deserted in Qin was re-adopted by the Han 
emperors for blending family values and universal-imperial values into a unified 
imperial ideology. Han’s reinterpretation of Confucius had highlighted the objective 
dimension to the notion of political legitimacy in Confucius’ thought. To realize Ren 
and Yi (benevolence and justice), the practice of familial rites and music was 
inadequate. One also needs to ‘convert the divinity of rituals and music to the 
scientific cognition of objective natural phenomena and the underlying supreme law 
of nature’ (Wang 2004: 162-163, my translation from Chinese). The revival and 
development of Confucianism in Han consisted of a series of efforts to ‘objectify’ 
Confucianism in order to make it a set of universal heuristic and normative principles 
that could operate without observance of subjective familial rules. After a period of 
intellectual contention, Dong Zhongshu and his ‘New Text School’ had risen to the 
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status of orthodoxy with a theory of ‘Yin-Yang Wuxing (Shade-Sunshine and Five Phases)’ 
which was thought to have constituted the dialectic of universal motions. Dong 
Zhongshu’s Chunqiu Fanlu (The Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals) was 
honoured as the most authoritative companion to Confucius’s thoughts which 
subjected all moral principles to ‘a universal system that explained how all things 
worked and provided a blueprint for the best actions of the individuals and the state’, 
and ‘following this blueprint would lead to balance, harmony and success’ (Rainey 
2010: 134-137)41.  
Hereby it can be seen that the nomadic form of militarizing society has dramatically 
contributed to the emergence of the earliest unified empires in northern China by 
imbuing centralizing military organizations and warring techniques to northern 
agrarian polities, which then inevitably called forth the establishment and expansion 
of centralizing state-bureaucracy. The configuration of nomadic and agrarian 
elements in the Chinese polity determined its evolution, like the Qin-Han empire-
formation, which was still built on a unstable power-equilibrium between the 
aristocratic families and the state-bureaucracy. Because of the overstretched domain 
of the two empires, their effort to expand centralizing control would inevitably run 
into conflict with the interests of local and regional landed aristocracies which were 
militarized on their own power base. As far as the social basis of both empires are 
concerned, though they relied heavily on bureaucratic administration, they were both 
polities borne out of and constrained by lineage-based militarist blocs. Thus the 
process of power consolidation involved not only bureaucratizing state-power, but also 
interweaving and coordinating family values in the expanding state-machinery. 
Whereas the failure of doing this has caused the collapse of Qin, the Han’s enlarged 
boundary and prolonged political stability was largely due to the balance between the 
two social forms. Now let me move to examine the Tang-Song transition as the 
advent of China’s kinsei caused by new amalgamation of social formations which 
tipped the balance of power away from the landed aristocracies towards the 
centralized state-bureaucracy. I will then show that the irreversible subordination of 
landed aristocracies to the state-bureaucracy was a qualitative change as an emergent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Wang Hui has detailed the transformation of Confucianism in the Han period to an 
ideology legitimizing the universal empire, see in his Xiandai zhongguo sixiang de xingqi (The Rise 
of Modern Chinese Thoughts), vol. 1, pp. 160-175.  
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property of the interaction between nomadic and sedentary as well as military and 
commercial social forms.  
3.4.2 The Tang-Song transition: the Chinese ‘kinsei’ and the temporary 
resemblance of modern nation-state 
The historical event that the state-bureaucracy began to overpower landed 
aristocracies has been the most notable ‘qualitative change’ in premodern China 
which can even be treated as the marker of China’s entry to the modern time. The 
Tang-Song transition (A. D. 618-1279) is traceable to the socio-political amalgam 
underlying the Tang state. On the north-south plane of unevenness, it is recognizable 
that in the Tang Dynasty, the state had secured its revenues by establishing strong 
control over the Yangzi Delta where agricultural products and human resources were 
bountiful. To secure the state’s monopoly over economic surpluses, the Tang Dynasty 
had been for a long time trying to enforce the ‘equal land allocation system’ (juntianzhi) 
which took its root in the Tang Dynasty’s predecessor, the nomadic state of Northern 
Wei. By allocating lands evenly to individual peasants, the imperial state of Tang 
aimed at creating a tributary system that monopolized economic surpluses free of 
impact from landed nobles. The equal allocation of land had reduced the size of 
landed conglomerates held by a handful of great families, subsuming individual 
peasants and their households to the state-held system of taxation and labour service. 
One could easily detect similarities between the Tang land allocation and Mao 
Zedong’s Land Reform concerning not only the egalitarianism of both movements, 
but also that ‘the tenure granted under the (Tang) system was limited to the lifetime of 
the holder, ad granted only the right of use (my emphasis)’ (Twitchett 1979: 25). Thus the 
Tang landed system marked the beginning of Chinese peasants’ structural 
dependence on the state for disaster-relief when ‘the chun-tien (tuntian) system was taken 
very seriously as the legal basis for all tenure of land, and every household’s landed 
possessions were registered in accordance with its legal entitlement’ (ibid). To deepen 
the state-bureaucracy’s penetration of society, the examination system was extended 
to the national scale based upon which a larger bureaucratic administration began to 
take shape. The nine-ranking system (jiupin) manipulated by the landed nobles had 
been replaced by the state-held examination which allowed agrarian civilians access to 
extraction and accumulation of economic surpluses via the state-bureaucracy. What 
the ‘equal land allocation system’ demonstrated was the state’s incentive to ‘maintain 
a large and well-off peasant class as a reservoir for (military) recruits’ which would in 
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turn strengthen the power of the state facing the nomadic Turks as the most 
dangerous enemy (Elvin 1972: 54-57).  
However, the looming impact of nomad-sedentary interaction and the regional 
unevenness created by it would generate counter-forces to the operation of the state-
monopoly of economy and society on the national scale. United great estates had 
never ceased to exist beyond the regulatory power of the state-bureaucracy and 
differentiation began to occur to the class of landed aristocracy. Whereas some landed 
nobles were high-ranking officials whose landed property was granted and protected 
by the imperial bureaucracy, some other landed nobles were still great aristocratic 
clans whose ‘sphere of influence’ remained intact from the expansion of state-power. 
This part of landed aristocracy, possessing private military forces, had eventually put 
the state-ordered tributary system to the end after the An Lushan rebellion (A. D. 755-
763). An Lushan, as a militarist with nomadic ancestry, had almost uprooted the 
equal-land-allocation system via his military upheaval. When the devastating conflict 
had depopulated and pauperized the northern countryside, the peasants could not 
depend on the declining imperial state but the landed aristocracies who outcompeted 
the state in power after the An Lushan rebellion. Therefore, centralization of lands 
took place again in late Tang when the impoverished peasants began to voluntarily 
subordinate themselves to the landed aristocracies for protection. Servile-tenancy and 
feudal rent collection re-emerged after the collapse of Tang (Twitchett 1979: 26). In 
the period of political fragmentation after the Tang Dynasty, what populated China’s 
social and political life were again family-centred warlords with large estates and 
servile labours dependent on their protection (Eberhard 1965). It was from these 
warlords engaging in political accumulation that the Song Dynasty had emerged. 
However this time, the emergence of Song was by no means a replica of former 
empires who were in constant tensions with the landed aristocracies that attempted to 
centralize their social and military power, it was, for the first time in history, a nation-
state built upon rational control over the society by professional bureaucrats (Naito 
1992; Banaji 2010).  Let us take a glance at how this historically unprecedented social 
structure arose from the uneven and combined development in the politico-military 
struggles during the post-Tang era.  
Sharper contrast among societies was always prone to generate contradiction-cum-
transformation. The Tang-Song transition could be dated back to the sharpened 
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unevenness of economic development within and between southern and northern 
regions in China. Revolutionary development in technology and skills had occurred to 
agricultural production in both the north and the south since late Tang period. Most 
critically, the agricultural growth in the southern ‘Ten Kingdoms’ had given rise to 
new commercial and monetary institutions which had later became conducive to the 
remaking of universal state-bureaucracy.  In the interregnum time of southern ten 
kingdoms between the Tang and the Song, southern regions were all engaging in 
different types of agricultural production with an ample supply of labour migrating 
from the war-torn north. The agricultural economy had not only increased in 
productivity, but also the degree of specialization along regional lines (Elvin 1973:146; 
Clark 2009: 171-178). The sharpened regional unevenness in agricultural production 
caused by specialization prompted southern regions and kingdoms to engage in 
inter/intra-regional trade in an unprecedented scale. Thus for the southern kingdoms, 
their economies began to develop with ‘an unparalleled dependence upon trade’, and 
such dependence coincided with the increasing volume of ‘overseas commerce’ 
(Marks 2007; Clark 2009: 177). The significance of trade within and beyond China 
had redirected the centre of economic life to the southern cities along the coast and 
inland waterways such as the Grand Canal where trade revenues had become the 
major source of taxes levied by the state (Clark 2009: 177). Facing such demand, a 
revolution in the monetary system took place through which taxes in cash had been 
introduced to replace taxes in kind (Elvin 1973: 146). The precocious development of 
iron and coal industries in the Song Dynasty had pushed the expansion of Chinese 
metallic industries to the level of England in the early phase of Industrial Revolution; 
thus metal cash needed for trade underwent a dramatic increase in supply due to the 
development of iron and copper minting (Hartwell 1962: 154-156). Also with the 
invention of printing technology, the Chinese government was able to sustain a 
‘monetary economy’ on the basis of a mixed use of ‘bills, tallies and tickets’ without 
being constrained by the periodic decline in coinage. More importantly, because taxes 
could be levied in cash rather than only in kind and labour, a wider range of levy 
beyond land-tax began to appear, introducing ‘household levy’ and ‘poll tax’ which 
were not leviable in Tang (Elvin 1973: 148). Therefore the development in 
agricultural specialization and monetary innovation had paved the way to the 
commercial miracle in southern China as the economic basis of the rise of the 
bureaucratic nation-state (Curtin 1984: 109).    
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However, another historical force co-determining the Tang-Song transition was the 
blockage of northern trade route by the frontier nomads which impelled the founders 
of Song to turn southward. In the tenth century, the northern Liao state had already 
become a frontier empire in considerable size by annexing a series of nomadic tribes. 
The Tangut tribes, who later became the Xi Xia state in the Ordos Desert had been 
encroaching the Song territory since late tenth century. In mid-eleventh century the 
Xi Xia had expanded their territory to the entire frontier in the northwest from 
Ningxia, Gansu to Tibet, and the Song Dynasty had been  ‘cut off from the land route 
across Turkestan to Western Asia and Europe’, which meant the closure of China’s 
traditional trade route to the West operative in Tang (Lau and Huang 2009: 252-253). 
The nomadic encroachment of the north and the burgeoning commercial 
development in the south had together driven the Song Dynasty to become a 
commercial state, thus on economic grounds, the capital of Song was moved from 
Chang’an to Kaifeng, which was closer to the ‘affluent south’ (ibid: 222).   
Because of the increasing significance of southern commercial economy to the Song 
emperors, the state bureaucracy, as the only agent that could effectively levy taxes 
effectively from commercial activities on national scale, gained more momentum than 
the aristocratic families did. In the meantime, the seizure of northern territories by 
nomad-tribal polities had impelled the founder of the Song Dynasty to reduce the size 
of the Chinese polity from a cosmopolitan empire to a limited state with stable source 
of revenues. With the economic centre of the state transferred to the south, the Song 
state needed a robust bureaucratic machinery to extract enough economic surpluses 
from the southern commerce. The founder of the Song, Emperor Taizu had 
succeeded in bureaucratizing the society by demilitarizing the war-machine of large 
aristocratic families and the influential militarists within the Song government. Having 
seized the throne via a coup d’état, Taizu had managed to subordinate regional-local 
military nobles through a series of political exchanges and manoeuvrings, after which 
military officials had been given comfortable official posts in the state-bureaucracy, 
and the military power had been centralized to the control of the emperor himself 
(Wang 1963: 191-194; Lau and Huang 2009: 216-217; McCord 1993: 17). More 
fundamentally, the rise of commercial economy in the south and the increasing 
commercial revenues enabled the Song state to sustain a large civil administration 
which had outcompeted the military sector. The state and the emperors’ monopoly 
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over the military power was not realized by ‘a small group of extremely powerful 
lineages’, but a ‘new class of professional bureaucrats’ recruited from the open and 
rational official examination (Banaji 2010: 27-28).    
Therefore it is fair to say that ever since the Song Dynasty, the state-bureaucracy 
began to rise above other class relations of the society by obtaining increasing socio-
political autonomy, which was a major result of the commercial and monetary 
development in the southern economy. This autonomy had remade the imperial 
bureaucrats a rentier class in economic life which enabled them to extract wealth and 
profits through the bureaucratic system without participating production directly. It 
was only until then that the bureaucracy populated by professional scholar-officers 
had become an independent state-class. The Song state was in a larger sense a 
resemblance of modern nation-state in Europe that the governmental power and 
state-society relationship had been rationalized to keep the state as the sole agency 
capable of exercising legitimate violence over limited territorial scale in Max Weber’s 
sense. And on the basis of rational and professional state-bureaucracy, the identity of 
Chinese-ness had arisen in the form of nationalism because a milieu in which ‘the 
existence of the (Weberian) state is already very much taken for granted’, and the 
existence of ‘politically centralized units, and of a moral-political climate in which 
such centralized units are taken for granted’ (Gellner 1983: 4) was present in Song’s 
time. Therefore, the Song Dynasty has presented the fundamental ‘wholesale 
transformation’ from which China’s modern history (kinsei) unfolded with the 
temporary occurrence of a nation-state (Naito 1992: 10; Miyazaki 1992: 153), and 
after which China’s development had twisted into a course of ‘dynamic recurrence’ 
leading to the final breakdown (Anderson 1974: 540). The accumulative development 
on the plane of the nomad-sedentary unevenness gave a critical push that turned the 
Chinese state from a nation-state to an empire.  
 
3.5 Development: the rise of a bureaucratic empire and the 
configuration of political agency of the peasantry 
3.5.1 The Mongolian interlude: class society liquated  
The rise of the Mongolian Empire was indeed the most significant world-historical 
event that reshaped the ‘social climate’ of the entire Eurasia. As for China, the 
penetration of the Mongolian political economy was crucial in the sense that the 
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Mongol overlord’s harsh taxation over the tribal states on the Central Asian frontier 
had driven them to declare wars against the Song Dynasty for extra revenues (Abu-
Lughod 1989: 154-157). More significantly, after the Mongolian Empire had 
inaugurated the Yuan Dynasty in China, the manorial economy of Song was 
dismantled and China was turned towards a ‘status society’. In such a society, 
distribution of surplus was fully dominated by the state-bureaucracy not only for 
extracting revenues from the agrarian society to sustain foreign conquests, but also to 
subject the Chinese agrarian social groups, especially the southern landed aristocrats 
to the military-hierarchical order of the Mongolian nomadic tribe (ibid; see also Yates 
2006: 217-218).  
The concept of status society means that the ownership of land and redistribution of 
surplus were determined not by the social relations developed organically in 
production, but a hierarchy of political status mediated by the state-bureaucracy 
(Moulder 1978). To Trotsky, it was the ‘incompetence’ of feudalism that rendered a 
backward society ‘formless’. In China’s case, the formlessness of society originated in 
the tribal status-system superimposed by the Mongolian invaders. It is equally 
important that the structure of the state-bureaucracy was not a Mongolian invention 
but what the Mongol Empire (the Yuan Dynasty) inherited from the Song legacy.  
Under the Mongolian rule, the newly created state-bureaucracy demonstrated two 
characteristics. First, it was not a system open to all civilians; thus rural scholars who 
wanted to change their life by passing the exam in the Song Dynasty were prevented 
from leaving the countryside. Second, it was a highly coercive system that enabled the 
state boundless power in extracting surpluses from all sectors of the society by tax-
farming. Landed property had been reclaimed and reshuffled by the state to reward 
the tribal-military notables in the form of appendages. Peasants’ duties first paid to 
appanages in the form of taxes were then remitted to the government for a second 
round of equal redistribution among the appanages (Rossabi 1994: 448). Through this 
process, the agricultural production dominated by manors in Song had been 
‘pastoralized’ with the power of the landlords dramatically reduced (Anderson 1979: 
265).  
Therefore, whereas the Song Dynasty had created a powerful state-bureaucracy 
operated by professional officials that was alienated from direct economic production,  
the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty had rendered the power of the state-bureaucratic class 
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insurmountable over all other social forces of the society via military conquest. Since 
the Tang-Song transition, no social force in China could outcompete the state in 
power because most of the threatening social forces had been dissolved by the military 
prowess of the Mongol Empire. The process of dissolution started with Yuan’s 
inheritance of the institutional remnants created and left by the Song Dynasty, and 
was accelerated and reinforced by topping the Song legacy up with tribal-military 
elements. The Yuan Empire faltered for its ruthless colonization of Chinese 
institutions and culture with nomadic characteristics; and the bitter lesson of the Yuan 
Empire as a historical baggage suggested to the subsequent rulers that a more 
sophisticated balance was needed to sustain an empire based upon effective 
coordination between nomadic and sedentary social forms.  
3.5.2 The debt of cosmopolitanism of the Qing Dynasty  
After the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.C.) had been exhausted by continuous intra-
factional struggles in the court, another strand of northern nomadic tribesmen, the 
Manchu had overrun the whole country and established the most ethnically 
sophisticated empire in Chinese history in 1644. Historians have argued from a 
comparative perspective that ‘the Qing dynasty was not simply the last of the great 
dynasties of China; it was a multiethnic empire utilizing a diversity of governing 
institutions and routines’ (Ho 1967; Miller 2000: 25). The Qing Empire has presented 
a great transformation replacing the Han-centred nation-state founded by Song with a 
multi-ethnic empire headed by Manchu, which was built upon the equilibrium of 
power among the northern nomads and the Han Chinese. In the meantime, the Qing 
Empire was the height of the enduring co-constitution between nomads and agrarian 
communities finally crystallized in the state’s bureaucratic control of the society which 
had become predominant since the Song Dynasty. Now let us see how the logic of 
Uneven and Combined Development underlay this transformation and helped shed 
lights on the decline of imperial order based upon the understanding of the amalgam 
of nomadism, sedentariness and bureaucracy.  
First of all, the rise of the Manchu power was a development traceable to the enduring 
interaction of nomadic war-oriented economy and agricultural production on the 
northern frontier. The Manchu was originally a nomadic society in the northeastern 
forest who was the descendent of Jianzhou Jurchen living in units of hunter-gather 
bands. Economically, the Manchu tribes were in close contact with settled villages of 
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higher degree of agricultural specialization. Through continuous trade and 
commercial relationships, part of the northeastern agricultural communities were 
either overtaken by Manchu tribes by force, or melted into semi-nomadic and semi-
sedentary communities under specific political arrangement. Part of the Manchu 
society had given up their hunter-gatherer production and tribal lifestyle due to the 
enhanced sophistication of production acquired from economic connections with the 
adjacent agrarian society. Through ‘sedentarization’ had the Manchu not only 
adopted techniques and skills of agricultural production which helped them escape the 
periodic decline of pastoral fertility, but more importantly the bureaucratic institutions 
that eventually helped them tam the various geopolitical pressures arising from either 
the Chinese bordered garrisons and the remnants of war-prone Mongolian tribes 
(Lattimore 1951: 83-92; Michael 1965: 15). The bureaucratically manipulated socio-
political system created by the Manchu leaders for coordinating and pacifying 
different geopolitical threats was known as the banner system, which was a ‘semi-
military and semi-productive/agricultural’ institution. Under the banner system, 
‘[n]obles, who were successful in war or who came to submit received new fields, 
families and serfs in smaller and greater numbers’ on hereditary basis, whereas they 
were all subjected to the great overlord who maintained the unity of the organization 
for military purposes; most of the enfeoffed nobles had to be rotated in the 
professional army organized on the basis of the Eight Banners (Lattimore 1951: 130-
133). The methods used to control the feudal nobles under the banner system was 
then turned into a bureaucratic administration after the Manchu conquest of China 
(Michael 1965: 53-55, 60-61). 
The functional aspects of the banner system were manifold. Accumulating greater 
amount of agricultural surpluses was only one thing, and the more important driver of 
the system was indeed geopolitical. Based upon the bureaucratic allocation of means 
of production and means of subsistence in accordance with military ranking, the 
Manchu polity had assimilated a variety of racial and ethnical groups into the banner 
system during the years of war on the frontier. When the Manchu had grown to the 
extent that its military strength could support wider stretch of the imperial rule, its rise 
to power coincided the partial revival of the Mongol military forces adjacent to the 
Manchu heartland in northeastern China. The remnants of Mongol tribes meant not 
only a latent geopolitical threat to the Manchu state, but also a chance to upgrade the 
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Manchu military forces under certain political arrangements that detached the 
Mongolian militarists from their original tribes (Lattimore 1951: 89-91). In this sense, 
the Manchu rulers in the early years had made the ‘banner system’ the institutional 
home for both nomadic military preparation and ethnical synthesis in the Manchu’s 
interest. The banner system was in some aspects resembling the Mongolian minghan 
that placed agricultural surpluses under the monopoly of patrimonial militarists, but it 
was more flexible in terms of its ethnical inclusiveness. Not only Mongolian tribes had 
been organized into banner units, but also Han groups, for example the border guards 
of the Ming Dynasty (weishu) on the frontier had been absorbed by this system as well 
(Michael 1965: 25-38). Using the banner system the Manchu tribes had increased its 
military capability very rapidly with a number of frontier military forces subjected to 
the Manchu overlord.  
The Manchu occupation of China proper had embarked upon two processes. Firstly 
the banner system, which revolved around the artificial demarcation between nobles 
and civilians in military terms, had been forcefully imposed upon the Chinese society 
and the Han-centred state-bureaucracy. The Chinese institutional and cultural forms 
were both mobilized to consolidate the social privileges of the Manchu nobles; the 
bannermen who had contributed to the founding of Qing were given posts reserved 
for the Manchus in the bureaucratic system in order to undermine their military 
characteristics and differentiate them from the Han population (Elliot 2001: 133-135). 
Secondly the Qing emperors, with the lesson taken from the Mongol’s ruthless 
pastoralization of China, had learned to coordinate the Manchu system with the 
Chinese society and culture without coercive imposition. Whereas the Qing armies 
had raided the southern landlords for times to dissolve them, and the government had 
in the meantime expanded the civil examination on provincially equal basis to 
subordinate landownership to scholarly office-holding (Anderson 1979: 530). 
However, as far as the banner system was concerned, ethical separatism was still 
maintained between peoples, which means exclusive economic privileges were still 
granted to the banner nobles on fixed terms. Both of these conditions required a 
expanded bureaucratic system that could only be maintained on a wide basis of 
financial revenues (Elliot 2001: 191-197).  
Unlike the Song Dynasty which was a prototypical nation-state with limited ethnical 
and territorial boundaries, the Qing Dynasty was an ethnically and territorially 
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unbounded empire due to its specific origins of state-formation. This did not mean 
that the Qing emperors were ruthlessly expanding their sphere of control by annexing 
secondary polities, but that the institutional and political structure of the state assumed 
ethnical openness from the outset which was not necessarily compatible with the 
notion of fixed territory. As the banner system consisted of not only Manchu nobles 
but also Mongolian tribes and Han militarists, the complexity of ethnicities 
presupposed that the Qing emperors could not evade dealing with its relationships 
with the frontier tribal states and the remnants of Mongolian branches which kept 
posing geopolitical threats in all forms (Lattimore 1951: 83-89). The militarism of the 
Manchu and Mongolian societies had produced a series of repercussions after the 
founding of the Qing Dynasty on the northern frontier, which had resulted in the 
expansionist military agenda of the Qing emperors (Rowe 2009: 73). By the reign of 
Qianlong (1735-1796), the northwestern frontier had been settled under a series of 
political and diplomatic arrangements into an administrative area known as the ‘New 
Dominion’ (Xinjiang) after the largest tribal empire, the Zunghars had been dismantled 
by incessant imperial attacks (see Perdue 2005: 209-292 passim). The making of these 
political settlement involved not only politico-military domination but also cultural 
and economic maneuverings such as state-ordered long-distance migration. All these 
operations required an all-encompassing, multi-functional bureaucratic system with 
which methods of long-distance control could be substantiated.  
3.5.3 The paradox of centralization and decentralization of the empire: 
the premodern orgins of China’s backwardness and the peasant’s 
political agency  
So far it has been demonstrated that the unique combination of the heritage of 
Chinese state-bureaucracy and the Qing Dynasty’s cosmopolitan premise 
strengthened the enduring tendency of the state-bureaucracy overriding local powers. 
However the other side of the coin was that the more the emperors attempted to 
extend the centralized bureaucratic control over the wide-ranging terrain of the 
empire, the more prevalent the concomitant tendency of centrifugal decline in state-
authority would appear. The Empire’s bureaucratization of social life had in itself 
conceived the danger of decentralizing the state authority. The structural crisis of the 
Qing Empire was that on one hand, its ethnical and territorial openness assumed an 
all-encompassing character of the state-bureaucracy; whereas on the other hand, it 
was never financially possible to sustain bureaucratic control over all variegated forms 
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of social and political forces of the time. The complicated structure of the empire had 
made long-distance control increasingly difficult facing the heterogeneous local 
political incentives, when regional and local bureaucrats with the imperial mandate to 
govern were not directly controllable by the central government (Perdue 2005: 548). 
This absence of state intervention did not only mean local corruption and abuse of 
power, but more seriously a necessary coordination between the Qing’s official 
standing army, the Manchu bannermen and the Green Standard Army as the ‘inner 
core of garrison forces’ and various local military forces with ‘personally oriented 
command structures’ of many kinds (Michael 1949: 470-471; McCord 1993: 18-19). 
In allowing the existence of these regional-local military forces with heterogeneous 
political and economic incentives, the Qing’s centralizing bureaucratization had from 
the outset sowed the seed of centrifugal dissolution.  
The contradictory dual process of centralization and decentralization gave rise to the 
particular backwardness of premodern China, whereas it also configured a very 
specific political agency of the Chinese peasant associated to the strength of the state. 
The specific condition of backwardness rested in the Chinese peasant’s vulnerability. 
Though the imperial state could render the landed class dependent upon its 
bureaucratic system as what Barrington Moore describes, it could not resolve the 
social problems caused by intensifying tensions between the booming population and 
the limited productivity of lands in total. In colonizing frontier dominions, the Qing 
government had ordered a huge number of Han people to migrate into those frontier 
areas, and because most of China’s local landlords who used to provide impoverished 
peasants with asylum by bonding them to the soil had already been disempowered by 
the time, the livelihood of those ‘political migrants’ had to be accounted for by the 
central government itself. As a result, the Qing state had turned into a specific 
‘developmental agrarian state’ whose legitimacy, for most of the landless population, 
was premised upon its ability to maintain a granary system for rescuing the starving 
peasants (Perdue 2005: 549-561)42. As Peter Perdue has argued, the Qing state had 
long been involved in ‘encouraging the fullest possible exploitation of landed 
resources, including foodstuffs and minerals’. The ‘Mandate of Heaven’ was 
determined by whether ‘the state regulation and cooperation with merchants was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For details of the state-held granary system, see PE. Will and RB. Wong ed. Nourishing the 
People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1991.  
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directed toward the common goal of improving people’s welfare while strengthening 
the resource of the state’ (ibid: 541).  
The specific condition of backwardness has on the other hand configured the Chinese 
peasant’s political agency. Once the state failed to sustain an effective granary system 
or to improve agricultural input during the time of famine or natural disasters, it was 
unavoidable that impoverished peasants turned to regional military organizations or 
even bandits for living, which would in turn exacerbate the decline in the state’s 
authority. However, if autonomous peasant revolts could ripple onto the systemic level, 
it always aspired to ‘bolstering the state-authority’ for provision of welfare and 
improvement of agricultural output. Egalitarianism and restoration of central 
government have thus been viewed as interdependent on each other by the Chinese 
peasant (see Lin 2006: 60). The Taiping Rebellion, which is viewed as the forerunner 
of Mao’s revolution exemplifies such a mixture of political incentives. The Taiping 
Rebellion (1851) marked its difference from traditional military conquest by 
introducing the Christian ideology known as ‘God-worshipping’. The universalist 
claim of Christianity was reinterpreted by its peasant leaders as a salvationist 
commission of renewing the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ which the corrupt Qing Dynasty 
no long possessed. More significantly, the Taiping leaders believed that the ‘Mandate 
of Heaven’ which was tied to the state’s ability of delivering welfare and promoting 
agricultural egalitarianism needed to be substantiated via a more potent bureaucratic 
system. The entire Taiping Kingdom was divided into a number of family-based units 
controlled by a sergeant who oversaw the civil and military activities of these units. 
The sergeant was then subject to a rigorously designed ‘pyramidal hierarchy of 
officers’ which supervised all the regional units under the imperial hierarchy (Kuhn 
1980: 190). Though the Taiping movement did not entail any incentives of 
developmentalism and modernization which was central to the subsequent 
revolutionary moves, it has nonetheless established a key principle to which the 
subsequent revolutionaries adhered: social justice could only be delivered by a strong 
centralized state with firm control of civil and military activities (ibid). The failure of 
the Taiping Rebellion can also be partly attributed to its inability of reviving 
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agricultural productivity with a reinvented state-bureaucracy43. Though such a 
principle bears numerous historical variances from the Self-strengthening Movement 
to Maoism, the centrality of state in maintaining social justice has never been denied 
throughout the modern history.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
China’s ‘condition of backwardness’, as the historical and logical starting point of 
China’s modern revolutionary development, is conventionally theorized by various 
students of Chinese history as a situation in which China’s economic and social 
development could only operate under a super-imposed, oversized state-bureaucracy 
which has caused the ‘unfit’ between socio-political relations and production forces 
(Isaac 1938: 2-5). However, such an ‘unfit’ was never a condition predetermined or 
self-constituted by any internal property of the Chinese society; it was instead the 
property of the major ‘qualitative transformation’ in history as a consequence of the 
prolonged interaction between the nomadic and the sedentary forms of society. Only 
by mapping the evolutionary trajectory of China’s pre-capitalist longue dureé can one 
understand the deep-seated crisis of imperial China, and the corresponding 
configuring of the peasant’s political agency as the origin of modern peasant 
revolution.  
By examining the nomad-sedentary interaction, Uneven and Combined Development 
can re-periodize China’s premodern history in line with the thesis of ‘Tang-Song 
transition’ upheld by the Kyoto School, which argues that the predominance of state-
bureaucracy instated in Song was the marker of China’s entry to early modernity 
(Kinsei or Jinshi) (Miyakawa 1955; Naito 1992: 10; Miyazaki 1992: 153; also Anderson 
1979: 540; Banaji 2010: 28, 34). Such a reconstructed historiography of pre-capitalist 
China will enable a redefinition of the historically specific problematique of China’s 
backwardness, which can be understood as series of crises caused by a over-expanding  
state-bureaucracy superimposed upon a agrarian society of small-scale production. 
Having dismantled the local landed aristocracies, the state-administration operated by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 It is recorded that agricultural output dropped by 6% during the two decades of 
Taiping Kingdom, see Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, 1993, Zhongguo Zibenzhuyi 
Fazhanshi (The History of Capitalist Development in China), vol. 3, pp. 275. 
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professional bureaucrats in Song was over-expanded and over-appropriated by 
imperial state-builders for extracting economic surpluses for military purposes, and to 
sustain a huge ‘status society’ emerging from frontier geopolitics. With the state-
bureaucracy rendered the most powerful social force since the early modern era, the 
central question for the Chinese development became how to establish an effective 
structure of state-authority over a culturally and developmentally heterogeneous 
territorial space by which sufficient social service and agricultural growth could be 
provided to the vulnerable peasant communities. On this basis, the specific political 
agency of the Chinese peasant was historically conceived: ‘bolstering state-authority’ 
was perceived by the Chinese peasant as the key modus operandi to promote 
egalitarianism and economic development in order to renew the universal ‘Mandate 
of Heaven’.  Such political agency of the Chinese peasant conceived in the uneven 
and combined development of premodern history will foreground the analysis of 
China’s encounter with the universalizing force of western modernity and enable a 
international conception of modern revolution transcending the extant dichotomy of 
Sino-centric and Eurocentric narratives.  
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Chapter 4 The Origins of China’s ‘Revolution of 
Backwardness’ and the Paradoxical Marriage between 
Communism and Nationalism as the General Context of 
Modern Revolution 
4.1 Introduction: Sino-centrism, Euro-centrism and ‘Revolution of 
Backwardness’  
How did China’s imperial crisis give rise to the specific context of China’s modern 
revolution, and why was the premodern political agency of the peasant translated into 
its modern form of peasant socialism? For this question, the Xinhai Revolution (1911) 
needs to be interpreted as a critical formative moment of China’s modern revolution. 
In a military coup d’état, the Qing Empire was overthrown by a broad revolutionary 
alliance formed among regional militarists, overseas students and liberal-democratic 
revolutionaries; and the revolutionaries had created a constitutional republic 
(Republic of China) which was extremely unstable. The liberal-democratic regime 
founded in 1911 had soon descended into political fragmentation dominated by 
warlord politics, whereas liberal democracy became merely nominal. The bitter 
legacies of the 1911 Revolution, inter alia the unfulfilled promise of national liberation 
and unification urged more radical political resolutions to the Chinese nation’s 
‘condition of backwardness’ in the aftermath of the dynastic history. Social and 
political upheavals incurred by the Xinhai Revolution had created a power vacuum 
for more progressive forces to mushroom; and they had also taught the Chinese elites 
a bitter lesson about the failure of industrialization and political reform of the 
nineteenth century, and set for the revolutionaries new parameters within which early 
socialist thoughts were conceived. What is theoretically significant is that the 1911 
Revolution has presented a typical case of liberal-democratic revolution fusing with 
traditional agrarian socioeconomic structure (Matin 2012). To understand the specific 
origins and patterns of the Chinese Revolution, this chapter will reconceptualize the 
development of the nineteenth century and the 1911 Revolution as the consequence 
of a prolonged ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ in which the incentives and possibilities 
of peasant-socialist revolution was conceived (Knei-Paz 1978; Matin 2006, 2012).  
Notably, causes of the collapse of Qing and the 1911 Revolution is under-theorized 
because of the extant dichotomy between Sino-centrism and Eurocentrism which 
both tend to view China’s entry to modernity as a singular process. They have 
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reduced the rationale of the Chinese Revolution to either ‘sustaining China’s 
premodern pattern of development’ or ‘adapting to the West’. Such a binary has 
prevented them from viewing the whole constellation of national and international 
contradictions that the 1911 Revolution was to address. The Eurocentric approach 
understands China’s modern transformation as a process of ‘impact-response’ 
dynamics. For this approach, the Chinese society is treated as a passive adaptor to the 
norms and pressures of the western society. The West is viewed as the only 
universalizing force of global social transformation, and China’s entire modern 
revolution is treated as an enterprise of the Chinese elites attempting to recreate the 
Chinese society in western images (Fairbank and Teng 1954; Gong 1998). Whereas 
the Eurocentric approach could by no means perceive the peasantry as a relevant 
agent of modern transformation, other scholars have come to pursue a Sino-centric 
approach that traces the particular consequences of 1911 to China’s own past. They 
argue that the profound agrarian structure of the Chinese society was too impervious 
to sustain genuine modernization. As a result, the Chinese elites’ effort to modernize 
the society would irrevocably compromise to the traditional political and social 
structures, producing ‘domination’ rather than ‘liberation’ (Esherick 1995: 48). By 
arguing so, these authors have not only interpreted the 1911 Revolution, but also the 
entire modern revolution as a continuation of China’s changeless past characterized 
by the agrarian structure. Thus Sinocentric accounts could not understand the 
particular agenda of China’s modern revolution, neither could they understand the 
specific role the peasant would play in the process (Moore 1966; Levenson 1968; Wolf 
1969; Fairbank 1994). This chapter aims to demonstrate with Uneven and Combined 
Development (U&CD) that the explanation of the meaning of the Chinese Revolution 
can only be sought in a protracted historical process by which the Chinese elite-class 
strove to appropriate external social elements to resolve China’s own crisis of survival 
in the context of global capitalism. By doing so, the binary between Sino-centrism and 
Eurocentrism could be transcended.  
By re-theorizing the 1911 Revolution as a combined development emerging from the 
interaction between premodern Chinese social forms and global capitalism, this 
chapter will further lay bare the relationship between the emerging discourse of 
‘national salvation’ in the twentieth century and the general crisis of national survival 
in the nineteenth century caused by China’s encounter with global capitalism. The 
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1911 Revolution as a result of China’s encounter with the West in the long nineteenth 
century will be reinterpreted as a critical formative moment of China’s modern 
revolution which has generated the ‘modular character’ (Anderson 2006: 4) of modern 
Chinese identity. Such identity urgently demanded a revolutionary project as a 
combination of the idea of social equality and practical actions of national salvation 
which underlay the specific Chinese version of communism and nationalism. The 
meaning of the modular character of the Chinese Revolution will further shed lights 
on the emergence of China’s peasant socialism as the central question of the thesis. 
The involvement of peasantry in Mao’s revolutionary mobilization emerged as both a 
social formation under the circumstances created by nineteenth century’s socio-
political struggles and a critical negation of the legacies of the 1911 Revolution.  
Therefore, this chapter will argue that the uneven and combined quality of the 
aforementioned historical conjunctures determines that China’s early industrialization 
led to intensifying social contradictions and political upheaval which called for speedy 
resolution consisting of intertwined revolutionary perspectives of both nationalism and 
socialism/communism. Such a resolution of China’s backwardness was first proposed 
by Sun Yat-sen in his ‘Three People Principles’; and in integrating socialism to a 
wider project of national salvation, the incentive of socialist revolution arose without 
any mature capitalist social relations and working-class formation as the basic 
condition of Mao’s communism based upon peasant mobilization (Lin 2006; D’Mello 
2009). This chapter will be divided into the following sections. The first part examines 
the particular global context which compelled the Chinese elites to pursue a 
‘Revolution of  Backwardness’. It will show that the unevenness between the Chinese 
empire sinking in its structural crisis and the ‘geopolitically conveyed imperialist 
exploitation’ existed as the world-historical origins of China’s modern transformation; 
it will also show that what matters was not the abstract ‘logic of capital’, but the 
historically specific strategies of different imperialist powers determined by the timing 
of their interaction with the Chinese society. The second part will then turn to the 
‘combined development’ of China’s Revolution of Backwardness, which will be 
reinterpreted as a process of exacerbation of social inequality and deepening of 
geopolitical crisis. The last part of the empirical study will examine the end-products 
of China’s long nineteenth century, which includes both the causes and consequences 
of the 1911 Revolution and the modular ideology (Sun Yat-sen’s Three peoples’ 
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Principles) the revolution has generated. It will argue that the 1911 Revolution 
emerged from the fragmentation of political authority which was intractably 
accelerated by the late imperial reforms; and Sun Yat-sen’s thoughts, as a 
representation of China’s particular national identity of modern revolution, have 
presented a peculiar fusion of nationalism and communism. The chapter concludes by 
recapping the debate on Sino-centrism and Euro-centrism and its implications for the 
general understanding of modern Chinese revolution.  
 
4.2 Unevenness and the ‘condition of backwardness’: a 
disintegrating empire facing competing imperialisms  
4.2.1 The structural crisis of the Qing Empire 
The first plane of unevenness that entered the process of combined development of 
modern Chinese nationhood and the revolutionary ideology of 1911 was the 
unevenness among various internal social and cultural units conceived within the 
cosmopolitan Qing Dynasty (more on this in Chapter 3). The cosmopolitanism and 
heterogeneity of regional political structures have characterized the Qing polity, 
framing completely different political agenda for the emperors who governed an ‘ever-
larger population settled across greater stretches of territory’ (Ho 1967; Wong 1997: 
88). As an empire borne out of both frontier warfare and continuous interactions 
between agrarian and tribal societies, Qing was established as a peculiar imperial 
structure which had been making uninterrupted attempts to deploy state-bureaucracy 
to incorporate various tribal and pastoral societies on the frontier in order to pacify 
their war-prone character (Elliot 2001). This tendency made the Qing Empire fiscally 
thirsty, driving it to explore financial resources and control of agricultural and 
commercial surpluses in wider geographical areas. Thus ever since the founding of the 
Qing Dynasty, a centralizing tendency of state-formation was underway as a process 
of the state attempting to extend the reach of its bureaucratic administration deeper 
into the society. With owners of large estates demilitarized or rendered dependent 
upon the state-bureaucracy, the Qing Dynasty was resting upon the support of a 
discrete landed class known as ‘the gentry’, who secured their landownership by 
holding posts in government with themselves detached from direct agricultural 
production (Moore 1966; Brenner and Isett 2002: 614-617).  
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The financially driven centralizing tendency of the Qing Dynasty was further 
propelled by the dynamics of nomadic warfare and tribal state-formation on the 
northern frontier (Fletcher 1978; Perdue 2005). The socio-cultural cosmopolitanism of 
the Qing Empire, predicated upon its institutional structure known as the banner 
system, presupposed that the Qing emperors could not easily stop militarizing the 
northern frontier as a way of managing the interwoven racial and ethnical 
relationships upon which the legitimacy and state-ideology of the Empire was built, 
lest the Mongolian tribal empires would have waged wars against the imperial order if 
they were granted no place in the noble-ranking system. During the reign of Kangxi 
(1661-1722), the largest bordered empire, Zunghar had been dismantled and placed 
under the administration of  ‘New Dominion’ as part of the state-bureaucratic system 
after a number of adventurous military expeditions launched by the Qing emperor 
(Perdue 2005: 209-292; Rowe 2009: 71). This tendency of military and administrative 
overstretch characterized the Qing Dynasty as an unprecedented era in Chinese 
history. The Manchu rule stood as ‘the largest consolidated empire in Chinese history’ 
sustained on the basis of feasible ‘long-range policies of control and complex 
administrative and military apparatus’ (Ho 1967: 189).  
The Qing court held a number of ‘long-range policies of control’ and administrative 
skills at its disposal, whereas those administrative channels never guaranteed smooth 
operation and coordination of the empire. Financial difficulties had become a major 
challenge to the emperors not only because a large state-bureaucracy was required to 
control the newly conquered frontier communities, but also an enormous noble-
ranking system was established under the state-bureaucracy for pacifying new ethnic 
groups incorporated to the empire by war. The geopolitically induced financial thirst 
thus brought up the issue of how to maximize the empire’s revenues. To extract as 
much surplus as needed, the empire was in need of a even larger bureaucratic system 
over agricultural economy and trans-regional commerce. As a result, rents had been 
for the first time in history fixed politically and peasants were prohibited from joining 
large landlords to escape official charges (Huang 1990; Brenner and Isett 2002). To 
control the surplus of commercial activities, the Qing state had continued the Ming 
court’s policy of maritime restriction (haijin) in order to undermine the power of 
private maritime merchants and centralize trade revenues (Arrighi 2005: 323). 
International trade had been restricted to a small commercial enclave at Canton 
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(contemporary Guangzhou) where the imperial bureaucrats of commerce, known as 
the Hoppo were appointed by the government to manipulate foreign trade; the Cohong 
licensed by the Hoppo was the only legal partner with which foreign businessmen could 
trade (Wakeman 1978). This mode of surplus extraction by the state-bureaucracy 
known as the tributary system was dressed in the discourse of ‘All under the Heaven’ 
(tianxia) as a dominant principle of the Qing’s diplomatic practice. The non-Chinese 
peoples, broadly perceived as ‘barbarians’ on the periphery of the imperial order was 
kept off the heartland of the empire and quarantined from Chinese civilians as to 
sustain the imperial supremacy predicated upon a hierarchy of ethnicities (Qian 2011; 
Zhao 2006). 
The other side of the centralizing process of state-formation was an inevitable 
tendency of centrifugal decline plaguing the empire when the Qing rulers began to 
extend the reach of state-bureaucracy. The most notable aspect of the centrifugal 
decline was the tendency of local militarization documented in Philip Kuhn’s seminal 
account that identifies the temporal boundary of China’s traditional state (1980). 
Local militarization was originally a by-product of the expansion of banner system 
under which the Manchu nobles, known as the bannermen who enjoyed their fixed 
privileges according to hereditary military rankings without undertaking any duty in 
the army (Elliot 2001: 175). The Qing court allowed local-regional notables to 
maintain their informal private militias where imperial military forces were absent or 
could not be effectively deployed (McCord 1993: 18-21). The cosmopolitan character 
of the Qing Empire preluded the uneven growth of local militias which finally went 
out of the court’s control. The shortage of centrally commanded military forces 
impelled the Qing government to cooperate with local ethnical groups to balance 
against troublemaking populations such as forces of sectarian societies and bandits 
radiating from the overpopulated lands. Those local ethnical groups, however, had no 
bureaucratically defined position in the banner system, thus with no incentive to 
cooperate with the court, they had later joined rebellious forces as one of the major 
strategies of coping with agrarian crisis and internal trade disputes (e.g. the Miao 
rebellions on the southwest) (Perdue 2009: 265). The 1796 White Lotus Rebellion 
heralded a century of local military revolts, which had set the Qing court in a 
constantly paradoxical situation compelling it to choose between 
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officializing/empowering local military forces and letting them override the central 
authority.  
All these contradictions emerging from the complex structure of the Qing Empire 
were together a testimony to Wang Hui’s observation, that though the Qing Dynasty 
was officially an empire, it was nevertheless a hybrid system that entailed the 
structures of both unending empire and territorial nation-state44. To Wang Hui, the 
structure of the Qing Empire was highly paradoxical in the sense that centralized 
state-authority and dispersion of local power-centres were struggling to outcompete 
each other. Whereas the imperial court strove to present itself as a consistent cultural 
and civilizational entity embodying a universalist spirit, this attempt contradicted the 
endogenous heterogeneity of the Chinese polity which was an inherent character of 
any unit of ‘civilization’ (Wang 2004: 27). The boundless and non-territorial structure 
of empire was from the outset contrasting to the very political institutions proved 
conducive to capitalist development in Europe (Wang 2004: 33), especially in the 
sense that the absence of centralized management of military forces based upon 
parcellized territories prevented the mutual propelling between capitalism and the art 
of war in China (McNeil 1982: 125; Tilly 1985: 169, 1990: 68). This thus became the 
logical starting point for the modern reformists and revolutionaries to denounce the 
imperial system for paralyzing the state’s effective control of the military forces (e.g. 
Schwartz 1964: 6-8; Wang 2004: 837-840). However, this particular quest for 
modernity needed to be triggered by more specific conjunctures, which in China’s 
case, was the penetration of variegated imperialisms. 
 
4.2.2 Imperialisms: early and late partitioners of China 
It is important to note that scholars like Philip Kuhn who focus on the internal crisis 
and tensions between different social forms within the imperial order have not 
finished telling the story of the Qing’s decline and demise as a world-historical 
phenomenon because they have not theorized the world-historical context in which 
the imperial decline was accelerated and recreated into a new configuration of social 
forces. What does it mean by world history and how can we possibly place China’s late !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 As the previous chapter has shown, the collective memory of nation-state is the legacy of 
state-formation in the Song Dynasty marked by the Kyoto School as China’s early modernity.  
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imperial transformation in due context? This is a question about how to theorize 
capitalist expansion and its character of global heterogeneity beyond the ‘logic of 
capital’; and this problem is to be explained by the inbuilt conjunctural method of 
Uneven and Combined Development.  
In general, it is obvious that the whole nineteenth century was characterized by the 
epoch when capitalism began to establish itself as a world system (Wallerstein 1974: 
300). ‘A world economy whose pace was set by its developed or developing capitalist 
core was extremely likely to turn into a world in which the ‘advanced’ dominated the 
backward’, and capitalism as a comprehensive system of social relations was turned 
into various ‘new types of empire’ coupled with endless colonial wars as a global 
process (Hobsbawm 1987: 56-57). But the general context of globalized capitalism 
needs to be broken down into a set of more historically nuanced conceptual devices 
only with which can we make sense of the interaction between variegated forms of 
early and late developing societies. With the inbuilt conjunctural method of U&CD, I 
argue that the collective consequence of China’s engagement with different forms of 
imperialism at different historical moments does matter in accounting for the end-
product of China’s revolutionary movement; also it is notable that interactions and co-
constitutions among imperialisms themselves have constituted an lateral field of 
causality that shaped the changing world-historical context in which China’s 
transformation had unfolded. Finally, China’s involvement in the expansion of world 
capitalism would in return be ‘inserted’ back to the totality of capitalist geopolitical 
calculation and spatio-temporally differing developmental trajectories of imperialism 
(Trotsky 1980: ), giving both spaces and pressures to specific agencies that led to the 
complication of capitalist development as a world-historical syndrome.  
The first western power that came to develop ‘sphere of influence’ in China was 
Britain whose geopolitical interests were defined by the specific ‘free-trade hegemony’ 
(Arrighi 1994: 48) as well as Britain’s relative early entry to the Chinese market. Britain 
as the leading country of the Industrial Revolution needed overseas marketplace to 
deal with her problem of overproduction at home. It was obvious in the nineteenth 
century that ‘the early British industrial economy relied for its expansion chiefly on 
international trade’ and Britain’s domestic market was ‘originally too small to 
maintain an industrial and trading apparatus of the size actually developed’. This was 
not only because that Britain did not have a population sizable enough to consume 
124"
"
"
124!
her overgrown industrial products, but also the fact that the British working class was 
too poor to purchase these products manufactured in large quantities (Hobsbawm 
1968: 113-114). Statistics have also shown that Britain’s relative early start in 
industrializing national economy had granted her the advantage to expand into an 
‘international vacuum’ where competitors in trade were absent. Late-developers from 
continental Europe trading foodstuffs for Britain’s manufactured products had also 
come to render the British economy excessively dependent on foreign trade (ibid).  
As Eric Hobsbawm has recorded (1968), there was a time when both industrializing 
countries and underdeveloped countries were dependent upon Britain’s central role in 
international trade (1846-1873). Catching-up imperialist powers had however come to 
shake Britain’s advantageous status in international trade especially from the Great 
Depression of 1870s onwards, since output of manufactured goods in these countries 
increased, turning those emerging industrial economies towards economic 
protectionism; Britain’s industrial manufacturers were thus prompted to gradually 
relinquish their predominant role in world market by pursuing alternative modes of 
capital accumulation (Hobsbawm 1968: 116). From 1870s onwards, the tendency of 
industrial expansion across western countries had emerged to drive Britain towards 
exporting capital-intensive goods such as machinery, railway system and financial 
services demanded by late-developing countries where early industrialization was 
underway. When industrialization began to take place in other countries across 
Europe, Britain had already developed a ‘world-wide networks of dependence’ in 
which the British Empire was able to reproduce its interests by maintaining a ‘global 
balance of power’ among states on the basis of haute finance and liberal ideology 
proclaiming the marriage between free trade and universal wealth-this transformation 
enabled the British imperialism to be re-inaugurated without overusing coercion 
(Polanyi 1957: 14; Arrighi 1994: 56). Britain was then able to sustain her pre-existing 
interests in trade and finance in the stance of ‘splendid isolation’ rather than any form 
of direct intervention. Thus what determined Britain’s geopolitical calculation about 
China was not only the nature of the so-called ‘free trade imperialism’ (Gallagher and 
Robinson 1953) but also Britain’s relatively early entry to the Chinese market.  
China’s two neighbouring powers also deserve attention as they were struggling to 
change from archaic empires into late-coming imperialists while China was undergoing 
the bitter settlement of the Opium War. The economy of the Tsarist Russia by then 
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was still dominated by agricultural commerce without nationwide industrial 
development; commercial centres rather than industries were still the major source of 
revenue for the militarized Tsarist government. Thus ‘the distribution of the peasant 
industries over various districts created a demand for trade mediation on a larger 
scale’ (Trotsky 1980: 4). The Tsar’s effort to expand its trading space on China’s 
northern frontier was initiated from the seventeenth century when the Qing court was 
seeking to pacify the war turbulence from the Mongolian tribes. The Tsar had 
reached three territorial agreements with the Qing government in which the 
boundaries between the two empires had been roughly carved out as part of the 
Qing’s strategy to withstand other tribal societies. Through these agreements, the 
Russian merchants had been given equal access to trade and commercial activities on 
the frontier. The major problem, however, was that Russia’s trading privileges on the 
frontier were subject to the tributary system dominated by the Manchu jurisdiction 
according to which Beijing could suspend the trade relationship from time to time 
when even mild disorder such as opium smuggling and silver outflow occurred on the 
border; and the open area for trade specified and regulated by the three treaties was 
still too limited to accommodate the Russian trade. Russia was also seriously 
concerned with the possibility that Britain’s access to southern treaty ports would 
‘prejudice’ the Sino-Russian trade on the frontier. Thus Russian officials had made all 
efforts to extend Russia’s trade zone beyond Kiakhta (Fletcher 1978a: 317-320). Since 
late eighteenth century, the Tsarist government and its commercial officials had been 
using all possible diplomatic channels to probe for the opening of trade in much wider 
frontier territories, inter alia Xinjiang province as well as the north-eastern Manchuria 
where Russia was obsessed with the navigational right of the Amur River. The Opium 
War and the Nanking Treaty gave Russia the chance to request trading privileges 
equivalent to that of Britain by shaking the foundation of the Qing’s monopoly of 
trade (Fletcher 1978a: 334; Scott 2008: 47). Xinjiang was forced open in the Kujia 
Treaty in 1851, and the entire northern frontier from Manchuria to Xinjiang was 
forced open to Russia in the 1860 Peking Treaty45. 
Russia’s vector of imperialist expansion was thus established on the northern frontier, 
and Russia had begun to enjoy exclusive privileges as the most-favoured-nation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 In return, Russia offered military assistance to the Qing government in the war against the 
Taiping Rebellion, see Fletcher 1978: 348. 
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north-eastern Manchuria under extraterritorial jurisdiction (Fletcher 1978: 347-348). 
With wide-ranging territorial leaseholds in northern China, Russia’s sphere of 
influence, however, underwent dramatic challenge from Japan as a rising great 
imperialist power in the region. Being much smaller and poorer than China and 
India, Japan was burdened by less colonial heritage so that it was left with a freehand 
to build up a new army and navy driven by the state-led industrialization after the 
Meiji Restoration (Norman 1940: 46; Moulder 1977: 93; Anievas and Allinson 2010: 
484). However Japan’s industrial development was internally uneven and 
contradictory as it had produced ‘a highly concentrated urban capitalist sector, 
contrasting sharply with conditions in the countryside that many Marxists came to see 
as vestiges of feudalism’ (Hoston 1986: 9). Thus Japan’s capitalist development had 
from the outset haunted by endless ‘agrarian crisis intertwined with industrial class 
struggle’, to which ‘an aggressively expansionist foreign policy in search of much 
needed raw materials and secure markets’ for surplus capital was posited by the state-
bureaucratic class as the only solution (Anievas and Allinson 2010: 485). Thus even 
though Manchuria was seized by Russia as an early comer, Japan’s ‘combined 
development as a geopolitical feedback loop’ would inexorably encounter Russia’s 
status quo power for the bountiful forest, mining and landed resources in the area.  
4.3 Combination: industrialization, local militarization and 
national disintegration 
4.3.1 From the Taiping Rebellion to the Summer Palace on fire: the Self-
strengthening Movement as industrialization by local militarists  
Britain’s quest for China’s opening up to free trade was enduring since late eighteenth 
century when the British merchants attempted to break into the Chinese market from 
Macao with the British warships landed nearby (Waley-Cohen 1999: 129-130). The 
early British adventure made to open the Chinese market had been rejected by the 
Qing government on crude ritualistic grounds, but conflicts between Britain’s soaring 
demand for trade and China’s restrictive control over trade and market were to take 
place sooner or later; ‘China was one (unexploited area) which haunted the 
imagination of salesmen-what if every one of those 300 millions bought only one box 
of tin-tacks?’ (Hobsbawm 1989: 66). Since mid eighteenth century, the British East 
Indian Company was shipping silver to China for tea which pushed up the silver price 
and placed great pressure on the Company to avert the trade deficit. Britain also 
needed to redirect Indian cotton exports away from Europe to China in order to find 
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a ‘market outlet’ for the Indian cotton industry. This had then become the so-called 
‘India-China-Britain triangular trade’ of Britain’s invention (Wallerstein 1989: 167-
168). Thus it was always a problem for British merchants that China was not buying 
enough products manufactured by British industries (Wakeman 1978; Wong 1998: 
333). The only problem was that China was able to produce cotton at home and did 
not need to purchase Indian cotton in large quantity; Opium was thus the only 
commercial leverage that the British merchants could deploy to open up the Chinese 
market as to reverse the enormous trade deficit with China. However, the ensuing 
opium trade was perceived by the Chinese officials as ‘barbarians trembling in owe’ 
because of the great social disorder the products would cause to civilians in the 
southern provinces. The Chinese local officers’ effort to ban opium consumption 
would inevitably run counter to Britain’s Palmerstonian foreign policy which 
proclaimed that ‘an Englishman, no matter where, no matter what the circumstances, 
could expect the protection of his own government from arbitrary foreign 
prosecution’ (Wakeman 1978: 188). China’s campaign against opium was seized by 
the British navy as the excuse to launch attacks on China’s coastal ports, forcing the 
Chinese government to open up ‘treaty ports’ where British merchants enjoyed free 
trade under the political protection of extraterritoriality.   
Conventionally, people argue that the opening of treaty ports and the introduction of 
extraterritoriality marked the beginning of China’s concession of sovereignty to 
foreign power which was the very problematic impact that provoked China’s response 
and efforts of modernization. However the historical condition of backwardness would 
only become alarming when substantial social processes emanated from it came to 
threaten the very existence of a traditional society. The very threat to China’s imperial 
order was only felt when the traditional elites from both local and central levels 
witnessed their power of control over commercial relations undermined and the 
ritualistic imperial order of ‘Chinese-ness-barbarianism distinction’ disturbed. Ensuing 
civilian resistance against foreign takeovers began to take place in Canton, making the 
province ‘almost lost to bandit gangs’. The Qing court had soon found its interests in 
reaching agreement with the Englishmen in opening trade and having foreign 
gunboats to check local resistance. This simply created the Manchu court’s image as 
the ‘treacherous protection of foreign missionaries’ and even worse, ‘a foreign ruling 
house appeasing the barbarians to save its own skin at the expense of the Chinese 
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people’ (Wakeman 1978: 203). Thus anti-Manchuism was planted as part of the 
origins of China’s modern revolutionary transformation of the nineteenth century. It 
is obvious that Sun Yat-sen’s construction of Chinese nationalism, namely the minzu 
principle was first characterized by anti-Manchu-ism, which in Liang Qichao’s words 
was a ‘narrow nationalism’ that only aspired to transform the tributary empire into a 
nation-state based upon the common identity of Han people (Wells 2001: 2, 9; Wang 
2004: 614).  
It is a fair saying that foreign takeovers of coastal cities were not paid enough attention 
to by the Qing court until enlarged scale of revolts from the underworld of sectarian 
societies began to spread across the southern provinces, which had finally escalated 
into the widely spanning Taiping Rebellion. Rural vagabonds who moved from the 
overpopulated countryside to the cities to work as transporters before the Opium War 
were suddenly driven home because of the suddenly imposed restriction of 
transportation in inland waterways; China’s internal trade routes of water channels 
were controlled by British naval forces after the Nanking Treaty. Others working as 
brokers and artisans in the Canton commercial system were also forced to leave as the 
new centre of international trade was shifted to Shanghai for Britain’s convenience. 
All these arrangements of the Nanking Treaty had in turn intensified local conflicts by 
generating reversed waves of migration back to the countryside, and those returning 
vagabonds could never be fed by the local agrarian economy with declining 
productivity. Thus a decade after the opening of treaty ports, violent conflicts broke 
out between returning vagabonds, rural outlaws and the local militias (tuanlian) in 
Guangxi province. These waves of local conflicts had merged into a nationwide 
military campaign known as the Taiping Rebellion which had rapidly eaten up half of 
the territories of the Qing Empire. The reason that the Taiping Rebellion could 
expand to such an unprecedented scale was largely because that the traditional 
Manchu armies were too poorly organized under the banner system to withstand such 
an explosive insurrection (Kuhn 1986: 281); and the message delivered by the 
rebellion was obvious that the imperial military forces on all levels were incompetent 
of defending China’s vast localities. The Manchu banner army was full of non-
military nobles who had been enjoying military prestige without ever being drilled in 
the army. To pacify the rebellion, the Qing government could have done nothing but 
to turn to the local militias for assistance. Thus private armies built upon personal 
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networks of regional and provincial notables were brought to the fore by the Qing 
court for pacifying the ensuing Taiping Rebellion as well as other continuous peasant 
revolts such as the Nien Rebellion (1851-1868).  
Local militias had quite a few characters favourable to the court’s task of re-
establishing regional stability. Most importantly, those regional militias were 
financially independent due to their particular source of income secured via the ‘lijin’ 
system. China’s regional trade had been continuously haunted by the dramatically 
growing bandit gangs and sectarian societies since late eighteenth century; and the 
central authority was apparently not able to protect merchants from disturbance of 
the outlaws. The only possible way for the merchants to protect their activities on the 
trans-regional trade routes was to pay a certain amount of lijin (‘gift money’) to heads 
of local militias and regional-local notables for their military assistance. Thus unlike 
the imperial armies such as the bannermen and the Green Standards which were 
constantly suffering fiscal difficulties, soldiers in private militias fared relatively well 
based upon their interdependence with China’s internal commercial networks and 
trade relations, which had then turned into the militias’ firmer allegiance to the 
regional notables.  
The second important character that made those militias conducive to the emperors 
was the fact that the militarized regional notables, despite their financial 
independence, were still in need of the state-bureaucracy to accumulate their political 
as well as economic capital in larger scale. Though these regional notables held their 
own armies which the central authority was not capable of interfering, very few of 
those armies were large enough to overtake the whole country. In the practice of 
traditional ‘political accumulation’ (Brenner 1982), the state’s official control of 
commercial and agricultural revenues was an important source of power with which 
these regional militarists could outcompete each other in seeking larger scale of 
momentum and access to wider territorial spheres beyond their own localities; having 
stronger political leverage in the state-bureaucracy could also give these militarists 
more room in mediating foreign issues as to shore up their financial capability by 
building connections to foreign capitals. Moreover, these militarists, such as Zeng 
Guofan and Li Hongzhang, had long personal history of being educated and 
immersed in traditional cultural context, which made them aspire to restore the 
integrity of China’s imperial order rather than replacing it with any alternative 
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political-cultural orthodoxy. Getting involved in the state-bureaucracy and 
cooperating with the Manchu court was to broaden their possibility of realizing such 
political aspiration. Thus a coordinated and interdependent relationship seemed to 
have emerged between the state and the regional notables especially after Zeng 
Guofan, the head of ‘Xiangjun (The Hunanese Army)’ had assisted the Manchu court 
in pacifying the Taiping Rebellion. However it was evident that the interdependence 
was skewing towards the regional militarists’ favour.  
At almost the same time, another incident that had caused the Manchu elites to 
perceive the West more substantially as a threat was the burning down of the Summer 
Palace as Britain and France’s ultimatum demanding further opening of marketplace 
in China. The Second Opium War, waged to force the Qing government to revise the 
Nanking Treaty, was demonstrating not only Britain’s unsatisfied demand for trade, 
but also other emerging imperialists’ effort to bandwagon the treaty ports system. 
France and the US sought to extend their extraterritorial rights via the settlement; and 
Russia, in mediating the war, was also seeking wider access to trade and commerce in 
northern China. The Qing government’s reluctant compliance with those requests 
had caused the powers’ collective and rampant response. The Summer Palace, known 
as Yuanming Yuan was left ‘a dreary waste of ruined nothingness’ by the Anglo-French 
soldiers ‘seized with a temporary insanity’ (Scott 2008: 44). This splendid royal site 
built in the image of the Qianlong Emperor’s fantasy of tripping to Jiangnan was not 
only a repository of great landscaping and architects of the glory of Chinese 
civilization, but also a combination of finest arts collected from all nations. Such a 
fairyland of enchantment was no doubt the emperors’ favourite that symbolized 
China’s ‘national prowess’ and grace of the imperial order. With such a palace at the 
heartland of the empire systematically ruined, the Manchu court was thus forced not 
only to respond to the foreign demand for trade, but also possible reforming projects 
that could save the empire from further humiliation.  
Thus China’s first wave of systematic attempt to modernize the country was ushered 
in after these two destructive incidents that had almost come to the verge of debasing 
the Manchu rule; and the Manchu nobles, especially those on the regional-local level 
had become the key agency of the first wave of modernization. Since 1860s Chinese 
elites from both central authorities and regional military organizations became 
actively engaged in transplanting western technology to the country in order to catch 
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up with advanced foreign powers without substantially altering the imperial political 
system. International conditions became more alarming to the early modernizers after 
the Taiping Rebellion and the Summer Palace Incident that had fundamentally 
weakened the foundation of the imperial policy of keeping barbarians at distance. Also, 
through the Taiping Rebellion, Manchu nobles had found their interests in allying 
with the regional militarists or even giving them posts in the state-system in order to 
sustain the empire nominally. Li Hongzhang, a provincial notable who had close 
contacts with foreign experts and merchants, pioneered in launching projects of 
shipyards, arsenals and munitions in a few coastal provinces before other imperial 
officials with similar backgrounds followed suit. With the assistance of the British 
custom official Robert Hart in regulating coastal trade, part of the custom revenues 
that used to be swallowed by corrupt officials was redeemed to form the primitive 
capitals for the movement to start off (Kuo and Liu 1978: 513). Thus the Self-
strengthening was able to take flight in a historical combination of conjunctural 
factors including the political augmentation of regional militarists, deepened 
penetration of western capitalist relations and the rise of the discourse of ‘learning 
from the West’. The atrocity of the Summer Palace prompted the Qing court to 
accommodate western requests with the belief that by accepting the arrangement of 
the treaty port system as well as western powers’ request for revising the Nanking 
Treaty, China’s own strength could be built up by preserving peace and borrowing 
technology with the West (Kuo and Liu 1978: 492).  
The combined development of Self-strengthening Movement has generated a specific 
conjuncture for China’s ‘Revolution of Backwardness’. This conjuncture entailed a 
very specific set of class relations in which the bourgeois class played a passive role in 
industrialization under the dual pressures from foreign capitals and the newly 
emerging ‘bureaucratic merchants’. To use the term ‘bourgeoisie’ might not be 
adequate to indicate the contradictory nature of the formation of China’s urban 
merchant-class, which was actually a peculiar mixture of social forms developed in 
very specific context. However this segment of the urban society was really the first 
social group in China to drive the country to partially adapt to western commercial 
practices impinged by foreign economic presence. The Chinese merchant-class 
originated from the compradors who acted as brokers between China’s vast local 
economy and the foreign enterprises. The compradors had a paradoxical identity due 
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to its double dependency on both foreign powers and imperial bureaucracy. Their 
capital was originally produced by receiving salaries and charging all kinds of fees 
from foreign companies in treaty ports. Foreign merchants had hired a number of 
Chinese brokers to assist them in trading with local producers and suppliers, which 
enabled these brokers, who used to be hongists or their recruited purveyors a certain 
degree of monopoly of foreign trade among Chinese merchants (Chan 1980: 419; Wu 
and Xu 1990: 168). As the Self-strengthening Movement proceeded, this peculiar 
urban merchant-class, the compradors were recruited to provide the Self-
strengtheners with essential funds and connections with foreign capitals. When the 
Self-strengtheners began to realize that trade deficit and silver outflow was ‘draining 
people’s wealth’, the government had shifted its focus from building military industries 
to ‘promoting commercial affairs’ with the mercantilist hope that locally 
manufactured goods could reverse the trade imbalance with the West and maximize 
wealth and power of the state (Chan 1980: 417). Thus from 1870s onwards, provincial 
governments began to mobilize private capitals and individual merchants to get 
involved in the ‘Wealth and Power Movement’ (fuqiang) launched to invigorate the 
commercial sector and relieve the government’s financial pressures. Non-military 
industries such as coal mining, navigation and cotton cloth were promoted by regional 
notables who had recently seized posts in the central government such as Li 
Hongzhang. Lacking substantial institutional frameworks for manipulating privately 
owned commerce and industries, Self-strengtheners such as Li Hongzhang could do 
nothing but to use their personal influence to protect private shareholders from 
bureaucratic squeezing on all levels, and this was the initial basis of trust between 
China’s emerging merchant community and some of the imperial officials in a few 
regions (Chan 1980: 424).  
Far from creating a unified bourgeois class strong enough to alter traditional social 
relations, the Self-strengthening Movement had led to an extremely tension-prone 
stratification of class relations among the Chinese merchants. Self-strengtheners such 
as Prince Kung and Wenxiang in the court had very quickly lost their momentum 
because of their defeat in endless factional struggles against conservative Manchu 
nobles who felt threatened of their power and influence by the movement and its 
advocates. Provincial and regional notables had thus become more active in 
promoting Self-strengthening not only because that they were more capable of doing 
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it but also that they actively sought to maximize their power through accumulating 
industrial capitals. Because the Self-strengthening Movement was launched for the 
specific geopolitical rationale that economic growth should be channelled towards 
military empowerment, bureaucrats from all provinces were given justice to place 
industries under their official sponsorship in the name of ‘imperial mandate’. This was 
not only a temporal expression of the gentry-scholars’ ‘ingrained notion of state-
prerogatives’ of ‘government supervision and merchant management’ (guandu shangban), 
but also a consequence of western capitalist powers’ effort made to seek proxies in 
China by rendering China’s most influential state-officials dependent upon their 
economic presence. ‘Just as merchants purchased official titles, so officials and gentry 
swelled the merchant ranks’ (Chan 1980: 419-421). The rising class of ‘gentry-
merchant’ (shenshang) was a hybrid social group who was engaged in commercial 
activities daily but could easily fend off market pressures with their power in the 
bureaucracy. ‘In time, ‘Self-strengthening’ became less a rallying cry for genuine 
efforts at innovation than a shibboleth that served to justify expenditures and vested 
bureaucratic interests’ (Kuo and Liu 1978: 491). The worsening practices of 
bureaucratic merchants had dramatically reduced the private merchants’ living space 
because bureaucratic entrepreneurs such as Sheng Xuanhuai were always ready to 
sacrifice the interests of private shareholders to reclaim official loans in a failing 
company’s remaining assets (Chan 1980: 434-435); bureaucratic merchants who had 
a foot in both business and diplomatic affairs could also easily sell enterprises to 
foreign capitals when they underwent financial problems, leaving local private 
investors stripped of their shares. In Hunan and Hubei, where agricultural decline 
had driven private capitals to flow to the newly emerging industrial sector in the cities, 
bureaucratic capitals’ complicity in imperialist expansion had stirred up waves of 
Right Recovery Movement in both provinces (Esherick 1992: 69-72).  
For all the above reasons, the emerging urban merchant-class as the descendent of 
both the compradors and the state-bureaucrats was of insurmountable weakness ever 
since the very beginning, which was then to hinder China’s capitalist social formation 
as industrialization proceeded. As Karl Marx has argued, a society’s shifting away 
from pre-capitalist epoch could produce two contrasting results. In some cases, ‘the 
producer becomes merchant and capitalist, in contrast to the natural agricultural 
economy and the guild-bound handicrafts of the medieval urban industries’-this 
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scenario, according to Marx, promised the ‘really revolutionizing path’. In some other 
cases however, ‘the merchant established direct sway over production. However much 
this serves historically as a stepping-stone…cannot by itself contribute to the 
overthrow of the old mode of production’ (Marx 1977). China’s case was certainly the 
latter one in which traditional landed ownership in village communities and state-
apparatus were deployed to exert direct control over producers of not only 
commodities but also money capitals, making their conditions worse than before. This 
combination of social relations maintained Chinese merchants’ structural dependency 
on foreign capitals, but it had debased China’s nation-wide bourgeois class-formation 
because of the contradictory and exploitative relationship between the bureaucratic 
capitalists and other forms of private capitals.  
The combined development of the Self-strengthening Movement had produced not 
only a weakened bourgeois class and different agency of industrialization, but also a 
new condition of national crisis. The more severe problem caused by the Self-
strengthening Movement was that an act aiming at strengthening the state’s rump 
material capacity had finally resulted in a much worse situation of geopolitical failure 
and military meltdown. This situation has demonstrated the spiral-ascending 
development of modernization in which combined social formation would from time 
to time throw a society even further backward in either socio-historical or political-
realist sense. Though no solid bourgeois class was formed, urban and rural proletariats 
were mushrooming as a result of agrarian crisis inflicted by modern commerce and 
enterprises. Former peasants became ‘displaced persons’ (yumin) not only because the 
rural resources had been exhausted by wars, silver outflow and tax-farming, but also 
that the traditional imperial networks of control and welfare such as pao-jia (local 
police) and the imperial granary could not sustain by a vulnerable central government 
like late Qing (Bastid-Bruguiere 1980: 586-587; Kuhn 2002: 80).  
Apart from the exacerbated pauperization of traditional communities, the further 
weakening of state-authority was even more fatal to the imperial regime. This was first 
caused by intensifying conflicts between the Self-strengtheners and the Manchu 
conservatists who felt threatened of their traditional prestige. Modern industrial 
projects and new-styled school set up in cities had recruited a great number of 
students who would have joined the state-bureaucracy via the official examination; 
thus debates on whether ‘learning from the West’ was promoted at the expense of 
135"
"
"
135!
traditional cultural and political framework had been reheated for many times among 
the elites. The other source of intra-governmental conflicts came from the competition 
for political capital among regional notables who were all Self-strengtheners 
themselves. Most industrial and commercial programmes introduced from the 
‘bottom-up’ level lacked strategic central planning. When it came to military 
organization and war preparation, it became frustrating that no collective military 
mobilization could be orchestrated on the national level, and weapons produced in 
discrete munitions and arsenals were too different in size and shape to be used by a 
single army (Wang 1978: 131). This contradiction was then more intensively 
manifested in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, which came to challenge the theoretical 
legitimacy of the Self-strengthening Movement.   
 
4.3.2 1895: the Middle Kingdom dying in bitterness and the bankruptcy 
of Self-Strengthening 
The Self-strengthening Movement had for the first time gone under examination 
through the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 attesting to the degree of enhancement in 
state-capacity. Consequently, the war had not only extravagated China’s frustrating 
situation of ‘being backward’ but also come to question the theoretical legitimacy of 
the Self-strengthening Movement which aspired to modernizing the state without 
making cultural and political self-repudiation. The debate on whether or not it was 
effective to carry out technological ‘catching-up’ movements within the traditional 
imperial order seemed to be brought to closure when the Japanese navy defeated the 
Beiyang fleet with a landslide. This geopolitical crisis had led to a new era of western 
powers struggling to seize more ‘spheres of influence’ against each other. As for the 
Sino-Japanese War, there was no major quantitative gap between both sides in 
military capacity; ‘[i]n terms of military strategy and the quality of weapons, China 
actually fared rather well’ (Fung 1996: 1029); the very factor that had paralyzed the 
Beiyang fleet lay not only in the situation of regional militarization and the 
extravagated competitions among elites, but also geopolitical calculations of western 
powers made at the expense of China’s interests. Li Hongzhang, with only his private 
Anhui Army under command and other regional fleets staying ‘neutral’ to Japan’s 
aggression, was dreaming of winning western sympathies in order to ‘force Japan into 
peace settlement’ (Hsu 1980: 106). His diplomatic mediation had however ended up 
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futile due to major western powers, especially Britain’s stance of non-involvement. 
‘London had not anticipated this (Japan’s) rapid turn of events and was caught 
without a suitable policy’. Japan’s military encroachment in Korea and Manchuria 
did not pose immediate threat to Britain’s commercial interests in China compelling 
enough to cause Britain active reaction. Britain’s ‘mild innocuous proposal’ calling for 
both Chinese and Japanese armies’ withdrawal from Korea was soon rejected by 
Japan shortly before the open encounter at sea broke out between the two East Asian 
countries in August, 1895 (ibid). With only one ship lost, the Japanese navy caused 
China a loss of four ships, not to mention the huge causalities on land. And the 
settlement of the war was devastating to China because of the humiliating 
performance of the Chinese fleet. Japan was seeking a systematic exploitation of 
China to relieve all tensions between its domestic constituencies formed in its process 
of industrialization. Territorial cessions (the Liaodong peninsula, Shandong, Jiangsu 
and Manchuria etc.) were urged by Japan’s various political forces for natural 
resources, capital-export and migration; and quality ice-free ports in Manchuria (Port 
Arthur/Dalian) were also demanded by the victor. Japan was also seeking to take the 
victory as a chance to find vectors for her future military expansion-Taiwan was thus 
requested ‘as a base for operations in South Asia’. Like what all other imperialist 
powers attempted to do, the Japanese treasury requested a huge indemnity of 200 
million taels in order to ‘make the war pay for itself’. Thus, Li Hongzhang, with 
limited regionally-based power to command armies but full responsibility to negotiate 
the peace settlement on behalf of the state, was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki packaging all the unaffordable terms including ‘indemnity, the cession of 
territory, and commercial and navigational privileges’ (Hsu 1980: 107).    
The knock-on effects of the Japan-dominated peace settlement were dramatic as 
Japan’s rapid takeover of vast territories, the Manchurian heartland inter alia, had 
stirred up great anxieties among western powers, especially imperialist governments 
like Russia which had secured their navigational and commercial privileges in the 
same regions with treaties signed much earlier. Japan’s victory was also a 
demonstration of China’s political fragmentation and military disorganization being 
deepened in imperialists’ favour. Japan’s ambition for greater power-status, and her 
desire for more overseas territories and resources caused by developmental pressures 
at home had urged the West to be more concerned with their existing ‘spheres of 
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influence’ in China. Geopolitical competition in Continental Europe had also by then 
become a lateral field of causality supervening on China’s national crisis-
Redistributing ‘spheres of influence’ among the powers had become a supplementary 
means to sustain the European balance of power between the newly formed politico-
military blocks. Shortly after the 1895 crisis, western powers had started a new round 
of ‘partitioning China’ as they had mostly entered the stage of ‘New Imperialism’ 
(Hobsbawm 1987). This round of imperialist expansion mediated by strategies of 
geopolitical balancing and dressed in the diplomatic rhetoric of protecting China’s 
sovereignty and Korea’s independence was taken by Li Hongzhang, who was then 
still in charge of China’s foreign affairs a critical opportunity to minimize Japan’s 
influence in China.  
Russia was the first player who recognized the significance of containing Japan’s 
penetration of China. Russia’s Count Witte was obsessed with the idea that Russia’s 
footing in Liaodong should be preserved in every possible way including declaring 
Vladivostok a war zone. Russia took the interventionist position for the concern that 
Japan’s takeover of the Liaodong peninsula would lay barriers to Russia’s pre-existing 
project of trans-Siberian railway system. Under Russia’s military intervention joined 
by France and Germany (the Triple Intervention), Japan was finally forced to return 
the Liaodong peninsula to China in late 1895; and shortly afterwards, China and 
Russia had entered a secret alliance based upon Li Hongzhang’s geopolitical 
calculation of balancing against Japan by granting Russia’s the privilege of railway 
construction in Liaodong. With both Japan and Russia as two rising imperialists 
expanding their shares of interest in China, other advanced imperialisms had finally 
come to a new round of ‘scrambling for concession’ in China seeking to either secure 
their pre-existing extraterritorial privileges or expand those in new forms (Hsu 1980: 
112-113). In 1897, Germany forced China to cede Shandong to her as a naval base, 
which was accepted by the Russian Tsar as a strategic cession made to redirect 
Germany’s power concentration away from Europe; in return, Russia took Port 
Arthur and Dalian, and push her monopoly over Manchuria railways further under 
the general framework of the Sino-Russian Alliance. These struggles in the north had 
in turn given Britain a free hand to further secure her privilege of trade in the Yangzi 
area and Hong Kong; and France was also left with the chance to lease the 
Guangdong-Guangxi area adjacent to the French Indochina. The United States, with 
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no pre-existing leaseholds as entries to the partitioning of China, had to propose the 
‘Open Door Policy’ for access to future concessions in China. The Open Door Policy, 
stipulating each imperialist power’s ‘sphere of influence’, rejected the act of 
monopolizing commercial interests in one’s own sphere of influence using political 
and military forces. This policy had later become a principle applauded and shared by 
western powers who with much larger pre-existing interests in China became 
increasingly unwilling to get involved in military operations outside Europe, but it was 
in the meantime opposed by Japan who had almost lost out her interests obtained in 
the Shimonoseki Treaty after the process of ‘scrambling for concessions’ among great 
powers (Hsu 1980: 111-115).  
The Triple Intervention and the ‘scrambling for concessions’ had further consolidated 
Russia’s interests of railway construction in China. The Qing government’s alliance 
with Russia had settled a series of railway projects either cosponsored between the two 
governments or ceded to Russian capitals. Some of these railways were presumed to 
run through Britain’s traditional spheres of influence such as the Yangzi valley. 
Russia’s further empowerment gained by allying with the Qing government had thus 
come to threaten Britain’s longstanding diplomatic tradition of ‘splendid isolation’, 
especially when Britain realized that lacking substantial allies was causing her 
enormous loss on the peripheries of the empire in events such as the Boer War (Hsu 
1980: 131). Japan, whose leases in Manchuria was recently minimized by Russia’s 
military interventions and other great powers’ diplomatic manoeuvrings, was 
recognized by Britain as a new reliable ally in the Far East. Thus in 1902, an alliance 
between the two powers came to materialize in a treaty that stipulated mutual 
safeguarding of interests once either party was threatened. Protected by the new 
framework of geopolitical alignment, Japan was given a free hand to reclaim her 
demanded interests in Manchuria. In 1905, a war between Japan and Russia broke 
out which had by the end wiped out Russia’s domination in Manchuria; Japan’s 
control over the Southern Manchurian Railway was then reinstated, which, unlike the 
devastating naval war in 1895, was an event that saved China from Russia’s further 
encroachment of the territories in the Manchurian heartland. ‘Had Russia been 
victorious, she would most likely have annexed Manchuria and perhaps Mongolia, 
provoking other powers to demand territorial compensation’, but with Russia’s defeat, 
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the Tsar’s focus was shifted to the Balkans ‘where she collided with Austria-Hungary 
and Germany, setting the stage for World War Ι’ (Hsu 1980: 141).  
The above international geopolitical conjuncture had prevented China from being 
colonized by any single imperialist power, but the fact that China had undergone so 
many rounds of imperialist partitioning had discredited the Self-strengtheners’ 
promise to enhance the military capabilities and to reach diplomatic resolution. The 
Self-strengthening Movement was tested a failure by Japan’s military conquest as a 
result of the movement’s unfulfilled promise of strengthening the empire in military 
terms. Li Hongzhang, as the key leader of the movement in provinces had very 
quickly lost his momentum among both the Chinese public and the Manchu nobles in 
the court, being accused for selling the country to Japan in negotiating the 
Shimonoseki Treaty. With the idea of Self-strengthening debased, new forms of social 
transformation as to which China’s particular perception of modernity was 
constructed would then be called upon by elites with more social power and influence 
obtained from the demise of the Self-strengthening Movement.   
 
4.3.3 The Constitutional Reform: from technological to political reform 
Japan’s rise as a world-class power was not only attesting to the failure of the Self-
strengthening Movement but also suggestive of a possible approach as to which 
eastern societies could embrace capitalist modernity in its own way. The immediate 
reason for which Japan had become China’s role model after the 1895 naval war and 
the 1905 Russo-Japanese War was of course Japan’s great military success in these 
great power encounters. The deeper reason that legitimized the Japanese model was 
Japan’s historical and cultural resemblances with China as a country developing 
against the backdrop of traditional agrarian society. Japan’s post-war settlement in 
1905 allowed the Qing court to reclaim sovereignty (at least nominally) of Manchuria, 
which enabled a relatively more cooperative and amicable relationship between the 
two governments, under which Chinese student groups and governmental officials 
were sent to Japan by the Qing court to investigate and study Japanese politics and 
reforms (Jansen 1980: 348; Harrell 1992).  
However, the discourse of ‘learning from Japan’ produced two sharply contrasting 
views of social transformation. On one hand, political reform, which was regarded 
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necessary, was envisaged by the Manchu elites as a opportunity to transcend 
backwardness without overthrowing the Qing throne. Japan’s Meiji Restoration, as a 
‘passive revolution’ that had absorbed the revolutionary class into the monarchical 
structure without incurring major social upheavals, was accepted as the possible path 
that China’s further socio-political reforming should follow (Norman 1940: 47; 
Allinson and Anievas 2010). The logic of ‘passive revolution’ was compatible with the 
universalist worldview of Neo-Confucianism which was widely accepted by the court 
and traditionalist scholars such as Kang Youwei.  The intellectual tide of Neo-
Confucianism emerging in 1890s argued that Chinese learning belonged to the 
category of ‘dao’ or ‘ti’ (substance) whereas western learning was given the value of 
‘qi’ or ‘yong’ (functionality) (Chang 1980: 282-283). Under this framework, Kang 
Youwei proposed to convert the universalist empire of Qing (substance) directly into a 
modern nation-state (functionality). During this process, the traditional imperial 
power was expected to play a even stronger role in addressing the possible social 
upheavals (revolution) inflicted by the pre-existing internal contradictions of the 
cosmopolitan empire (Wang 2004: 821-825).  
On the other hand, Japan’s success produced enough revolutionary discourses that 
would reject the Self-strengthening model which underestimated the significance of 
political reform. It needs to be noted that the debate on ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ emerged ever 
since the Opium War, whereas the only ambiguity of the debate was whether western 
political institutions were only functionality that could be easily assimilated by the 
imperial order. Chinese intellectuals became more aware of ‘the victory of 
constitutionalism and the defeat of monarchism’ in reflecting upon the rise and fall of 
Japan and China (Hsu 1980: 141).  The study-in-Japan project sponsored by the 
Manchu court produced more centrifugal forces headed by ‘disaffected youth’, among 
which Tongmenghui (Alliance Society, founded in Tokyo 1905) was an exemplar which 
has then become the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party (Harrell 1992: 7, 88).  
However, the more fatal reason that caused the Qing Empire to swallow the bitter 
fruit of the Constitutional Monarchy was that the diverse local and regional 
authorities coeval with the imperial court could not be effectively incorporated into 
the framework of modern nation-state. The Japanese model was posited by the Qing 
court as of two constitutive elements. One was the centrality of military forces 
presiding the course of the reform, and the other was the mechanism of constitutional 
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monarchy capable of coordinating between different constituencies with seats in the 
legislation and the central government. Both were directly grafted onto China’s 
reforming attempt via two programmes.  One was the making of the New Army and 
the other was the experiment of parliamentary democracy. However both reforming 
programmes were undertaken under the circumstances of regional militarization and 
declining central authority which had given the Qing reformists no conditions 
equivalent to the Japanese state-led modernization. The Qing government’s attempt 
of parliamentary democracy was undertaken within many regional-political enclaves 
(Provincial Assemblies) where local elites had replaced the pre-existing court-
appointed governors-general to dominate provincial affairs, whereas on the central 
level, the National Assembly had no power to interfere decisions made through 
chaotic local-regional struggling. The National Assembly’s inability to coordinate 
between regional powers was however perceived by the public as the Manchu court’s 
reluctance to push the reform forward. This problem was also shown in the Qing’s 
unsuccessful reform designated to centralize financial resources which was rejected by 
the regional elites. To overcome this problem, the Qing government could do nothing 
but to turn to the regional elites again for financial support for the New Army 
programme which was supposed to serve to strengthen the power of central 
government. The regional-provincial bureaucratic capitalists, in looking for financial 
sources to fund the New Army programme, would either sell the state-sponsored 
enterprises to foreign capitals, or pushing for new rounds of tax-farming in the rural 
communities.  
The New Army, being financially dependent on the regional powers, was perceived 
by the Manchu court as the modernized and strengthened force that was to replace 
the bannermen and the Green Standards which were supposed to be loyal to the 
court. Thus the Manchu elites felt necessary to reclaim military commandership over 
the New Army which was not funded by them. Yuan Shikai, the head of the Beiyang 
clique who had built up his personal networks among northern militarists through the 
New Army programme, was promoted to Beijing by the Manchu nobles in 1908 in 
order to keep him off his New Army forces in Zhili. However this political 
manoeuvring made by the young and over-ambitious Manchu princes could not deny 
the New Army’s financial dependence on their regional sponsors; those who were 
disempowered during the reform had soon reclaimed their control over regional 
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armies, however with their trust in the Manchu court abandoned (Ichiko 1980: 385-
386). The Manchu court’s attempt to penetrate the New Army had caused much 
wider turbulence rippling across provinces. For most of the time the New Army in 
many provinces was ordered to defend ‘foreign lives and property’ against 
revolutionary riots despite the troops were originally inaugurated to ‘defend the 
country from imperialism’ (Esherick 1992: 138). Soldiers, who did not fare quite well 
in the troops had accepted revolutionary ideas; and a spark of riot in the Wuhan army 
had quickly turned into enduring waves of military attacks on the Manchu’s local 
officials who had little military forces at disposal. This riot had very quickly been 
upgraded by the alliance between urban private capitalists, progressive intellectuals, 
overseas students and rural vagabonds in the cities; and because the Manchu forces 
were so disunited along regional lines, many of the southern provinces with 
developing industrial centres were soon set in chaos. In the meantime, northern 
provinces remained stable as most of those areas were garrisoned by foreign troops 
and some of the strongest regional militarists were still in control of those provinces. A 
civil war had very quickly broke out between armies from northern and southern 
provinces. Yuan Shikai, who saw much greater interests in joining the revolutionary 
camp, had easily reached a peace settlement with the southern revolutionaries who 
acknowledged Yuan’s substantial control of the new republic in return for Yuan’s 
agreement to overthrow the Manchu throne. Therefore, the consequence of the 1911 
Revolution as a peculiar historical combination was manifested in the paradoxical 
structure of a nominal democratic republic. The revolutionaries, who had sung the 
high note of the revolution, had transplanted a idealistically designed democratic state 
apparatus to the regional militarists’ substantial military control. No mature urban 
bourgeois class was in place to perpetuate the practice of constitutional democracy 
which was originally an expression of the disposition of social power in a fully 
developed capitalist society (Wood 1981; Rosenberg 1994).  
4.4 Development of the general context of China’s modern 
revolution: Sun Yat-sen’s ‘modular character’ of modern China 
and the contradictory marriage between communism and 
nationalism  
Though the 1911 Revolution was largely empty in the sense that it has created no 
substantial social groundings for the liberal-democratic ‘superstructure’, Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolutionary and nationalist thoughts deserve to be viewed as a ‘modular’ ideological 
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framework for the entire Chinese Revolution. The contradictory character of Sun 
Yat-sen’s thoughts could be treated as a result of the combined development of the 
bitter reforming and revolutionary process of the nineteenth century. Sun Yat-sen’s 
idea of the ‘Three People Principles’ (Minzu, Minzhu, Minsheng) was certainly aiming at 
combining solutions to social injustice and national crisis into one unified 
revolutionary process. Social justice was taken as a prima facie goal of the revolution as 
Sun Yat-sen had eye-witnessed the hardships the Chinese proletariats suffered in the 
nineteenth century (Bastid-Burguiere 1980; Chesneaux, Bastid and Bergere 1976). 
Like most of the Marxist thinkers, Sun Yat-sen, though he himself was always at a 
distance with communists, argues that the origins of China’s poverty and social 
injustice lied in the unequal traditional landownership. In the ‘principle of livelihood’ 
(Minsheng), Sun Yat-sen believed that the state should played a more active role in 
redistributing rural surpluses, especially concerning that un-manipulated land-
transaction accelerated by urban development was producing enormous displaced 
peasants (Sun in De Bary 2001: 320-330). As Sun has announced, the principle of 
Minsheng is ‘a form of communism’; and also, his communism was more a grand 
design of China’s future development (Godley 1987: 120).   
However, the sprout of communist thoughts as a social combination in Sun Yat-sen’s 
Three People Principle has also reflected the national crisis faced by the Chinese 
nation which gave rise to a contradictory understanding of the prior tasks of the 
Chinese revolution. To recapitulate his emphasis on inequality, Sun Yat-sen argues in 
a lecture the year before his death (1924) that the problem of inequality was ultimately 
a problem of underdevelopment and economic vulnerability facing the pressure of 
imperialisms (Wells 2001: 63-64). ‘China was suffering from poverty, not the 
distribution of wealth’ (Godley 1987: 120-121). This understanding of China’s 
primary crisis has undermined the central claim of Marxism/socialism about social 
justice and equality, and it opens up the Three People Principle as the initial quest for 
modern nationhood of the Chinese Revolution to the transplantation of capitalism 
and nationalism which would from time to time contradict the principles of 
communism. How did Sun Yat-sen resolve tensions among all the different strands of 
thoughts in his revolutionary proposal? His approach was to subject all these values, 
including capitalism, nationalism and communism to a stagist notion of revolutionary 
development. As Sun Yat-sen envisioned, ‘[t]he state would take the lead in the 
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creation of an economic infrastructure, to include mining, manufacturing and 
communications, including transportation’. Private capitals as well as foreign 
investment, if they were manipulated properly by the state, could also be rendered 
conducive to the realization of ‘the principle of livelihood’. But once the state-led 
industrial development was prioritized, communism would then become a vision of 
the future which could only be realized when the first stage of state-led development 
was accomplished (Godley 1987: 120-122). 
The stagist notion underlay not only Sun’s understanding of communism, but also his 
understanding of democracy in China’s particular scenario of backwardness. 
Obviously, the Three People Principle has proclaimed that democracy as a result of 
the revolution would be the ‘most appropriate political system’ (Sun in De Bary 2001: 
320-330). However, this system in perspective was also subject to a pre-democratic 
stage of state-tutelage because the Chinese society under the rule of the Manchu 
Empire was like a ‘sheet of loose sand’ (Schoppa 2000: 238). For Sun, the 
disorganization and vulnerability of the traditional society was a result of the absence 
of a modern nation-state that is of limited sovereignty over a fixed territorial realm 
(Anderson 2006: 7). The Manchu monarch, who was held as the scapegoat for failing 
to keep check of the tendency of local militarization and imperialist penetration, was 
set as the target enemy of the Principle of Nationalism (Minzu). However, it was not 
because that Sun was a Han-centric racist, but that his Minzu principle was posited as 
a thorough rejection of the imperial order which allowed coexistence of multiple 
forms of political authorities and military forces (Sun in De Bary 2001: 320-322)46. 
Having recognized the ‘jungle rule’ of modern international relations, Sun Yat-sen 
emphasized the state’s absolute control of the armies and the modern military system, 
echoing most of the traditionalist scholars such as Yan Fu and Kang Youwei, 
(Schwartz 1964: 91-97). However, since Sun Yat-sen’s idea of modern nation-state 
emerged against the background that the Constitutional Reform ended in a total 
failure, the traditionalist Kang Youwei’s dialectic of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ was completely 
delegitimized. The framework of imperial order, according to Sun, should be deserted 
without negotiation. Sun’s emphasis on military tutelage of the state as a pre-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Because anti-Manchuism was only an concrete expression of the negation of imperial order, 
it did not come up in Sun’s initial petition to Li Hongzhang (1894); and also, it diminished 
after the 1911 Revolution (Wells 2001).  
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democratic stage had also marginalized the Principle of Democracy which was posited 
as a constitutive moment of the Chinese Revolution only in the future. Like Trotsky 
criticizes Lenin for emphasizing leadership of the avant-garde party which would in turn 
hinder the formation of working-class identity (Knei-Paz 1978: ), Sun Yat-sen’s 
Principle of Nationalism was almost a Chinese version of the idea of avant-garde party 
which preluded the setback of liberal politics in the Nationalist Kuomintang 
(Fitzgerald 1996: 180). 
In sum, what arose from the combined development of local militarization and 
imperialist penetration of the nineteenth century was a contradictory revolutionary 
idea endorsing both nationalism and communism. That the contradictory principles 
of those could coexist in one unified revolutionary project reflected the interwoven 
social crises China was facing under the condition of backwardness. China, as a 
traditional empire torn apart by imperialisms, was haunted by problems of both social 
injustice and political fragmentation. Though Sun Yat-sen has attempted to render 
nationalism and communism compatible by constructing a stagist roadmap, the effect 
of his Three People Principle was that both discourses were justified simultaneously 
and inherited by different social and political forces in the aftermath of the 1911 
Revolution. Warlords could easily justify their escalating violence masked by 
nationalism; and politicians could prioritize military tutelage and suspend 
democratization sine die (e.g. Wakeman 1997; Harrison 2000: 198-199). All these 
would not only contradict Sun’s original promise of democracy, but more importantly 
impose harsher exploitation over Chinese peasants whose status was not addressed in 
Sun Yat-sen’s thoughts and the 1911 Republic. This problem, as a result of the social 
combination of nineteenth century’s ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ produced a 
paradoxical marriage between communism and nationalism underlying the Chinese 
Revolution; though communism needs to be addressed in tandem with nationalism, 
Sun Yat-sen’s legacies that let urban industrialization and modern military system 
overshadowed social equality and communism would certainly need to be modified by 
alternative revolutionary projects-and this was the sociological setting of Mao’s 
revolution.  
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4.5 Conclusion: bridging the gap between ‘China-made’ and ‘West-
made’ historical narratives  
The previous sections of this chapter have shown that China’s Revolution of 
Backwardness originated in the Self-strengthening Movement which aspired to 
withstanding the geopolitical pressures within the framework of traditional imperial 
order. However the disillusionment came as a result of the combined development of 
two prolonged and contradictory forces, namely the penetration of western capitalism 
and the local-regional militarization. As Harold Isaacs has argued, the seeds of 
China’s century-long revolts were all to be found in the ‘accumulative results of all 
agencies of dissolution’ (Isaacs 1938: 5). As for the developmental tendency generated 
by the above outlined international combination, exploration for reform and 
revolution of the nineteenth century had left for the Chinese elites a divided merchant 
class, a formalistic liberal-democratic republic, a fragmented central authority and a 
large number of unsheltered proletariats. This situation means that any subsequent 
revolutionary proposal would have to address the problem of social justice, 
industrialization and national unification simultaneously. Sun Yat-sen’s idea of ‘Three 
Peoples’ Principles’ reflected China’s situation of national crisis, in which any relevant 
revolutionary projects were compelled to combine tasks of social equality and national 
salvation. Also, because the development of the nineteenth century has proved that 
the merchant class, the Manchu court and regional militarists were all incapable of 
undertaking China’s ‘Revolution of Backwardness’, the unfulfilled task of the 1911 
Revolution was urging the organization of a brand new revolutionary class which 
would be more youthful, energetic and autonomous-this context would then give rise 
to the revolutionary peasant class.  
By reconceptualizing the historical development of the long nineteenth century and 
the particular result of it using U&CD, it could first be shown that the cause of 
China’s modern transformation could not be reduced to either China’s internal 
problem or the West as an external driver. It was the encounter between China as an 
empire in centrifugal decline and evolving imperialisms that incentivized the Manchu 
elites to mobilizing ‘advantages of backwardness’ by transplanting modern elements, 
including industrial technology and political institutions to the traditional empire. It 
was also the interaction among the Imperial court, the local-regional militarists and 
global capitalism that had brought the regional notables to the fore as a key agency of 
late imperial reform. In terms of the consequence of the revolution, it could neither 
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qualify as a continuation of traditional socio-political order or a bourgeois revolution 
perceived by Sinocentric and Eurocentric perspectives; instead it was a combination 
of liberal-democratic political regime operated by rivaling regional militarists for 
political accumulation under which the double crises of national disunification and 
impoverishment of the proletariats (the peasants inter alia) had been increasingly 
worsened. Thus Sun Yat-sen’s contradictory blueprint of national revolution 
crystallized in the ‘Three People’s Principles’ has emerged as a response to the double 
crises of the combined development of the nineteenth century by marrying 
communism with nationalism. Therefore, using Uneven and Combined Development 
and the concept of ‘Revolution of Backwardness’, a closure could be brought to the 
debate between Sinocentric and Eurocentric understandings of origins of the Chinese 
Revolution.  
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Chapter 5 Revolutionizing the Peasant for National Salvation-
Uneven and Combined Development and the Historical 
Specificities of Maoism  
5.1 Introduction: Maoism and the ‘peasant revolution’ as an 
internationally constituted resolution of China’s crisis of 
backwardness 
This chapter interrogates the emergence of Mao’s communist revolution and its 
historically specific outlook of ‘peasant socialism’ as a response to China’s deepening 
crisis of survival under the pressure of global capitalism of the nineteenth century. 
China’s 1911 republican revolution has only resulted in the collapse of empire rather 
than a substantial bourgeois society (Lin 2013: 439). Shortly after the event of 1911, 
the Chinese polity descended into deeper crisis of survival with Japan, as a newly 
growing imperialist power encroaching its territories on much larger scale. This 
national crisis induced the May Fourth Movement through which the Chinese 
Communist Party came to the fore of national revolution. The Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy and geopolitical calculation, known as ‘forging the link between the class 
struggle in the West and the national struggle in the East’ (Chen 1983: 514) has 
pressed the CCP into the revolutionary alliance headed by the Kuomintang (KMT) 
which was symbiotic with urban bourgeoisie and even traditional local militarists. The 
CCP has mobilized radical and violent political struggles in both the cities and the 
countryside under the rubric of the revolutionary alliance. Mao was a believer in 
violent struggles in the countryside in the 1920s which was characterized by himself as 
‘prairie fire started by a single spark’, and the CCP was also active in mobilizing 
urban worker movements in the meantime until it was cleansed by the KMT 
violently. Such revolutionary experiences of China has made Mao Zedong desert both 
the abrupt, radical methods of revolution and the bourgeoisie and the worker as the 
forces of revolution. This historical experience has determined the uneven and 
combined character of Maoism and his Yenan Model which has skipped over the 
stage of bourgeois and worker revolution, reinterpreting both democracy and 
socialism on the basis of a much protracted politicization of peasants. How can such 
unique experience be explained?   
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, Mao’s revolution and his particular 
perspective of socialism emerged as both an inheritance and negation of the legacies 
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of the 1911 Revolution aspiring to both social equality and national salvation. The 
triumph of Mao’s revolution was predicated upon a relatively successfully resolution of 
the two problems of the century-long ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ by fusing the 
campaigns of anti-imperialism and the restoration of rural order in a unified peasant 
revolution. The meaning of Maoism and the differentia specifica of the 1949 state is a 
question of why the peasantry was mobilized and integrated into China’s particular 
project of socialism, and what specific historical role the peasant played in 
reinterpreting socialism to muster enough force for China’s prolonged ‘Revolution of 
Backwardness’. Arguably, the founding of the 1949 People’s Republic and the Land 
Reform could be in a large sense seen as a substantial response to these campaigns 
despite its contested consequences. For extant explanations, however, the 1949 
Revolution has been understood as either China’s reaction to western modernity on 
the grounds of her agrarian tradition, or an emulation of Russian Stalinism. This 
chapter will show that these explanations are anachronistic due to their deep-seated 
internalist method. Uneven and Combined Development can overcome this problem 
by providing an conjunctural analysis of the historical specificities of Mao’s revolution. 
This event will be interpreted as a substitutionist response to China’s modern crisis 
emerging from the intersection of the collapse of the imperial state and the 
universalizing force of capitalism. China’s status as a late developing society in relation 
to both the capitalist West and the revolutionary Russia has determined the nature of 
Mao’s peasant revolution, which should be understood as a form of substitutionist 
development by mobilizing ‘human capability’ to defend the polity while modern 
industrialization could not be attained (D’Mello 2009).  
The problem of anachronism has occurred to some existing explanations because they 
have treated Mao’s revolution as a replica of China’s traditional agrarian order as a 
reaction to modernity. Due to the strong peasant-based character of the Maoist 
Revolution, it has always been interpreted as a modern development of China’s 
agrarian tradition which has reproduced the ‘core tenets’ of the millennium-long 
civilization (Fairbank 1987; Wolf 1969; Moore 1966). This mode of explanation tends 
to neglect the socialist dimension of the peasant’s agency and deny the role of socialist 
theories and practice in facilitating peasant organization. The demographic majority 
of the peasant population makes it easy for students of Chinese history to assume that 
the backward character of the peasantry has not only predetermined the trajectory of 
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the Chinese Revolution, but also overshadowed other modern elements the revolution 
has introduced. These authors argue that the Chinese peasant was as a structural 
determinant of the repetition of dictatorial governments in Chinese history as a 
settlement of endless, premodern-styled peasant wars (Moore 1966; Barnett 1967; 
Wolf 1969). By positing the communist victory as a modern continuation of the 
millennium-long ‘dynastic cycle’, one will inevitably loose sight of the sociological 
characteristics of the Maoist Revolution and the 1949 state-formation which was 
engendering an epochal break with China’s past (Meisner 1999). Notably, Mao was 
by no means China’s Emiliano Zapata whose perspective of ‘good society’ was ‘rooted 
in traditional Mexican society and limited by its essentially agrarian character’ 
(Knight 2008: 57-58); so the concept of ‘peasant revolt/rebellion’ cannot illuminate 
on Mao’s effort to overcome problems of the traditional society.  
Another understanding of China’s peasant revolution tends to overemphasize the 
impact of the Soviet Union. These authors have marginalized the role of China’s 
peasantry by reducing China’s specific experience of socialist revolution and political 
agency to a process of emulating Russian Stalinism (Esherick 1995: 50). This form of 
anachronism is grounded by the aforementioned conception of the nature of Chinese 
peasantry as an embodiment of backwardness, which with its ‘deeply ingrained 
irrationality’ could never lead a novel and progressive social transformation. Joseph 
Stalin has reified this idea into a mechanistic notion about developmental stages 
which insists that socialism could only emerge in a society where large-scale 
industrialization has reached an advanced level. Thus all the socialist elements in the 
Chinese Revolution are regarded as borrowed from the Soviet Union. Theda Skocpol 
has reinforced this argument using the concepts of geopolitics and world time, which 
understand the emergence of modern revolution as a ‘structurally determined fortuity’ 
in international context (Skocpol 1973: 28-29). However, as chapter 1 has already 
demonstrated, authors such as Skocpol have treated ‘the international’ as a field that 
keeps generating external interferences to China’s internally set direction of 
development. She thus views the penetration of the Soviet communism to China as an 
process intervening the internal development of the Chinese Revolution with a 
separate field of determinism (world time). Viewing the Soviet factor as well as all 
other foreign influences as a realm of ‘externalities’ has in turn perpetuated the debate 
on whether the Chinese Revolution is ‘China-made’ or ‘foreign-made’ (Escherik 1995: 
151"
"
"
151!
50-51; see also van der Ven 1991; Chen Yung-fa 1990; Vogel 1987; Bernstein 2010). 
Also, it is believed by some other authors that Stalinist institutions and ideologies 
could coexist well with China’s traditional elite and folk culture (Keating 1997: 11; 
Kong 2010: 153). Though the Soviet impact is undeniable, it is nevertheless 
impossible for these authors to understand Mao’s opposition to the Soviet tutelage 
which emerged in tandem with the acceptance of it. Equating Maoism to Stalinism 
has generated enormous explanatory difficulties not only for envisaging the possibility 
of peasant revolution in China, but also for interpreting the specificities of the 1949 
state as the legacy of the revolution. most accounts have treated Maoism as a 
resemblance of Stalinism as a form of increasing state-held violence and coercion 
deployed in economic production for creating more ‘industrial labours’. Isaac 
Deutscher’s essay on the meaning of the Cultural Revolution was indeed an exemplar 
of this argument. Deutscher interprets the continuation of Mao’s socialist revolution 
after 1949 as a ‘personalistic orgy’ inaugurated for ‘moral compensation for all 
disappointments and frustrations’ emerging from China’s ‘unsuccessful 
industrialization and the collapse of pro-Maoist parties across Asia’ (Deutscher 1964: 
214). Maoism was treated as a more extreme version of Stalinism, and Mao’s Yenan 
struggle as well as the Cultural Revolution was viewed as the Chinese Proletkult in 
which the intelligentsia was disciplined by the Party’s organized violence (ibid: 213)-
‘Like Stalinism (and partly under its influence), Maoism allows no open discussion or 
criticism of its high priest and hierarchy’ (Deutscher 1964: 196-197, 204)47. But if 
China’s ‘socialist’ incentives could only stem from Russia, Mao’s autonomous 
development since 1920s and even China’s diplomatic split with the Soviet Union and 
realignment with the US in the 1970s are understood as a deviation from ‘socialism’ 
(Schram and d’Encausse 1969; Bernstein 2010). On this score, these authors have also 
returned to the anachronistic argument that the nature of the Chinese peasant has 
predetermined the trajectory of the Chinese Revolution. It has ignored a fundamental 
historical reality that Mao’s 1949 Revolution and the subsequent Cultural Revolution !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Similar accounts that views Maoism as a ‘personalistic orgy’ include Li Zhisui’s The Private 
Life of Chairman Mao, 1994; and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday’s Mao: The Unknown Story, 2005. 
Lin Chun and Gregor Benton have mounted an anthology of Chang and Halliday’s book Was 
Mao Really a Monster?  in 2009, criticizing the couple’s arbitrary interpretation of historical 
data. See also Gao Mobo’s critiques of both books in The Battle for China’s Past, 2008, Chapter 
4-6.  
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was never a recession to China’s premodern ‘cultural values’ because these 
movements has demolished the traditional value-system such as Confucianism (Howe 
and Walker 1977: pp 176-77; Gurley 1976: chapter 2).  
To overcome these two modes of anachronism, the debate on whether the Chinese 
peasant is inherently progressive or not needs to give way to a world-historical 
conception of China’s revolutionary development. The theory of Uneven and 
Combined Development could possibly solve the problem of anachronism for it 
fundamentally rejects the notion that China’s modern development is predetermined 
by any inherent nature of the peasantry as a self-constitutive entity. Instead, in an 
international perspective, U&CD will show that the political agency of China’s 
peasantry in the modern revolution has emerged from China’s constant interaction 
with both the capitalist West and the Soviet Russia-China’s belatedness in modern 
industrialization played an decisive role in determining the nature of peasant 
socialism, which should be understood as a way of substitutionism in response to 
pressures caused by China’s backwardness.  
Notably, U&CD’s inbuilt concept of substitutionism operates as a pivotal explanatory 
device to the formation of the peasant’s political agency in China’s particular context 
of backwardness. Substitutionism in Trotsky’s original formulation refers to a typical 
scenario in a backward society that the weak working class was substituted by a 
‘narrow political instrument which would take it upon itself to speak in the name of 
Marxism and in the name of workers themselves’ (Knei-Paz 1978: 195). When the 
Russian worker was politically incompetent to head a revolution, an alternative avant-
garde party was introduced and harnessed to play the worker’s role. Substitutionist 
development emerged from the Russia worker’s political weakness not because it was 
an ‘inherent property’ of the Russian society, but it was co-constituted by the 
engagement between Tsarism and western capitalism. This idea can well be applied to 
China where the working class was even more vulnerable due to China’s belated 
industrialization and social development (Deutscher 1964: 184-189). As a response to 
this condition of backwardness, the peasant was brought to the fore by the vanguardist 
Communist Party as an substitution of the worker in social revolution.  
It is clear that substitutionism arose from an enduring, ‘epochal’ context of 
developmental backwardness; but the specific patterns, strategies and trajectories of a 
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substitutionist development was formulated in a concrete geopolitical conjuncture as 
an emergent property of the unevenness between early and late developing societies. 
Most significantly, substitutionism also implies that a backward society would not only 
transplant ‘privileges of backwardness’ from advanced industrial societies, but also 
mobilize its vernacular, domestic social relations for the same purpose when routes to 
external resources were blockaded in concrete geopolitical situations. As postcolonial 
scholars have noted, such social combination of modern and premodern social forms 
has generating two mutually propelling processes: while there was enduring 
imperative of mustering enough material capabilities to withstand ‘external whips of 
necessity’, there was simultaneously a necessity for backward polities to pursue an 
alternative path of development in order to do so. Whereas the drive for ‘Self-
strengthening’, which always manifests itself in a nationalist manner, has 
demonstrated a profound tendency of ‘openness’ to modernity, the quest for 
alternative development has erected an ‘autonomous’ counterforce struggling to break 
free from the constraints of modernity (Dirlik 1997; Anderson 1998; Lin 2006, 2012; 
Wang 2011). These two processes would give rise to a combined development in 
which premodern social force, such as the Chinese peasant was driven to adopt 
modern practices such as socialism and industrialization; and the meaning of socialism 
would thus be radically altered in China’s agrarian context. To theorize the 
configuration of such substitutionist combined development, a much closer 
examination of geopolitical transformation on the basis of China’s interaction with 
other societies is required.  
Under this theoretical framework, I will reconceptualize the Maoist Revolution as a 
critical inheritance of the revolutionary legacy of Sun Yat-sen which aimed to provide 
a holistic solution to China’s backwardness by combining nationalism with socialism. 
Historically, the creation of Maoism as a combination of modernity and counter-
modernity involved a considerable number of contingencies. Mao’s critical negation 
of Sun Yat-sen’s approach to modernity emerged only after pre-existing modernist 
approaches has failed due to China’s much more severe ‘condition of backwardness’. 
To substantiate this argument, this chapter will be developed in the following sections. 
First, I will analyze the transformation of the discourse and practice of the idea of 
‘national salvation’ and the major modernization projects it elicited in early twentieth 
century. It will be highlighted that the success of Russian Revolution and China’s 
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upsurge of modern commercial sector during the First World War has given rise to 
the nationalistic Communist Party and the Kuomintang’s urban-based state-led 
industrialization under the Soviet tutelage. I will show in particular that China’s 
belatedness of industrial development and its corresponding geopolitical hardship 
made it difficult for China to replicate political and economic systems from advanced 
industrial societies-the KMT’s attempt to establish a Soviet-styled developmental state 
had set the rural society in turmoil and left the Chinese nation in deeper geopolitical 
crisis. On this basis, Maoism arose with its peculiar modus operandi including the 
organizational structure of the CCP as well as its economic production as an 
substitution for both the bourgeoisie and the Soviet-styled avant-garde party to 
undertake a democratic revolution, a campaign for national liberation and a socialist 
revolution. I will also provide an overview of the mutations of Maoism in the post-
revolutionary era which has demonstrated a strong continuity of substitutionist 
development based upon the peasantry.  
 
5.2 Unevenness in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution: China’s 
late-development and the declining ‘condition of backward’ after 
various modernization projects 
5.2.1 The ‘Golden Opportunity’ for the Chinese bourgeoisie and the high 
tide of emulating capitalist modernity  
Modern revolution was conceived in an ‘aggregate of contradictory histories’ in which 
elites were prompted to both emulate and negate western lifestyle (Dirlik 1997: 3-4; 
Anderson 1998: 4-5). The key question here is why a backward society like China has 
undergone the processes of both emulating and negating foreign models of 
development. The immediate answer to this question is, the unsuccessful emulation of 
advanced models would compelled the elites to pursue a substitutionist development 
by mobilizing alternative resources or allying with different social class. Here I will 
first examine the failure of China’s emulation of both western capitalism and Soviet 
bolshevism in early twentieth century; and in U&CD’s perspective, it will be shown 
that such a failure can only be understood as a result of China’s belatedness in 
modern industrial development and the intensifying geopolitical pressures arising 
from that basis.  
 
China’s status as a late-developing society never presupposed a stasis of development; 
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instead, the condition of backwardness has resulted in a more radical compression of 
two contrasting forms of society during the First World World: this was a rapid 
upsurge of modern commercial sector in the context of scattered peasant communities 
dominated by the warlords’ premodern political accumulation (see Davidson 2006: 
212-213).  China’s nineteenth century reform and revolution have witnessed an 
unease adoption of democratic republicanism as the 1911 Revolution had brought in 
nothing but further weakening of state-capacity and wider proletarianization of 
peasants. The unfulfilled promise of the 1911 Revolution, however, did not rule out 
the ‘golden opportunity’ for China’s capitalist development due to lax political 
pressures on the industrial and commercial sector in the First World War. In 1914, 
when 'the light of Europe went off' and the two military blocs of Europe clashed into a 
total war driven by the incentive of unlimited geopolitical subsumption and power 
maximization (Hobsbawm 1989), China’s modern sector attained a ‘golden 
opportunity’ to expand when the First World War ‘diverted the great powers’ energies 
away from China’ while generating increased demand for raw materials and 
foodstuffs on the world market (Bergere 1986: 64)48. Under these circumstances, 
China’s industry experienced an annual rate of growth of 13.8% between 1912-1920 
(ibid: 70) and an increasing number of coastal cities had been transformed into 
modern industrial and commercial centres. In the meantime, the temporary absence 
of state-intervention in economy gave more room to the rapid development of China’s 
modern industrial sectors, though warlord competition set China in a extremely 
vulnerable political situation and continuous civil wars had severely devastated the 
countryside. The lax administrative interference to commercial activities coincided 
with the withdrawal of imperialist industries during the First World War. With rapid 
flourishing of modern industries, modern banking system began to develop in 
Shanghai with a sharp increase of 130% from 1913-1920 (ibid: 80-81).  
 
The upsurge of the modern sector gave the Chinese elites the hope and illusion that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 For example, during 1917-1919, England’s export of cotton fabrics to China drooped 48%; 
also the great war had led to the increase of silver market which had in turn increased the 
buying power of Chinese currency under the silver standard system, making it easier for 
China to pay off foreign debts. These were all favourable conditions for China’s economic 
recovery (Bergere 1986: 64-66).  
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China’s modernization could have succeeded by emulating western capitalist social 
relations such as urban industrial and financial sectors. In the 1910s and 1920s, there 
were few attempts made to question the applicability of western modernity. However, 
the disillusionment came subsequently because China’s ‘upsurge of modern sector’ 
operated in an adverse geopolitical context as part of global imperialist competitions. 
Now I will turn to the specificities of this geopolitical context which has partly 
reflected China’s condition of backwardness and the impossibility of catching up with 
advanced industrial societies without substitutionism.   
 
5.2.2 Rising powers and contested geopolitical calculations: pressures on 
backward China’s catching-up development 
Now let us turn to the question of how China’s condition of backwardness was 
geopolitically manifested in a new round of postwar imperialist competitions; and why 
China’s shortlived ‘golden opportunity’ of capitalist development has eventuated in a 
worsening geopolitical situation which preempted the peasant’s revolutionary agency. 
This has to be understood with reference to China’s relationships with different forms 
of advanced industrial societies. First of all, Japan’s rise as a late-coming great power 
in East Asia had already been a destabilizer of the regional status quo formed in the 
1870s. Such posture of Japan was explicated in the 1895 Sino-Japanese Naval War 
and the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s role on the ‘East-West plane of 
unevenness’ was analogous to Germany’s role on the eve of the First World War, 
which unsettled the ‘established geopolitical configurations’ (Rosenberg 2010: 25). 
The diplomatic settlement of the First World War was certainly a confirmation of 
Japan’s role as a rising regional and global imperialist power. In 1915, the ‘21 
Demands’ negotiated between Yuan Shikai and the Japanese government heralded 
the future scene of East Asian international order, that a Japan-centered age of 
imperialist expansion was underway. Japan made her way to great-power status by 
replacing Russia as the dominant power in East Asia after seizing control of the 
Southern Manchurian Railway in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, and Japan had 
finally become a power of world class by taking over the Jiaozhou (Chiaochow) 
peninsula from Germany according to the peace settlement of the Versailles Treaty. 
Such status of Japan was then further reinforced by the Washington Treaty that had 
enabled Japan’s dominance at sea in the East Asian region on the basis of a tripartite 
agreement with the US and Britain. Though Japan had agreed to reduce her warship 
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capacity to a lower ratio, the treaty had nonetheless ruled out the possibility of future 
arm racing in East Asia with the US and Britain having agreed not to build naval 
fortifications in the region (Gordon 2003: 175). Thus Japan had been given a freehand 
to establish her military hegemony over East Asia with her stronghold in China as 
stipulated in the settlement of the First World War.  
 
Japan’s rise to world-class power needs to be viewed closely with the historical 
withdrawal of advanced western powers from partitioning China. When Germany 
had been excluded from geopolitical competition in the region and sunk in deep crisis 
due to the highly punitive Treaty of Versailles, Britain had also entered an age when 
direct involvement in colonizing China became increasingly unaffordable. Britain’s 
last footholds of interest in China and the Far East were further limited to the private 
financial and banking sectors in Shanghai and Hong Kong which were more reliant 
upon the principle of laissez-faire. When the First World War broke out, the British 
government had soon terminated the Reorganization Loan given to Yuan Shikai in 
order to reduce political commitment to China’s domestic struggles. Imperialist 
powers like Britain had already gone through the stage of colonial expansion with 
their overseas colonies spreading around the globe. This was certainly not the case of 
Japan. The historical withdrawal of western powers from China had provided Japan a 
chance to narrow her gap with advanced imperialisms by pushing its militarily 
sponsored capitalist interests much further in China, especially Manchuria. As a 
combination of ‘capitalism and feudalist relics’, Japan was not able to develop 
sufficient purchasing power on the domestic level for her capitalist industrialization 
which was developed more ‘in width’ than ‘in depth’; thus Japan was congenitally 
short of sizable market for the highly concentrated capitalist development (Norman 
1940; Halliday 1975: 100-102). Also, as Japan’s industrialization further proceeded, its 
demand for raw materials became more pressing. It is recorded that by 1920s the 
number of Japanese expatriates living in China had reached 134 000, and China was 
Japan’s most important destination of investment and textile exportation (Gordon 
2003: 176). For Japan’s status as a late-developing imperialist power and cultural 
inferiority, she was unable to compete with western imperialists ‘on equal terms’ on 
the global scale from the outset (Halliday 1975; Suzuki 2004). Thus the enormous size 
of the Chinese territory was viewed by the Japanese imperialist as their very own 
hinterland for relieving domestic crises caused by profit-drop.  For the same reason, 
158"
"
"
158!
Japan would by no means tolerate any attempts to make China politically strong or to 
place China under any political force stronger than Japan-A politically unsettled 
China with an underdeveloped industrial economy was extremely conducive to 
Japan’s developmentally constituted geopolitical strategy, which was to enact a core-
periphery structure in East Asia having annexed Taiwan and Korea as Japan’s formal 
colonies (Cumings 1981: 4-8).  
 
This geopolitical calculation of Japan also preluded Japan’s invasion to China since 
the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident of 1931. For the unwise decision to return to the 
gold standard at prewar parity in the 1920s, Japan suffered severe domestic economic 
backlash since the 1929 Great Slump, largely because the mainstay of postwar 
Japanese economic relations were based on the functioning of the US economy. The 
reverberation of the economic crisis in the US had resulted in the rise of the military 
dictatorship who began to dominate the Japanese government after the assassination 
of the liberal-internationalist prime minister. Japan, like Germany was reacting to the 
global capitalist order in a fascist way by ‘launching an assault first on many of the 
West’s private markets, and subsequently sources of vital raw materials’ (Halliday 
1975: 122). With the growth of internationalism on the global scale, Japan, who was 
in deepened crisis as the knock-on effects of the Great Depression was reacting to the 
liberal international order in a more radical way by the ‘bold action to bring China 
under decisive Japanese control’ (ibid). 
 
Another rising power that destablized and altered the preexisting international order 
of East Asia was the post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, which to China was also an 
advanced industrial society. The Soviet Russia’s geopolitical strategy and foreign 
policy were always characterized by a mixture of revolutionary prospect(s) and 
realpolitik. The peculiar nature of the Russian state as well as the Soviet revolution had 
made the Soviet foreign policy a contradictory one. That is to say, no matter how 
much ‘socialist’ the Russian revolution actually was, it was in the first instance a 
revolution against imperialism which aimed to transcend Russia’s geopolitical and 
developmental backwardness. After the founding of the Soviet state in the late years of 
the First World War, the Soviet Russia had managed to free itself from the endgame 
of the First World War by signing the Brest-Litowsk Treaty with Germany which was 
severely punished and isolated by the Versailles peace settlement. This diplomatic 
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realignment indicated that the immediate task posed to the Soviet leaders was to 
safeguard the newly founded regime at home. Shortly after probing realpolitik against 
the imperialist obstruction which had summoned multi-national troops to the Russian 
soil, setbacks of ‘world revolution’ in Poland and Germany had legitimized Stalin’s 
line of ‘building socialism in one country’ as a strong appeal for realpolitik, which was 
also deployed to purge out Leon Trotsky who was against the alliance between the 
CCP and the KMT in the intra-party struggles (Borkenau 1962: 306; Trotsky’s 
Preface in Isaacs 1938).  
 
China, as a late-developing society not only in terms of industrialization, but also the 
degree of working class formation, provided Stalin a typical case to justify his prospect 
of ‘Socialism in One Country’. Theoretically, Stalin’s foreign policy practices was 
predicated upon a stagist assumption that China needed to go through the phase of 
bourgeois revolution before she could meaningfully embrace a socialist/proletarian 
upheaval (Deutscher 1964: 184). Stalin suggested that China’s peasant and worker 
were both too weak to take a central role in the revolution. More significantly, this line 
of theoretical assumption could be easily adapted to the practical geopolitical 
calculation that a unified China under the Russian tutelage was contributory to 
consolidating Russia’s new regime, despite social composition of the Chinese 
leadership. Thus in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution had it emerged a 
North-South plane of unevenness between Russia as the early revolutionary state and 
China as a late one, which was to supervene on China’s course of late development by 
binding China’s communist elites with other political forces (e.g. the KMT) conducive 
to Soviet Russia’s geopolitical calculation. The North-South plane of unevenness 
between Russia and China had given rise to a dual approach in Soviet Russia’s 
foreign policy practices which was a peculiar mixture of realpolitik and spirits of world 
revolution. The Soviet geopolitical interests driven by tensions on the North-South 
plane had sowed the seed of the subsequent CCP-KMT conflict. However, it is  
arguable that the Soviet influence had set for the Chinese Revolution both a 
significant model of modernity and considerable obstacles to emulate the model which 
has in turn compelled the Chinese elites to reflect on different paths of modernity 
throughout the revolution. That the Soviet Russia acted as both ‘foe and tutor’ was 
not a separate case; it was almost a common pattern of China’s reception of 
modernities. But before reflecting upon limits and incompatibility of foreign models, 
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what the Chinese revolutionaries first confronted was the question of appreciating 
modernity against the premodern relics untouched by the 1911 Revolution.  
 
It was a consistent theme in the Soviet Russia’s ‘Socialism in One Country’ that a 
strong, unified China was desired on her southern border in order to balance against 
the pressure from western powers; and this theme bore some variances in varying 
geopolitical conditions. When it came to the closure of the Second World War, the 
most pressing task for the Soviet Union became to remedy the war-torn economy and 
maintain its ‘sphere of influence’ acquired in the wartime. As the wartime 
condominium between the Soviet Union and the West had collapsed by 1947 when 
the US inaugurated the Marshall Plan to transmit European states to the US 
hegemony, Moscow felt threatened that the Soviet control of Eastern Europe would 
be ‘rolled back’; thus Stalin was prompted to enforce the programme of ‘Socialism in 
One Country’, which was predicated upon ‘a centrally planned, autarkic economy 
subordinated to a fixed ideology’ at the global level (van der Pijl 1993: 250). Moscow 
had then forced Poland, Romania and Hungary to join the Communist alliance by 
establishing the Cominform as the new institutional headquarter of the Soviet bloc. In 
1949 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was set up among member states 
of the Soviet bloc, which was a mechanism through which the Soviet Union 
exchanged engineering and technology to the member states for cheap energy and 
natural resources. The regional economic cooperation of the Soviet bloc was then 
placed under the central bureaucratic planning of the CPSU. However Stalin’s effort 
to expand the system of ‘Socialism in One Country’ ran into a series of difficulties in 
its early years when it was alarmed by increasing hostility from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia from 1948 onwards (Ulam 1968: 379; Hopf 
2006: 662). Moscow found it difficult and costly to purge out the pro-West elites in the 
Soviet bloc and to curb the ambition of some nationalist leaders such as Yugoslavia’s 
Tito. Alarmed by the continuous resistance from Eastern Europe, Stalin began to 
direct the expanding system of ‘Socialism in One Country’ towards China, where the 
CCP was badly in need of heavy industries, technology and political recognition for 
sustaining the newly built republic. However, the North-South unevenness 
presupposed the problem that China’s emulation and transplantation of the Soviet 
model of political economy would not only be assisted by the Soviet Russia, but also 
be subject to the geopolitical calculation of her-the Soviet model would thus refracted 
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through prisms of such geopolitical calculation on China’s development.  
 
In sum, the First World War had provided the peripheral China a freehand to reap 
the profits of sprouting modern economic sectors; the ‘upsurge of modern sector’, 
though it was short-lived and unsustainable, gave the Chinese elites the faith that 
China had the equal chance to embrace modernism. ‘The international’ constituted 
by interrelationships with Russia as the revolutionary avant-garde and Japan as the 
saboteur of China’s modern industrial development then resulted in a peculiar 
combination in which the first unified nation-state in the post-dynastic time was 
conceived. Now let us turn to a more significant question about the origins of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
 
5.3 Combination: the interwoven themes of nationalism and 
socialism in the making of the Chinese Communist Party 
5.3.1 The May Fourth Movement and the nationalist origins of the 
Communist Party 
When the aforementioned two historical processes, China’s upsurge in urban 
bourgeoisie and the political penetration of Japan and the Soviet Russia, intersected in 
the first decade of the republican era, the Chinese society was on the verge of a new 
wave of political transformation energized, accelerated and mediated by wide-
spreading nationalist movements across the country. From the hiatus of the First 
World War had the Communist Party arisen under not only the banner of socialism 
but also that of national independence and radical political actions (Dirlik 1989, 
Mitter 2004). The term ‘national salvation’ was coined in the May Fourth Movement 
(1919) as the most inclusive and widely endorsed idea for all political forces of the day 
to legitimize their projects. The May Fourth Movement was a nationwide protest 
against the Beiyang government based upon a wide alliance between students, 
workers, merchants and intellectuals. The trigger of the Movement, however, arose 
from the East-West plane of unevenness due to Japan’s unceasing quest for overseas 
domination. In the Versailles Conference (1919), Germany’s extraterritoriality in 
Shandong was transferred to Japan despite China’s strong opposition. Since 1915, 
Japan’s request for Shandong raised in the 21 Demands had already aroused 
nationwide waves of anti-Japanese commercial boycotting. Because China made its 
particular contribution to the Allies in the First World War by sending 96, 000 
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Chinese labourers to the Western Front, the expectation of reclaiming China’s rights 
and sovereignty in Shandong was extremely high across the country before of the 
Versailles Treaty was signed (Mitter 2004: 5). Needless to say, the failure of the 
government’s diplomacy revived the anti-Japanese campaign on a more broader, 
nationwide scale.  
 
The May Fourth Movement was initiated by a group of 3, 000 students attempting to 
break into the house of the foreign minister Cao Rulin, and had very quickly rippled 
into the urban intelligentsia. A group of progressive intellectuals began to promote the 
idea of ‘New Cultural Movement’, which was targeted at the non-progressive, anti-
Enlightenment elements of the traditional values that were thought to have prevented 
China from transcending the condition of backwardness. ‘Democracy’ and ‘Science’, 
which were identified as the two cornerstones of western modernity, were introduced 
by intellectuals at Peking University, the institutional home of the New Cultural 
Movement. Chen Duxiu, one of the key advocates of the Movement argued that 
Confucius was an ideology for the feudal age, which only taught people to submit 
rather than to embrace lifestyles in ‘civilized society’; and Lu Xun, the leading 
Chinese radical novelist, claimed exaggeratedly in his renowned work Kuangren Riji 
(Diary of A Mad Man) that what lay between every line of those fine Confucian 
principles such as ‘benevolence, righteousness and morality’ were only the simple but 
brutish cry of ‘Eat people!’ 49. These arbitrary and partial interpretations of traditional 
culture appeared to have proposed a reflection on the traditional way of life thought 
to be short of the essential impetus for Enlightenment. However, the New Cultural 
Movement, which first focused on the cultural aspects, was soon overpowered by the 
more radical political agenda of ‘national salvation’.  As the Movement proceeded, 
the search for ‘Democracy and Science’ was played down by the emerging ‘central 
patriotic ground’ in the cities, which proposed that ‘a rejuvenated, unified China 
would have the means to cope with the three great problems of warlordism, an 
exploitative landlord system described as ‘feudal’ in nature, and foreign imperialism’ 
(Spence 1990: 313). After the appeal for ‘New Culture’ in the Chinese intelligentsia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 See Chen Duxiu,  “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life” in De Bary, Sources of Chinese 
Tradition, Vol 2: From 1600 through the twentieth century, pp. 353-356. 
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had given way to the more powerful and all-encompassing discourse of national 
salvation, the May Fourth Movement was able to grow into a nationalist movement 
that had involved almost all strata of the Chinese society. Students blamed the 
Beiyang government for allying with the imperialists and selling out the interests of the 
Chinese nation; Merchants and urban entrepreneurs imputed their lack of profit to 
the warlords’ exploitative policy, their lack of political representation and the influx of 
Japanese goods. In this situation, the intellectuals’ denunciation of Confucianism was 
more likely to draw people’s attention to the dubious and deceitful relationship 
between the warlords and the imperialisms, especially given that Yuan Shikai had 
glorified Confucius as the ideological orthodoxy of his ‘Empire of China’. As a result, 
the May Fourth Movement, which entailed a strong incentive to modernize Chinese 
culture, had ultimately become a movement of ‘actions of thorough and 
uncompromising opposition to imperialism and warlordism’ (Chen 1970: 74).  
 
Thus it becomes more obvious that the May Fourth Movement, which manifested 
itself as the ‘New Cultural Movement’ in reflecting upon the non-progressive elements 
of China’s traditional values, was the most powerful catalyst to the bourgeoning 
nationalist movements after the First World War. The characteristics of the renovated 
‘nationalism’ can be found in the social combination of the movement. Rana Mitter is 
correct to argue that the Movement had succeeded in creating a new ‘atmosphere’ of 
Salvationism with the fetishism of westernization; ‘[a] ‘nation’, a political form based 
on the idea of equal citizenship, was a foreign concept, yet it quickly became clear that 
it was a potentially useful one’, and also ‘thinkers…understood that nation-states were 
a product of western modernity’ that needed to be adopted by China for the reason of 
‘national salvation’ (Mitter 2004: 118). Political discourses and ideological upsurges 
involved in the Movement were mostly advocating revolutionary radicalism rather 
than any forms of reformism compared to the relatively conservative aura of the 
Constitutional Reform in late nineteenth century. In 1890s, it was Japan’s successful 
restoration that persuaded the Qing government to seek the balance between 
traditional values and modernization in the Japanese mirror;  however, after the First 
World War, it was also Japan’s aggressive demand for China’s territory and 
sovereignty that had discredited Japan as China’s mentor and role model. Also 
Japan’s changing role had vetoed the legitimacy of China’s traditional values 
(especially Confucianism) in facilitating national restoration and reunification, 
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opening a century of political radicalism that tended to replace the old world 
completely with western thoughts such as Social Darwinism, Pragmatism and 
Marxism. Most of China’s progressive intellectuals involved in this movement were 
compelled to disvalue China’s traditional way of life completely.  
 
However, it is notable that most of the western ideas ventilated in the movement were 
reinterpreted narrowly as ideas for ‘surviving competitions’ subject to an emerging 
project of substitutionism conceived by the elites50. The May Fourth Movement has 
uncompromisingly highlighted the significance of practical political action towards 
national unification. The communist thoughts of social revolution were first 
introduced and openly addressed under this circumstance. Li Dazhao and Chen 
Duxiu, both faculty members of Peking University were the earliest intellectuals to 
publish on communism. Both of them believed in radical political actions for 
subverting the old order. As the main advocates of the May Fourth and the New 
Culture Movement, Li and Chen were both consciously highlighting the radical 
dimensions in Marxist ideas as a guidance of political action. Though Li Dazhao and 
Chen Duxiu were both ‘marginal intellectuals removed from the mainstream of their 
intellectual community’ (Narkiewicz 1981: 148; Dirlik 1989: 95), it is obvious that 
‘they apprehended Marxism as an ideology of action before they had a firm grasp of 
its theoretical basis’ (Dirlik 1989: 98). As Arif Dirlik has precisely argued, ‘while the 
Marxist social revolutionary idea, and Marxist concepts of social analysis, emerged 
quickly in 1919 as fundamental components of the language of radicalism in China, it 
is wrong to deduce from that there existed at this time an ideological commitment to 
or theoretical grasp of Marxism that pointed the way to a strategy of revolution that 
Chinese radicals could call their own’ (ibid).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 It is noteworthy that though advocates of this wave of ‘learning from the West’ movement 
did have internal differences from one another, for example whilst Chen Duxiu and Li 
Dazhao, the earliest Marxists were actively involved in mass demonstration, Fu Sinian, 
another major advocate of the New Cultural Movement was negative towards students’ 
onslaught on foreign embassies. However, voices like Fu had been largely marginalised in the 
Movement, carrying very little weight in constructing any revolutionary ideology because of 
the atmospheric predominance of nationalist radicalism. For details of the Movement and 
disputes among its advocates, see Vera Schwarcz, 1986, The Chinese Enlightenment, University of 
California Press  
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Therefore, the May Fourth Movement recreated a nationalist conjuncture in which 
the formerly suppressed social forces, such as the workers and the bourgeoisie were 
energized at the same moment under the unchallenged legitimacy of ‘national 
salvation’ (Jiuguo). Under this rubric, all western social and revolutionary thoughts 
being experimented in the cities, communism inter alia could be easily channeled 
towards the radical, anti-traditional end, which gained considerable momentum by 
proposing an ultra-westernizing revolutionary agenda. ‘China had to learn from 
foreigners’ was the renewed and reinforced social consensus. After the Japanese model 
was ruled out, it only depended on whom the new mentor would be. More 
importantly, if the notion of nationhood in the 1911 Revolution was predicated 
vaguely upon the potency of anti-Manchuism, the intellectuals of the May Fourth 
Movement has lifted the idea of ‘nation’ to a more scientific level: the legitimacy of the 
discourse of ‘modernization as westernization’ seemed un-negotiable; and 
westernizing, which to the largest audience meant building a ‘centralized, as opposed 
to federal, vision of China’ that would wipe out the corrupting and ‘people-eating’ 
phantom of the old culture (Mitter 2004: 119) then became the very social and 
intellectual zeitgeist. Under the revolutionary hegemony which emphasizes both radical 
political practice and westernization, it can be understood why the newly founded 
CCP could join the political alliance headed by the KMT despite their different social 
visions.  
 
It is important to note that the historical significance of the May Fourth Movement is 
that it has reinforced the revolutionary identity created in the nineteenth century that 
social transformation needs to be integrated to a broader picture of nationalist 
movement. The Beiyang Government’s weak position in the postwar negations 
strengthened the image that the warlord class was no better than the imperialists in 
oppressing the Chinese people. Mao has stated in his much later text, The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party that ‘[t]he two (imperialism and feudalism) 
collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people’, whereas ‘imperialism is the 
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foremost and most ferocious enemy’ for it was onerous (Mao 1939)51. Mao referred to 
the warlords as a form of ‘feudalism’ not in the sense of European feudalism, but that 
traditional local militias, such as the warlords were tearing the state-structure apart 
and encroaching national integrity, which then gave imperialism a space to oppress 
the people. This notion implies that Chinese communists has from the outset posited 
the nature of China’s revolution as a combination tasks of national salvation and 
social transformation, with anti-imperialist campaign occupying the centre of 
revolutionary ideologies. Dirlik’s observation of early communism shows that Mao 
and his predecessors were much more assured of the imperative of national salvation 
and its required political actions than of the form and nature to which the traditional 
society would be transformed. A question thus arises-why the stage of bourgeois as 
well as worker’s revolution have both eclipsed with Mao and the CCP coming to 
identify the peasant as the agency of socialist revolution as the above 1939 text has 
stated?  
 
5.3.2 The KMT’s Nationalist Era as a premature modernization and the 
exacerbation of social and geopolitical crisis 
The May Fourth Movement reconstructed the Communist Party as an avant-garde 
party which prioritized political action over Marxist theories. Russia was also set as 
China’s new role model as a major result of the movement (Spence 1990: 305-310)52. 
However, Russian’s revolutionary model would refract through prisms of geopolitical 
context emerging from China’s developmental belatedness in relation to Russia. As an 
advanced revolutionary and industrial society,  the Soviet Russia exercised a dual 
policy towards China in order to promote world revolution and to sustain a unified 
and stable China on the eastern border simultaneously. The Soviet Union decided to 
place the newly founded Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 See Mao Tsetung, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
2/mswv2_23.htm, last access, 28, Feb, 2014 
52 Notably, the Soviet foreign affairs commissar Karakhan announced to relinquish Russia’s 
rights in Manchuria. This diplomatic act ‘marked contrast to the behavior of the other 
Western powers and Japan that the Soviet Union appeared as China’s truest friend’ (Spence 
1990: 307). On this basis Li Dazhao had further justified grafting Russian Marxism onto 
China’s national salvation. 
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militarily and organizationally centralized Nationalist Party, despite the latter had 
retained its enduring connections with regional militarists, landlords and urban 
bourgeoisie; thus the KMT took the initiative to construct the first unified modern 
state under the Soviet tutelage.  
 
Under the leadership of the KMT, the communists undertook the task to launch anti-
warlord movements in both rural and urban areas, which was advised by the 
Comintern’s policy that peasant revolts should be organized as part of wider national 
liberation struggles in oriental countries (Wilbur 1983: 15-18). The Communist Party 
had also succeeded in mobilizing urban labour protests in major cities as a 
continuation of working class activism sparked in the May Fourth Movement. 
Especially in 1925, the labour protest in the Shanghai International Settlement was 
extended to a nationwide movement known as the ‘May Thirtieth Movement’, which 
had then attracted large funding from overseas Chinese and the Soviet Russia. Such 
movements were further echoed by rebellions against foreign privileges in widely 
dispersed concessions across the country (ibid). With the hostility between workers on 
strike and foreign settlements, working class movements were effectively internalized 
to the broader theme of national salvation.   
 
It is undeniable that labour movements ‘created a nation-wide social consciousness 
which is essential toward the building of a new and vigorous republic’ (Isaacs 1938: 
63). Thus Canton and the Guangdong province, where the earliest foreign economic 
presence and the wide-ranging sectarian societies originated, had very quickly become 
the base of revolutionary forces not only because it was relatively untouched by 
northern warlords, but also mass movements were most heated in the region. Students 
and youngsters flocked to Guangdong for progressive and revolutionary prospects, 
and the Soviet Russia began to pour funds into the area in order to bolster the KMT’s 
military and organizational capacity. The Soviet military adviser Borodin had very 
soon identified Chiang Kaishek, who was scion of a Zhejiang merchant family with 
close personal connections with underworld societies in Jiangnan, as his ‘dark haired 
darling’ (Isaacs 1938: 67). The Whampoa Military Academy built under the Soviet 
tutelage was of great importance to both revolutionary parties. Most immediately, it 
was certainly the ‘privilege of backwardness’ that armed the Chinese revolutionary 
force to a much more advanced level. This advancement was not only attained 
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technologically, but also organizationally and socio-politically. The alliance of the 
KMT and the CCP parties, which had been identified as the avant-garde of the nation, 
were restructured in the image of the Soviet organizations of party-state. The Political 
Training Department (hereafter PTD) was implanted in the National Revolutionary 
Army to indoctrinate the general revolutionary ideology. The PTD was in charge of 
political and cultural education of soldiers which was nonexistent in other concurrent 
regional military forces. As the role of political propaganda became increasingly 
crucial in the army, the revolutionary party had succeeded in politicizing the military 
force by infiltrating it with the idea of national salvation (Wilbur 1983: 34). Mao 
Zedong, the subsequent CCP leader had become Chief of the Nationalist Propaganda 
Bureau. Though Mao’s task in the propaganda section of the KMT was as short-lived 
as the CCP’s involvement, he has played a significant role in creating a ‘revolutionary 
part’ of the Nationalist Army by instilling the idea of allying with workers and 
proletariats. Mao’s seizure of the propaganda machine of the government had indeed 
accelerated the ongoing revolts and struggles in urban workplaces headed by the 
CCP. Thus in realizing the first national unification after the imperial collapse, the 
two predominant political forces, the CCP and the KMT were further and more 
clearly identified with respective social classes (Fitzgerald 1996: 214-260). As the 
national-revolutionary conjuncture unfolded, its early stage was by all means highly 
progressive accelerated by the Soviet Union’s dual policies not only because it has 
tottered the pre-existing warlord regime, but more importantly it brought up the 
question of the ‘Communist Party entering the national-revolutionary organizations’ 
(Trotsky 1976: 124). With the avant-garde national army being modernly drilled and, 
more critically, organized under the solid political leadership of the revolutionary 
party, the national unification movement had very quickly swept across the country, 
displacing warlordist militias which were still built upon personal allegiance and 
clanship. China’s revolution was also pushed forward with the CCP’s increasing 
organizational capacity mustered by cooperating with the KMT in mobilizing mass 
movements during the Northern Expedition (Fitzgerald 1996: 261). Certainly on the 
early stage of China’s political unification, the CCP was still too weak to stand as a 
contradictory force to the military prowess of the KMT because the CCP did not 
have any military capacity at its disposal on this stage. Nevertheless, the CCP’s 
propaganda strategies and negative lessons learned from the revolutionary alliance, 
were all developed in the history of the rise of KMT under circumstances of 
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geopolitical contestations among the Soviet Russia, Japan and the West.  
 
A world-historical riddle following the huge success of the national unification 
campaign was indeed the breakdown of the revolutionary alliance between the CCP 
and the KMT which started from the bloody crackdown on the communist section of 
the KMT party and armies in April, 1927. Explanation to this event is not to be found 
in the character of either party but a wider picture of international conjuncture. The 
rise of the KMT and China’s national unification had ‘exploded’ the balance of power 
in the region between Japan and the western powers built upon the Washington 
settlement (Halliday 1975: 117). Chiang Kaishek’s hostility towards labours and the 
communists was not just because of his dependence on foreign capitals and the 
comprador class, but more importantly the particular version of modernization he was 
actively pursuing as a resolution of the condition of backwardness.  
 
The KMT’s relationship with the capitalist section of Chinese society was indeed a 
contradictory one. It was firstly symbiotic, but after all predicated upon an 
asymmetric interdependence between the two. The symbiosis between the Chinese 
capitalists (especially the merchant class in Shanghai) and the KMT was first created 
with the KMT promising to industrialize the country. Upon winning the anti-warlord 
struggle, the KMT party had taken control of the newly emerging urban industrial 
metropolises, which gave Chiang Kaishek the impression that the rise of a centralized 
developmental state was underway in the early years of the Nanjing government . 
Chiang, as a faithful student and follower of Sun Yat-sen who proposed state-led 
industrialization for China, felt the historical opportunity to build an economy of 
‘nationalized heavy industrialized and transportations’ pictured in Sun Yat-sen’s 
prospective The International Development of China53. Immediately after the unification, 
Nanjing was redesigned as ‘Paris of the East’ under rigorous central planning. The 
Nationalist government had soon set up a series of bureaucratic bodies such as the 
National Reconstruction Commission to reorganize the national economy (Kirby 
2000: 141).  
 
With Chiang Kaishek’s industrialization project accelerated by a set of Soviet-styled !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Sun first took this idea from Lenin’s New Economic Policy. See Godley 1987: 109-125.  
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bureaucracy, China’s development was still lagging behind the advanced West; 
however, Chiang’s ‘technocratic confidence and cooperation with advanced industrial 
nations’ (Kirby 2000: 138) was too early and premature for the rest of Chinese society 
which was still populated by small-scale agricultural production. The consequence of 
this combined development is disastrous in the sense that China’s rural order and 
geopolitical situation were both worsened by Chiang Kaishek’s industrial 
development. The utmost difficulty faced by Chiang Kaishek and his government was 
the lack of financial and technological resources for setting up additional industrial 
projects in the promised scale. The KMT’s immediate strategy to broaden its financial 
basis was to exploit the Shanghai capitalist community as much as possible by altering 
the fact that private capitals in major cities were ‘comparatively free from legislative 
and administrative control’ before 1927 due to the collapse of the Beiyang 
government of Yuan Shikai (Cobles 1986: 261). In uniting with the Shanghai 
capitalists the KMT was first prompted to play down the spreading worker activism 
heated up during the Northern Expedition. The Communist Party and its members, 
which under the Soviet tutelage were absorbed to the KMT’s organization for 
mobilizing workers, were all purged out due to the need to weaken the labour class in 
bolstering the KMT’s ‘developmental state’ (Kirby 2000: 137). ‘The policy of the 
government is to have labour working in harmony with the revolutionary army and 
the government’ (Isaacs 1938: ). In conceiving the relatively autonomous 
‘developmental state’, the KMT was prompted to wipe out the existing self-conscious 
labour movements from both the revolutionary alliance but also the entire society. 
Like a typical developmental state, ‘internal security legislation and agencies, secret 
police and party organisations has been standard practice in bolstering the state and 
controlling civil society’ (Leftwich 1995: 415); the KMT had thus set up a number of 
secret organizations to permeate the society. All these fascist practices were dressed in 
Chiang Kaishek’s reinterpretation of the traditional cultural values, Confucianism inter 
alia as a set of spiritual doctrines that ‘moves people’s minds to common public 
purpose’, central to which was the absolute domination of the military section of the 
state over social and political life (Eastman 1990; Wakeman 1997: 431). Thus by the 
1930s, Chiang Kaishek and his KMT had managed to impose a military control over 
the labour class as well as the capital-possessing merchant class. This development had 
laid a partial foundation for a modern developmental state as the politico-institutional 
basis for Chiang Kaishek’s project of industrialization.  
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Chiang Kaishek’s symbiotic relationship with the Shanghai capitalist circle was 
reinforced by China’s late-developing status during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
China, due to her peripheral status in the global capitalist economy, did not suffer 
much from the Great Depression (Iriye 1986: 494). Since the monetary system was 
still the silver standard which stayed intact of the financial crisis, when silver outflow 
began to soar since 1932 due to the rise in silver price on the American market, the 
Chinese rural economy began to further deteriorate as a result of decline in export. 
Shanghai financiers and bankers then decided to look for new opportunity for 
investment. The KMT’s financial ministry thus began to issue domestic bonds to raise 
funds for anti-communist campaigns. Endless wars at home were a major guarantor of 
the price of domestic bonds, which had then become a new interest for Shanghai 
bankers. The average price of domestic bonds had thus risen by 40 percent from 1932 
to 1934  (Cobles 1986: 165-168). In floating domestic bonds the KMT had rendered 
the Shanghai capitalist circle increasingly dependent on the state, whilst it was also in 
the KMT’s utmost interest to secure Shanghai as the only sustainable source of 
revenue. This interdependence became the sociological origins of the KMT’s non-
resistance policy to the Japanese invasion after the Mukden Incident (1931). The 
KMT did not want its connections to the Shanghai merchants and financiers be 
jeopardized by a head to head confrontation with Japan. The KMT had thus signed 
the Ho-Umezu Agreement with Japan in 1935 to accept the terms of military 
withdrawal and keeping resistance quiet in northern China, hoping to keep the 
Japanese forces off the Shanghai heartland before the KMT could manage to receive 
support from the West. In a time when the postwar economic internationalism was 
descending to regionalism and protectionism, London and Washington were both 
unwilling to intervene Japan’s bold action of aggression (Iriye 1986: 504-506). The 
consequence of the KMT’s inactive response to the Japanese invasion was proved to 
be lethal in the long run. The most immediate result of the KMT’s Japanese policy 
was that it had driven progressive, patriotic elites from of all kinds in both cities and 
villages to the CCP’s bordered area.  
 
The non-resistance policy of the KMT had severely damaged its legitimacy especially 
when the Japanese force began to overtake the coastal cities including Shanghai after 
1937 despite the Ho-Umezu Agreement. However, what directly led to the 
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augmentation of the peasant’s political agency was the worsening of the living 
condition of proletariats and the collapse of rural order as a result of the KMT’s 
industrialization which was too early for China. In building the nationalist 
government, Chiang’s source of revenues were far from enough to sustain a modern 
military force capable of dominating the entire territory. Competing warlords would 
accept the nationalist creed of the revolution for its strong symbolic power without 
conceding their personalistic control of armies to the central government (Harrison 
2000: 173-206). More crucial was that Chiang’s highly costly modern industrial 
projects and military expenditures demanded much larger financial sources which the 
urban commercial circles could not fully provide, thus the Nanjing Government’s 
relationship with the peasant became increasingly conflictual and exploitative. The 
KMT’s ruthless land tax and military conscription ‘exacted a heavy toll of the farmers 
and deeply affected peasant attitudes toward government authority’ (Eastman 1984: 
49). The key problem here is that the KMT had no direct connections to the peasant 
communities, thus it would have to rely on a complex alliance between various 
warlords and local gentry for tax-exaction which would in turn encourage local tax-
farming. This led to a polarization of wealth in the countryside, generating some more 
prosperous large landlords. What was more disastrous was ‘a sharp upward spurt in 
farm prices’ which resulted in wide-spreading panic in the countryside54. Moreover, 
Chiang Kaishek’s military incapability would also intensify rural crisis. In withdrawing 
to western China after Japan’s overtake of Nanjing, Chiang Kaishek’s armies 
disrupted many local communities by exploding the dikes in the Yellow River, which 
flooded more local peasants than Japanese armies (Spence 1990: 449). 
 
Therefore, China’s first national unification accelerated by the Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy and the KMT’s political and military prowess has not resulted in any bourgeois 
society or mature developmental state; it has led to deepened geopolitical and national 
crisis due to the state’s inability to resist Japanese invasion. This simply means that 
China’s experience of modern revolution as a combined development has to break 
down ‘the succession of events’ from bourgeois-democratic revolution to worker-led 
socialist revolution because the bourgeoisie were too dependent on the state and the 
workers were so disempowered in the specific geopolitical circumstances which gave !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 As Lloyd Eastman has documented, rice price increased 500 percent in Chongqing in 1940, 
see Eastman 1984: 46-47.  
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rise to the KMT’s particular industrial policies. This has no doubt reinforced Mao 
and the CCP’s perception of the bourgeoisie and the worker’s political weaknesses, 
compelling them to look for substitution of these classes. The KMT’s failure has also 
shattered its status as the leader of the Chinese Revolution, which, according to Mao, 
is because ‘[n]o sooner had the strength of the proletariat and of the peasant and of 
other petty bourgeois masses brought the revolution of 1927 to victory than the 
capitalist class, headed by the big bourgeoisie, kicked the masses aside, seized the fruits 
of the revolution, formed a counter-revolutionary alliance with imperialism and the 
feudal forces, and strained themselves to the limit in a war of "Communist 
suppression" for ten years’ (Mao 1940)55. Such combined development, manifested as 
a breakdown in ‘succession of events’ has in turn called forth an alternative leadership 
for the Chinese Revolution which had to be more capable of mobilizing more 
revolutionary and youthful class, the peasant inter alia; and it was in the geopolitical 
conjuncture of the Japanese invasion that Mao’s strategy to cope with such combined 
development became more pertinent. 
5.4 Development: the making of the Yenan Model of ‘Peasant 
Socialism’ as an substitution for western and soviet modernities 
5.4.1 The catalyst of the CCP’s substitutionism: the asymmetric war 
against Japan 
Now I will turn to the conjunctural explanation of the CCP’s peasant revolution, its 
substitutionist character and its reinterpretation of both democracy and socialism. To 
be sure, the KMT’s destruction of traditional rural society and geopolitical crisis was 
urging an alternative agent who were more capable of solving China’s problem of 
‘backwardness’. As part of the accumulative development of Chinese Revolution, it 
was the lessons learned from the tragedy of urban labour movements that have driven 
the CCP away from its previous trajectory, which compelled the CCP to look for new 
modes of resistance and identify with alternative social class (Deutscher 1964: 14). 
However, why was it the peasant and how was a peasant revolution possible? The 
specific conjuncture of this social formation was that China was fighting an 
asymmetric war against the Japanese invasion in a backward situation. After the 
Mukden Incident (1931), Japan was able to maintain a reciprocal relationship with the 
KMT government until Chiang Kaishek was by accident detained by the 
northeastern warlord Zhang Xueliang in Xi’an, whose father Zhang Zuolin was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 See On New Democracy.  
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murdered by the Japanese army. As a result of the Xi’an Incident (1936), Chiang was 
forced to abolish the so-called ‘first pacification and then resistance’ strategy and 
accept the CCP’s proposal of forming a nationwide anti-Japanese alliance, which is 
also known as the second KMT-CCP cooperation (Braun 1982: 149; Esherick 1995: 
53). The Red Army was reorganized into the National Army and began to receive 
financial aid from the KMT government. The Shan-Gan-Ning base area, which was 
founded by the CCP after the Long March, was granted de jure status by the Nanjing 
government. The reunion of the CCP and the KMT as a wartime alliance was indeed 
a partial one. Though the CCP’s army was conscripted in the Nationalist Army, the 
KMT was certainly not capable of intervening the autonomous operation of the 
CCP’s army. This was the lesson Mao had learned from the demise of the first 
revolutionary alliance that ‘political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ and the 
military forces should be placed under tight control of the Party (Mao 1965: 219). 
Notably, before the War of Resistance against Japan, the CCP had already developed 
a solid organizational structure resembling the Soviet avant-garde party and the 
Nationalist government in the 1920s, which includes the political control of the army 
and the prototypical party-state. Now the question becomes how the socio-political 
form of the CCP’s state has historically transformed to effectively interweave socialism 
and nationalism in the peasant communities during the Sino-Japanese War. This is 
firstly a question of how the CCP has managed to survive by mobilizing a ‘asymmetric 
war’ against the Japanese armies in which the peasants played a central role (Kennedy 
2008).  
 
Had the CCP not invented some new strategies of resistance and survival, the 
technologically backward Red Army would have been easily wiped out by the KMT’s 
intensive campaigns in early 1930s. Mao stated on the beginning of the war that the 
resistance against Japanese would be protracted and enduring. The reason for the 
protracted-ness is that Japan’s strategy in China mainly focused on the coastal cities 
with the northern and western parts of the country uncontrolled. To Mao, ‘the 
heterogeneity and uneven development of the Chinese economy are rather 
advantageous in the war of resistance’ and ‘to sever Shanghai from the rest of China 
would definitely not be as disastrous to China as would be the severance of New York 
from the United States’. This was simply because that the vast peasant communities 
provided the Communists the space and energy to mobilize guerrilla warfare with ‘a 
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high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields’ which enabled ‘the weak to win 
against the strong’ (Kennedy 2008: 887); and the extensiveness of the CCP armies 
enabled them to survive the intensive onslaughts of Japan’s modern war-machine until 
the Japanese army fell under an ‘international united front against Japanese 
imperialism’ (Mao 1938/1965: 134-136). Thus in Mao’s long-term calculation of the 
protracted struggle with the Japanese imperialism, Chinese peasants in the northern 
and western parts of the country played an extremely important role. The CCP’s Red 
Army, reinstated as the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army under the 
KMT were mostly stationed in the mountainous villages where Japan’s modern war-
machinery could not operate effectively. The economic backwardness of the peasant 
society enabled the CCP not only the anarchical space to organize protracted 
resistance (Skocpol 1979: 242), but also the possibility to invent a new form of 
resistance, the guerrilla warfare as a strategy of survival in an asymmetrical power 
relations56.  
 
The significance of peasant mobilization for China’s national liberation needs to be 
further understood by reference to the asymmetric war against Japan’s ‘mopping up’ 
attacks in early 1940s. In August 1941 the CCP launched the ‘A Hundred Regiments 
Campaign’ on the Japanese forces in five northern provinces. This campaign had 
damaged the Japanese occupation severely and most crucially caused disruption to the 
supply of resources and products to the Japanese army (Selden 1995; Watson 2008: 
385). The CCP’s military advance in the north alerted Japan that her small size of 
population and limited natural resources could not sustain a protracted war, especially 
concerning that Japan was dragged into the Pacific War against another country with 
bountiful material supply (the US) in 1941. All these factors have made the Japanese 
determined to destroy the CCP’s base area in a short time, which appeared to them 
the reservoir of both human resources and anti-Japanese energy. Thus since 1941 the 
Japanese army launched a total attack on China’s northern countryside known as the 
‘three-all-policy’ (rob all, burn all, kill all) (Selden 1995; Slyke 1986: 671). The 
outbreak of the Pacific War had compelled Japan to allocate more troops to China’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 For the record of Japan’s intensive military operation in northern China and Mao Zedong’s 
military response, see AB. Kennedy, ‘Can the Weak Defeat the Strong? Mao’s Evolving 
Approach to Asymmetric Warfare in Yan’an’, The China Quarterly, vol. 196, 2008.  
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northern villages, hoping to rapidly subsume China’s rural resistance via intensive 
military operation. Japan’s intensive attack using modern weapons since 1941 also 
provided the KMT a chance to weaken the CCP’s power by occasionally raiding the 
northern base and cutting off the government funds to the CCP. It has been shown 
that by 1939 the CCP’s taxes levied to sustain the large team of bureaucrats in the 
base area was already on a unbearable level57; despite the heavy taxation that could 
damage the peasant solidarity, the revenues were still not sufficient to sustain the self-
defence army. Mao was then compelled to work out solutions that could ‘reduce costs 
and develop self-sufficiency’ (Watson 2008: 387). Therefore, it is arguable that the 
historical conjuncture of ‘asymmetric war’ against Japan set the basic context for 
Mao’s peasant revolution because the vast peasant communities provided a platform 
for a ‘protracted struggle’ to survive Japan’s intensive onslaughts with modern 
weaponry. However, surviving the war cannot be equated to winning the revolution. 
How was the Chinese peasant mobilized to head a ‘socialist revolution’ propelled by 
national liberation, and how was socialism recast in China’s specific context? This 
question needs to be understood by examining the Rectification Movement and the 
Production Movement, which have substantially transformed the organizational 
structure of the CCP by critically negating the Soviet party-state structure, and also 
fundamentally altered the social property relations of the Chinese agrarian society.   
 
5.4.2 Reconstructing the peasant’s political agency: the mass line and the 
meaning of ‘people’s democracy’ 
The combined development of the formation of the peasant’s political agency was 
firstly a response to the aforementioned conjunctural crisis faced by the CCP. The 
Rectification Movement was indeed the political action taken to recreate the peasant 
in order to survive such crisis. The Rectification Movement had long been mistakenly 
understood as Mao’s effort to strengthen its personal power by purging opponents (cf. 
Gao 2001; Halliday and Chang 2005). It seems to some authors that Rectification was 
nothing more than a process for strengthening Mao’s patrimonial power through 
ideological and political manoeuvres. Indeed Mao did use the movement to retaliate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 It is worth mentioning that nearly half of the CCP’s revenue came from the landlords and 
rich peasant (Watson 2008: 346), of which the confiscation was always conflictual and costly. 
Also it is noteworthy that endless war against the landlords was detrimental to the anti-
Japanese United Front whose existence was in Mao’s interest. 
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on his critics (e.g. the Moscow clique), but in deposing opponents Mao certainly 
needed to identify more ‘friends’ even for the simplest reason of power consolidation; 
and here came the question of peasant representation (Hobsbawm 1973; Dugget 
1975). How could a Leninist Party headed by urban elites be possibly accepted by the 
local peasants? To address this question, Mao used the Rectification Movement to 
reflect upon the failure of the 1927 Revolution and to critically inherit the legacies of 
the May Fourth Movement. The cultural question articulated in the movement was 
about what form of national culture was conducive to the ‘Revolution of 
Backwardness’, especially the asymmetrical war against Japan. This was a negation of 
the ultra-westernizing tradition set forth by the May Fourth Movement which 
proposed that China should remake its state and culture in the image of ‘foreign’ 
legacies. ‘How wide-spread could a rationalist enlightenment ever be among the 
masses’ (Schwarcz 1986: 227). Intellectuals who came to the villages from the cities to 
escape the ‘white terror’ of the KMT then proposed that China, with her massive 
rural space should seek to reveal universality from the soil of localism, which was also 
used to define nationalism. In this climate, Mao published three articles regarding the 
new form of culture and ‘work method’ the CCP should deploy for mobilizing the 
peasants. In ‘Reform Our Study’ (1941) and ‘Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing’ 
(1942), Mao proclaimed to open orthodox Marxist and Leninist theories to the reality 
of China’s rural society and the practice of the Chinese Revolution; he asserted that 
the party should learn to use the language of the mass to avoid ‘subjectivism and 
sectarianism’. Further to this, Mao announced in his ‘Talk at the Yenan Forum on 
Literature and Art’ (1942) that the role of culture in the base-area was to both 
represent and educate the mass; thus ‘the thoughts and feelings of our writers and 
artists should be fused with those of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers’ 58.  
 
By ‘fusing with the masses’, the CCP’s intellectuals, cadres and writers were all 
encouraged to get involved in the daily life of the peasants and work with their 
familiar languages. By driving the pre-existing bureaucrats, cadres and intellectuals to 
the grassroot level of the countryside, the Rectification Movement preluded a 
decentralizing tendency which enabled the Production Movement. In line with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 See ‘Reform Our Study’, ‘Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing’ and ‘Talk at the Yenan 
Forum on Literature and Art’ in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 3, 1965.  
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opposition to bureaucratism and doctrinarism, the Production Movement was from 
the start against ‘grandiose, empty and unrealistic plans for large-scale investment in 
heavy industry’ (Watson 2008: 390). The goals of the movement, including ‘excellence 
and simplicity, unity, efficiency etc.’ were all targeted at reducing centrally controlled 
economic activities in order to relieve the ‘economic and financial problem’ in the 
geopolitical situation of intensifying Japanese pressure. Central to all goals of the 
Production Movement was that the revolutionary cadres, who had been ‘brought 
down to the earth’ in local military-productive units, were expected to organize 
guerrilla militias on self-sufficient basis.  
 
The idea of self-sufficiency in Mao’s political economy implies a transformation of 
social relations property which has later become a particular form of socialism on the 
basis of the peasantry. In response to intensive blockades and onslaughts, the party-
army’s modus operandi was to make ‘military and governmental units responsible for 
producing substantial portions of their own food and supplies’ (Selden 1989: 45, 
1995a: 228). This step taken initially to reduce cost suggested that party officials and 
cadres would not stand off the agrarian society as an autonomous administration; 
instead, they themselves become part of the agricultural production. Though this 
development did not rule out the pre-existing unequal power relations between the 
party and the peasant (Bianco 1986: 305), it has nevertheless brought substantial 
change to the party’s organization as well as social structure of the countryside-a more 
organic and cooperative relationship was built between the CCP and the peasants 
with the revolutionary cadres became part of the production process of the peasant 
communities, whose subsistence was supplied by agricultural surpluses redistributed 
within local communities; and since the revolutionary cadres laboured within the local 
peasants’ households on a self-sufficient basis, the traditional method of small-scaled 
farming stayed unchanged. By ‘going to the village’ and labouring together with the 
peasant, Mao’s revolutionaries was remade into a new agency of ‘guerrilla leader’ who 
was capable of ‘performing a variety of military, political, economic, and social tasks’ 
which was regarded by Mao as an ideal of the ‘red and expert’ (Meisner 1989: 94). 
Having said that, it needs to be noted at the same time that Mao’s ‘guerrilla leaders’ 
carried out different economic and military tasks in a technically backward and 
labour-intensive manner by means of political mobilization and even coercion (Selden 
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1995a: 231)59.  
 
Here comes the dialectical but also inherently contradictory logic of the newly created 
political agency of ‘peasant guerrilla revolutionary’. It needs to be noted that before 
the party cadres were dispatched to the local communities to ‘fuse with the mass’, they 
were educated in a Soviet-styled party which emphasized political leadership over 
soldiers and revolutionaries, this political education could only operate when the party 
was strong; also, ‘the legacies of armed revolution and the social-national 
developmental imperative allowed the state to quickly insulate itself from the people in 
a process of transforming a revolutionary party into a ruling position’ (Lin 2006: 136). 
However, the role of party-cadre and the role of peasant was always convertible under 
the line of ‘fusing with the mass’. Grassroot cadres’ penetration of the local 
communities has made the peasant’ traditional production of ‘politico-military’ aims 
of the CCP not only by educating the peasant in nationalist direction, but also 
transforming a considerable number of traditional peasants into revolutionary cadres 
(Schurmann 1968: 425-427). By fusing with the mass, the party-cadres have also 
developed the dual identity as both government officials and peasants, which are both 
crystallized in the new agency of ‘guerrilla revolutionary’. Through this process, Mao 
and the CCP have developed a stronghold of power in a peasant society by mobilizing 
the traditional small-scaled production to meet the ideological and revolutionary ends 
of the CCP (Anderson 2010: 66). Also, the Production Movement has denied the 
state’s centralized control of industrial development and the ‘alienation between the 
state and the masses’ before large-scale industrialization was introduced to China 
(Schurmann 1968: 109). The major advance here is that the ‘mass line’ has preluded 
an unprecedented praxis of democratic revolution by reinterpreting the meaning of 
democracy. The CCP’s idea of ‘people’s democracy’ is ‘understood in a way more 
faithful to an originally populist project’; thus the top leadership’s scientific design of 
economic and social policies would be challenged by the identity of the peasant 
guerrilla revolutionaries not as an force external to the Communist Party, but a force 
sublated to the internal contradiction of the hybrid structure of Maoism. It is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Mark Selden has documented an exemplar of the CCP using labour to substitute for 
advanced technology. General Wang Zhen mobilized people to melt down an old iron bell to 
make tools, see Selden 1995a: 230.  
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significant to note that the CCP’s ‘elitist undertone’ propelled by China’s ‘socio-
national developmental imperative’ which assumed that the party and the leaders 
should ‘know better in a downward pattern of command’ would ran into conflict with 
the populism represented by the guerrilla leaders as both ‘red and expert’ whose 
knowledge was acquired largely in via an upward process by fusing with the mass (Lin 
2006: 137-138)-this contradictory structure of Maoism presupposed the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). To relieve the tensions between these two forms of power, 
Mao has reconceptualized the idea of democracy by suggesting that ‘the party leaders 
thereby correctly understand the opinions of the people, and so fashion the required 
policies in a manner the masses will support and actively implement’. This is known as 
the two-way traffic of ‘‘from the masses, to the masses’’ which was compared by Mao 
to the relationship between fish and water (D’Mello 2009; Lin 2006: 138).  
 
It is clear that the peasant’s active engagement in both economic production and 
political mobilization was rendered an inherent dimension of Mao’s conception of 
‘people’s democracy’ as a significant substitution for the weak bourgeoisie and worker 
in the cities. China’s particular mode of substitutionism stemming from peasant 
mobilization was however aimed at transforming the politics of a much wider 
‘macrocosm’ (Hobsbawm 1973). As Trotsky has envisioned, ‘there are substantial 
grounds for expressing the hope that, through a correct policy it will be possible to 
unite the workers’ movement, and the urban movement in general, with the peasant 
war’ (Trotsky 1976: 580). Unlike Marx’s vision that the ‘peasant chorus’ could only be 
formed in a wider socialist revolution (Marx 2000; Shanin 1983: 14-17), Mao 
expected that his Yenan practice, especially the specific conception of democracy 
attained via the ‘mass line’ could be scaled up to a much wider democratic revolution 
which would liberate the nation from all forms of preexisting oppression; and ‘it was 
the duty of the communists there to rally the masses in support of such a project, for it 
would lead to national independence and bourgeois democracy’ (D’Mello 2009). Mao 
could tolerate the existence of many other social forces before the peasant’s activism 
was fully energized, or even suspended the Land Reform to for the support of 
landlords (see Myers 1986: 751), and he has argued that the concept of ‘people’ 
central to the idea of ‘people’s democracy’ was a composition of ‘working class, the 
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peasant, urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie’60. However, Mao firmly 
maintained that the revolutionized peasantry should occupy the leadership of the 
revolutionary alliance. Thus the guerrilla leaders as a transformed peasantry 
constituted the core of ‘people’s democracy’, whereas in theory, ‘the ‘people’ is more 
inclusive while signifying where the power should be derived and possessed’ (Lin 
2006: 137). Though the non-proletariat classes were included in the concept of 
‘people’, they were ruled out of the leadership and would be disciplined in some 
circumstances, due to Mao’s understanding from the Nationalist-revolutionary 
conjuncture that those classes’ weaknesses made them convertible to ‘the imperialists’ 
running dog’. For the same reason, Mao has accentuated that ‘the method we employ 
is democratic, the method of persuasion’61 which presupposes that other non-
proletariat classes in the alliance would be transformed, though non-violently.  
 
This line then became the logical starting point of Mao’s ‘United Front’ strategy 
revolving around the ‘proletarian democracy’, which was manifested not only during 
the Yenan period62 but also throughout the history of the 1949 People’s Republic. 
Stuart Schram argues correctly that ‘Mao…while continuing to talk about proletarian 
hegemony, had recruited (my emphasis), from 1927 onwards, among a much wider 
range of social categories: rural vagabonds or elements declasses, shopkeepers, office 
workers, minor civil servants, and intellectuals of all descriptions, as well as ‘national 
capitalists’, ‘patriotic gentry’ and others’’ (Schram 1989: 99). For political elites who 
accepted the new state, Mao treated them generously, offering them prestigious posts 
in the government63. For leading capitalists who were willing to stay in Mainland 
China, Mao and the CCP had also allowed them to maintain their property and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, 1949, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm, 
last access, 3rd March, 2014 
61 On the People's Democratic Dictatorship. 
62 It is noted that in early years of Yenan communism, the regime was able to become stable 
on the basis of a mixed economy, 'with some public owndership or monoply, but with a large 
private sector operating under overall government supervision and price control', and private 
tenancy was permitted, see Van Slyke 1986: 635. 
63 For example, in the first government of the PRC (1949), more than half of the vice 
presidents of the state were non-communists.  
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retain preexisting way of life in the name of ‘national bourgeoisie’ (cf. Meisner 1999: 
75; Westad 2003; Cochran 2007: 359). In 1949, a large number of Yenan-styled 
revolutionary cadres were also brought into the cities to work with thousands of urban 
cadres or technocrats left by the KMT (Brown 2008: 42). On the early stage of the 
Land Reform and the socialist transformation in early 1950s, Mao and the CCP also 
gave room to the survival of ‘national bourgeoisie’ and private landownership, As far 
as industrialization was concerned, it was significant for the CCP to transform the 
traditional exploitative agrarian regime to collective ownership, which enabled the 
state to extract more agricultural surpluses. However due to the institutional weakness, 
the CCP could only let different regions to carry out the reform in different paces 
according to their respective conditions. By 1951 the power of decision-making in the 
land reform had been largely transferred to regional administrators. This 
decentralization generated a ‘localist deviation’ in some parts of the country where 
local landed classes, regional cadres and the central government’s ‘general line’ ran 
into conflict64 (Maitan 1969: 31; Teiwes 1987: 82). The endurance of the United 
Front and its shifting class configuration were indeed both subject to the primary task 
of national salvation under constant geopolitical pressures. The reason that Mao had 
a faith in the bourgeois class is that China’s peasant revolution was in the first instance 
a national-salvationist campaign against imperialism, and the bourgeoisie, according 
to Mao’s historical observation, was an oppressed class ‘in a colonial and semi-colonial 
country oppressed by imperialism’. However, the lesson Mao has taken from the 
nineteenth century and the Nationalist Government’s failure is that bourgeoisie alone 
could not deliver any political incentives capable of altering the ‘semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal society’ (Mao 1939, 1940)65. The central role of the peasantry in the 
revolutionary leadership is also determined by the prospect that China’s revolution 
called upon a new social order-a new political order which preluded new social 
property relations. Thus China’s modern revolution entailed two stages: the New 
Democratic Stage which prepared the Chinese society for subsequent socialist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 The most typical example of this kind is the Land Reform in Guangdong province, see Ezra 
Vogel 1969, Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital 1949-1968, pp. 
41.  
65 See also Mao Tse-tung, 'The politics of new democracy' in On New Democracy, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm, 
last access, 28 Feb, 2014.  
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transformation by ‘confiscating the property of the imperialists and the big 
bourgeoisie’ without doing away with capitalism completely (Mao 1940; see also 
D’Mello 2009), and the Socialist stage which transforms the social property relations 
in an egalitarian and communal direction resonating Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Minsheng’ 
(People’s Livelihood) principle. Now it is important to understand the meaning of 
socialism and how it was predicated upon the peasant-based political leadership in 
Mao’s vision of revolutionary trajectory.  
 
5.4.3. Transforming rural social property relations: recasting the 
meaning of socialism 
The above analysis has indicated that by reconstructing the peasant’s political agency 
via the ‘mass line’, the peasant class became more politically and organizationally 
capable of heading China’s New Democratic Revolution mediated by the discourse 
and practice of ‘national salvation’. It remains questionable why China’s peasant 
revolution, by rallying the entire nation, the national bourgeoisie inter alia for national 
liberation needs to be channeled towards a socialist end. What role did the peasant 
play in constructing China’s specific conception and vision of socialism, and how was 
socialism recast to serve a much more specific task for the Chinese nation on the basis 
of the peasant’s political agency? Indeed the answer could be manifold for there are so 
many different sources from which specific interpretation of socialism could be 
derived; but in the perspective of Uneven and Combined Development, socialism, 
preluded and propelled by the stage of New Democratic Revolution would ultimately 
need to resolve China’s crisis of survival arising from the condition of backwardness as 
the very fundamental context of China’s modern revolution. As Arif Dirlik has 
specified, China’s modern revolution has presented ‘a synthesis of two meanings of 
socialism, both of which have deep roots in the history of Chinese socialism: socialism 
as an ideology of revolution and socialism as an ideology of modernization’ (Dirlik 
1989: 27). This synthesis bears its root in Sun Yat-sen’s problematization of China’s 
crisis of the nineteenth century-that the intersection between the traditional social 
relations and the underdevelopment of China’s modern economic sector set the 
nation in constant geopolitical and social upheavals. It has already been shown that 
Sun Yat-sen’s stagist prospect of ‘first industrialization (under the state’s strong 
military tutelage), and then social equality’ has been delegitimized by the KMT’s 
failure, thus the CCP’s peasant revolution would have to present a critical inheritance 
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as well as negation of Sun Yat-sen’s perspective of national salvation. It would have to 
inherit Sun’s emphasis on both modernization/developmentalism and social equality, 
whereas it would have to negate the stagist vision viewing socialism as a late stage with 
mature industrialization. The category of socialism which was reconstructed by Mao 
as a substitutionist strategy to resolve the problems of both revolution and 
modernization has thus come to the fore in Mao’s political maneuvering under the 
rubric of nationalism.  
 
How did Mao’s particular perspective of socialism differ from classic Marxism, 
Leninism and Stalinism due to the involvement of the peasantry? It is noted by Isaac 
Deutscher that ‘China’s communism descends straight from Bolshevism’ and ‘Mao 
stands on Lenin’s shoulders’ (Deutscher 1964/1984: 182-183). Like Leninism, 
Maoism also originated from the attempt to organize weak labour with substitution of 
an avant-garde party as a ‘narrow political instrument which would take it upon itself to 
speak in the name of Marxism and in the name of the workers themselves’ (Knei-Paz 
1978: 195). This substitutionist project has failed not only because of the structural 
reason that China had a much less developed urban working class, but also the 
particular timing of historical events as an emergent property of China’s interaction 
with the advanced industrial world: the KMT’s project of industrialization and the 
prototypical developmental state under specific geopolitical pressures ruled out the 
possibility of any urban revolution headed by the worker, while the KMT’s regime 
was shattered by the Japanese invasion despite its sprouting industrialization. As a 
result of China’s belated development, Mao and the CCP, with enormous ‘privileges 
of backwardness’ such as the advanced ideology of socialism as well as the Soviet-
styled ‘politicized army’ assimilated from the Soviet experience, needed to look for 
alternative political agency for the revolution. Therefore, from U&CD’s vantage 
point, a combined development emerged from China’s experience with a form of 
political organization belonging to advanced industrial polities, namely the communist 
party-state occupying the leadership of the revolution, whereas such organization was 
sustained by a different and alternative political agent-the peasant. This combination 
of two contrasting social forms has given rise to China’s configuration of revolutionary 
agency that was utterly different from the Russian and western experiences of socialist 
movements; but what further specifies the Chinese case was the subsequent ‘spirally 
ascending’ development, namely a radical reshuffling of historical sequences arising 
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from such a combination of social forms.  
 
The spiral ascendance in Mao’s revolution involves a radical negation of the Stalinist 
model which amplifies the over-determining role of production force. With the newly 
created ‘guerrilla revolutionaries’ as a result of the New Democratic Revolution, Mao 
radically reversed the Soviet model by highlighting the decisive role of ‘human 
capability’ in a situation when material conditions were undersupplied. This was 
understood by the postmodernist scholars an attempt to challenge pre-existing 
modernities by mobilizing cultural, ideological and other ‘super-structural’ resources 
of the society (Gao 1999: 34; Althusser 1976: 81; see also Jameson 1981)66, which 
reached its apogee in the Cultural Revolution. Notably, such a ‘mobilization of super-
structure’ is itself a process of ‘skipping over stage’ with advanced communal social 
property relations regime introduced to China’s unproductive countryside during the 
Land Reform and the subsequent Great Leap Forward. It cannot be denied that from 
the Sino-Japanese war to the early years of the PRC, private landownership as well as 
urban bourgeoisie were tolerated for maintaining political stability. However, the 
Land Reform transformed most of the rural communities into units of ‘agricultural 
cooperatives’;  and these cooperatives were classified as cooperative organizations on 
different stages according to respective degrees of collectivization (Teiwes 1987: 87, 
111). Mao also introduced the nationalization of private capitals in 1953 with the 
belief that ‘to restrict capitalism was ultimately to resist imperialism’ (Maitain 1969: 
28)67. But how can such large-scale collectivization as an advanced social property 
relations regime be massively introduced to China where industrial development and 
economic growth were so limited? The rationale behind this is that different stages of 
socialist revolution could be reallocated to accelerate the general development of 
socialism. The advanced phase of socialism where ‘distribution is according to the 
norm ‘to each according to her/his needs’’ was placed before the primitive phase of 
‘distribution according to her/his abilities’ regardless of China’s production force !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 For a comprehensive review of the postmodern take on the Cultural Revolution, see, Jian 
Guo, 1999, ‘Resisting Modernity in Contemporary China: The Cultural Revolution and 
Postmodernism’, Modern China, vol. 25, no. 3  
67 Notably Mao’s later opponent, Liu Shaoqi was also stressing the significance of ‘class 
struggle’ against capitalism in this period, see Teiwes 1987.  
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(D’Mello 2009; Magdoff 1975: 53-54). Mao believed that by reshuffling these two 
stages, social inequalities created in the primitive phase of socialist development could 
be transcended by the advanced social relations of the advanced phase such as 
agricultural cooperatives and People’s Communes.  
Here a few significant dissimilarities could be drawn between Stalinism and Maoism 
especially on the micro-level of production organization. The Stalinist model of 
socialist production was predicated upon a historical understanding that the growth of 
production force preceded the progress of social relations, thus specialist ‘abilities’ that 
facilitate the growth of production force should be encouraged. Thus it is 
characterized by its ‘exclusive reliance on heavy industry, highly centralized, 
bureaucratic method of planning’ under which the peasantry was only regarded as a 
‘source of savings’ rather than an active role in production68.  The Soviet model 
insisted on a highly hierarchical structure in production process, which was 
encapsulated in the ‘one-man management’ system. Under this system, authority of 
decision-making was concentrated on the level of factory administration which was 
the direct receptor of directives from the central government (Frazier 2004: 17-18)69. 
Hierarchy in workplace presupposed occupational specialization, which had been ‘a 
protracted and agonizing process marked by varied and strenuous efforts to mitigate 
the social consequences of the division of labour and an enormous reluctance to 
accept occupational specialization as the way of life in the new society’ (Meisner 1989: 
91). However, Maoism has completely negated this model by denying the primacy of 
production force in social progression. By prioritizing ‘superstructure’ over production 
force, Mao was placing great emphasis on the factor of ‘human capability’70 and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 For Mao’s complete critique of the Soviet model, see A Critique of Soviet Economics by Mao 
Tsetung, translated by Moss Roberts, Monthly Review Press, 1977.   
69 For a detailed analysis of the origins of the Soviet model in China, see Morris Bian, The 
Making of the State Enterprise System in Modern China, 2005, pp. 76-100. Bian’s argument has 
further suggested that the implementation of the Soviet model in China was a combination of 
the CCP’s inheritance of the KMT’s legacies and the penetration of Stalinism.  
70 Mao's admiration of 'human capabilities' is expressed in his famous text 'The Foolish Old 
Man Who Removes the Mountains' (yugong yishan). The classic story of the Foolish Man tells 
that an old kept digging the mountains in his way, ‘unshaken in his conviction’. As a result, 
‘[g]od was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on 
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agency of educated ‘guerrilla revolutionaries’ would could play multi-tasking role in 
both political and economic life (D’Mello 2009). This is regarded as the virtue of the 
People’s Communes which according to Mao ‘combines industry, agriculture, 
commerce, education and military affairs and facilitates leadership’ (MacFaquhar 
1983: 78). To substantiate such a combination of functionalities, the peasant’s political 
agency which includes the Party’s political education of the mass, the ‘fish and water’ 
relationship between the state and the peasant communities existed as a necessary 
condition for the CCP’s ‘swift and complete collectivization’ (Anderson 2010: 66-67).  
In sum, how to understand China’s particular peasant socialism and Maoism as a 
specific revolutionary modus operandi? U&CD suggests that they both need to be 
understood as substitutionist developments emerging from China’s ‘enduring 
condition of backwardness’ mediated by historically specific geopolitical conjunctures. 
To survive the Sino-Japanese War, the Communist Party has substituted the 
bourgeoisie and the worker with the peasant for a democratic revolution for national 
liberation. The historical necessity of such substitutionist strategy has been addressed 
in Mao’s texts on the leadership and social-class foundation of the Chinese 
Revolution, including The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (1939), On 
New Democracy (1940) and On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship (1949), which, while 
holding a pessimistic view that China were too backward for bourgeois revolution and 
worker’s movements (see Deutscher 1964/1984), has more optimistically envisioned 
the possibility that China could transcend these stages to directly enter a socialist era 
through the combination of rural restoration and anti-imperialist campaigns. Also, the 
centrality of peasantry in the revolutionary leadership consolidated on the stage of 
New Democratic Revolution is posited by Mao as the political condition for 
transforming the social property relations, with which China could skip the Stalinist 
stage of ‘distribution according to ability’ to directly entre a more socialist stage of 
‘distribution according to need’71.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
their backs’. Drawing upon the story, Mao proclaims that ‘[t]oday, two big mountains lie like 
a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese 
Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up’, see 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_26.htm, 
last access 2013-09-08.  
71"See Mao’s A Critique of the Soviet Economics."
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However, Mao’s theory, which pictures a clear substitutionist strategy as a response ot 
China’s combined development, has encountered more difficulties and chaos than 
incremental achievements in the post-1949 era which requires an explanation along 
the line of Uneven and Combined Development as well. To consolidate the newly 
established communist regime, Mao and the CCP have further substituted production 
force and technological specialty with ‘human capability’. While the democratic 
revolution and the socialist transformation were mutually propelling each other, they 
were both subject to a broader theme of ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ aimed to fulfill 
the task of ‘national salvation’ stemming from the crisis of the nineteenth century. By 
conceptualizing the peasant revolution as an emergent property of China’s relational 
condition of backwardness, its specificities could be understood progressively; and this 
explanation can also be applied to the mutations of Maoism in the aftermath of the 
1949 Revolution.   
 
5.5 Mutations of Maoism as a continuous substitutionist 
development in varying geopolitical context: the meaning of the 
Cultural Revolution  
It has been shown that China’s democratic and socialist revolution were subject to the 
broader theme of national salvation arising from the condition of backwardness ever 
since Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles. Whereas the ‘Revolution of 
Backwardness’ was a continuous task, specific patterns of ‘substitutionist development’ 
as an integral strategy of the ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ was mediated by varying 
geopolitical relationships. This logic gives a basis to understanding the mutations of 
Maoism in the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution as a continuation of China’s 
Revolution of Backwardness in substitutionist manner (1949). To deepen our 
understanding of Maoism, it is crucial to take a glance at how Mao’s democratic and 
socialist revolutions formulated in the Yenan conjuncture has later culminated into 
the socio-political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution as the climax of China’s 
socialist revolution (1966-1976). 
 
The geopolitically conveyed capitalist pressures on the newly founded PRC were 
intensive at the beginning of the Cold War. As the major beneficiary of the Second 
World War, the US possessed the world’s largest amount of industrial capital 
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accumulated through wartime manufacturing, and the most advanced capitalist mode 
of manufacturing of ‘Fordism’. Driven by the capitalist incentive of building a ‘free-
enterprise hegemony’ (Arrighi 1994: 59), the US was ready to reconstruct an 
international order of Pax Americana on the institutional basis of NATO and the 
Bretton Wood system (Ikenberry 2001; Gill 2008: 61). In Asia, the US’ capital 
reproduction was predicated more upon direct investment than free trade (Gilpin 
1975: 11; Arrighi 1994: 73-74). Japan was made the main destination of American 
industrial investment and raw materials via the postwar reconstruction and 
revitalization programme. To maintain Japan’s ability to purchase American goods, 
the US engaged in making Japan an export-led industrial country, whose low-cost 
goods exported to other Asian countries would generate revenues needed for 
purchasing advanced American industrial products (Hersh 1993: 18-23). The 
traditional networks of trade between China and other Asian countries thus became a 
major challenge to the US’ programme of making Japan the leading export-oriented 
industrial country in the region; and for this reason, the US had imposed an embargo 
on China (Zhang Shuguang 2001).  
 
The material shortage caused by the embargo and Chiang Kaishek’s ambition of 
‘retaking the mainland’ from Taiwan galvanized China’s demand of heavy industries 
for national defense which was not yet attained in the Yenan era. This prompted Mao 
to substantiate his ‘leaning to one side’ policy by allying with the Soviet Union in the 
1950s. Leading a delegation to Moscow in the name of celebrating Stalin’s 70th 
birthday, Mao playfully proclaimed that he was looking for something both ‘fancy and 
tasty’ (Yang 2002). It is documented that when the Chinese revolution was about to 
triumph before 1949, Mao was already aware of the significance of allying with the 
Soviet Union regardless of the longstanding distrust between the two parties 
accumulated through almost all phases of Mao’s revolution (Chen 1994: 64; Bernstein 
2010). Though Mao claimed purportedly in 1949 that China’s foreign policy was to 
‘lean to one side’, he still had to dispel the distrust between the two parties and 
showcase his benevolence. Thus during Mao’s first visit to Moscow, he offered to 
maintain the territorial concessions in Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria 
acknowledged in the KMT’s 1945 treaty with the Soviet Union. He also promised to 
allow the Soviet Union to deploy armies in Manchuria (Yang 2002). The lengthy 
negotiation between the two parties eventuated into a treaty of friendship signed in 
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February 1950. China was promised by the USSR of financial and technological 
assistance for economic recovery and industrial construction, which were not as 
generous as the CCP expected though (Yang 2002: 108; Luthi 2010: 28; Zhang 2010: 
353). The Soviet Union also offered to co-sponsor over 160 industrial units with 
China, with over 12, 000 technological experts dispatched to these units (Kaple 1998: 
117; Meisner 1999). More importantly, China was instructed to remould her state 
apparatus in the image of the Soviet model of state-bureaucracy (Kirby 2006). For the 
want of more advanced security assurance from the Soviet Union, Mao accepted to 
join Stalin’s Eurasian system of ‘Socialism in One Country’ despite the incompatibility 
between the Yenan model and the Soviet model. Subjecting the Yenan model to the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance for military and industrial assistance was also another form of 
substitutionism.  
The transformation of such substitutionist development was however determined by 
two historical processes derivable from China’s belatedness of industrial development. 
One is the mounted tensions between the Yenan guerrilla revolutionaries and the 
abrupt transplantation of the Soviet model. The Soviet-styled bureaucratization in 
cities had transformed many wartime mass organizations into oppressive structures for 
disciplining workers, for example the newly established ‘All China Trade Unions’. But 
because the CCP was still lacking rigorous institutions, what had accompanied the 
process of the so-called ‘socialist transformation’ were endless mass movements 
mobilized to remove social obstacles. From 1951 to 1957, the CCP mobilized a chain 
of movements to tam the old social forces inherited from the KMT. Because these 
movements were all mobilized without clearly defined scope and range, they had been 
inevitably enlarged and exaggerated by the end. Thus social cleavages were ushered 
in not only along pre-existing class divisions, but also newly planted hatreds. The 
process of bureaucratization of industrial production and nationalization of urban 
commerce under the Soviet tutelage in early years had dramatically reduced job 
opportunities in cities, with over 60 percent of the urban graduates as well as over 200 
million workers in the industrial sector redundant. In order to release pressure of 
unemployment in cities, this part of urban surplus labour was then sent to the 
countryside to join agricultural production since 1954 onwards, which had then 
become the necessary workforce for the agricultural cooperation movement with 
dispatched errant cadres during the Anti-rightist Movement (Liu 1998: 5). In the same 
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year the Chinese government also instituted the system of residential registration 
(hukou) to restrict the rural population from moving into the cities which might then 
become unemployed labours. In sum, the unfit between China’s limited urban 
industrial development and the advanced Soviet model heated the tension between 
bureaucrats and the Yenan revolutionary cadres which precipitated the total conflict 
of the Cultural Revolution.  
Another historical process that led to the repudiation of the Soviet model in post-
revolutionary time was the changing geopolitical relationship between China and the 
Soviet Union. As a knot in the system of ‘Socialism in One Country’, China was 
burdened with the unequal trade of agricultural products between the two countries 
(Zhang 2010: 358-360). On the global level, the Cold War rivalry began to cool down 
since late 1950s after the closure of the Korean War and Stalin’s death. The opening 
years of the Cold War proved to both blocs that a total war between them seemed 
unlikely, and the economic achievement of the Soviet Union made Nikita Khrushchev 
confident that the Soviet-styled socialism would overtake capitalism peacefully first in 
socioeconomic and then in geopolitical terms (Whiting 1986; Hobsbawm 1994: 242). 
It was against this geopolitical background that Mao decided to accelerate China’s 
autonomous economic development with socio-political legacies at her own disposal 
(Wang 2012). Mao’s geopolitical calculation was certainly concerned with the danger 
that China’s national economy was running the risk of being locked up in the US-
USSR ‘peaceful coexistence’, whereas China’s suffering of mounting social crisis at 
home still could not receive any security assurance from the Soviet Union. A chain of 
random diplomatic frictions reinforced Mao’s faith of ‘going it alone’. In 1956 
Khrushchev openly denounced Stalin in the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Mao 
interpreted Khrushchev’s discourse of de-Stalinization as an offence to the CCP’s 
policies, especially the speeded agricultural cooperation. In July 1958, Khrushchev 
was actively promoting a summit with the US on the Middle East crisis without 
including China in the negotiation, which to Mao was an appeasement to the West at 
the expense of the brotherly relationship within the communist camp. As a response 
to the accumulated tensions, Mao rejected Khruschev’s proposal of building the 
united radio-station and submarines at the expense of China’s sovereignty. In 
response to the Soviet appeasement, Mao mounted a limited bombardment on the 
Jinmen/Quemoy Island in the Taiwan Strait to test the atmosphere between the two 
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blocs. The result was no surprising that the Soviet Union alleged Mao not to cause 
trouble (MacFaquhar 1983: 92-100; Chen 2001: 64).  
To overcome the varying geopolitical crisis as a concrete manifestation of China’s 
backwardness, Mao continued to mobilize the legacies of the Yenan model to 
substitute for the Soviet assistance which was proved unreliable. The Great Leap 
Forward Movement can be understood as the first step taken to re-activate the Yenan 
guerrilla cadres as the agency of industrialization. Mao launched the Great Leap 
Forward in 1958 after he had toured around the country and conceived a proposal of 
transferring a great number of centrally managed industries to the local-provincial 
level. More significantly Mao announced openly in the same year that China would 
launched the programme of developing nuclear power with a small number of 
returning American-trained nuclear physicists, whom were repatriated to China in 
exchange for the American hostages captured in the Korean War. In the meantime, 
Mao, by advocating that ‘everyone is a soldier’ (quanmin jiebing), began to empower the 
commune-level militias as a substitution for China’s underdeveloped regular armies 
(McFaquhar 1983: 100). In industrial production, Nicholas Lardy has correctly noted 
that ‘control of resources allocation within communes was concentrated in the hands 
of lower-level cadres’ (Lardy 1983: 41). It has been recorded that by 1959, there were 
only 285 kinds of product placed under the control of the central government. 
Compared to that in 1957, the size of centrally controlled production had been 
reduced by half during the Great Leap Forward. By the year when the Cultural 
Revolution (1966) took place, China had only 579 centrally controlled products, 
whilst the number was 21,655 in the Soviet Union (Granick 1990: 73). Mao 
commented later on the massive process of localizing state-owned enterprises that he 
wanted all centrally controlled industries to ‘get out of Beijing with their men and 
their horses (lianren daima gunchu Beijing qu)’. What Mao was really nostalgic about was 
the practice of economic production that allowed everybody, especially grass-root 
workers and peasants who had no specialist managerial and technological knowledge 
to dominate. Thus Mao also suggested many times in early 1960s that all cadres, 
despite their preexisting specialties, should take charge of economic production 
directly (Gan 2007: 28-29).  
The calamitous consequence of the Great Leap Forward had first resulted in a series 
of factional cleavages within the CCP which is regarded by William Hinton as a 
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divide between ‘proletariats’ and ‘bourgeoisie’ (Hinton 2004: 54; Lieberthal 1987: 
293). Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, who were on the one hand 
sympathetic towards the people’s agony, on the other hand proposing a coalition with 
non-state economic sectors and rational policy leverages, initiated a rectification of the 
Great Leap Forward in 1961. Private commerce and market economy were partly 
restored in cities under central bureaucratic planning, and People’s Communes in 
villages were dramatically reduced to the pre-Great Leap Forward level (Lieberthal 
1987: 322). Under Liu-Deng’s policy, the non-state market-space was partly reopened 
and the urban bourgeoisie was again tolerated; and the state-power in economic 
manipulation was partly extracted to the central government. What Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping practiced was a developmental strategy that resembled Lenin’s New 
Economic Policy (NEP) which allowed private enterprises to coexist with the 
dominance of state-owned enterprises when China’s production force was not fully 
developed to support advanced social organizations such as the People’s Commune of 
the Great Leap Forward (Meisner 1999). However, the tendency of bureaucratization 
could be more easily associated to the sin of revisionism of the Soviet Union in which 
the workers’ state was hostaged by a ‘privileged bureaucratic capitalist class’.  
The antidote to the tendency of bureaucratization in Mao’s perspective could and 
should be to revive the ‘mass-line’. The institutional home of the ‘mass-line’ spirit was 
indeed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for the Chinese army as a product of the 
protracted guerrilla warfare was ‘less a professional military organization than a 
highly politicized and egalitarian popular force’. In 1963, Mao’s loyal but ambitious 
follower Marshall Lin Biao launched the campaign of ‘learning from the PLA’ as a 
prelude to the Cultural Revolution72. The main rationale behind such movement was 
to strengthen the Party’s connections to the society which were jeopardized by Liu-
Deng’s economic recovery by mobilizing the PLA’s basic organizational units-the 
local militia. Mao and Lin Biao both believed that local militias would enable wider 
mass participation and reduced central-bureaucratic control by blurring the 
distinction between social and guerrilla-styled military life. In event of this, ‘army !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 It could be observed that the period when Lin Biao was rapidly promoted in the Party and 
the State Council coincided the movement of ‘Socialist Education’. The centrality of the PLA 
in the Cultural Revolution was one of the most important reasons that Lin Biao was 
designated by Mao as his successor.  
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veterans and young peasants’ had been called back to the centre of China’s political 
stage, whilst the PLA and its mass-mobilizing organization for guerrilla warfare had 
been set as a model of pristine revolutionary life (Meisner 1999: 277). With Marshal 
Lin Biao’s rise in the Party, the PLA’s role was dramatically magnified as a 
prerequisite of the Cultural Revolution, and the spirit of revolutionary militancy was 
celebrated across the country with the eight ‘revolutionary model operas’ (geming 
yangbanxi) performing strong nostalgia for revolutionary romanticism of the Yenan 
era73. At the same time, Lu Xun, one of the most radical ‘bannermen’ of the May 
Fourth Movement who has circumstantially described China’s Confucian tradition as 
‘eating people’, was again glorified by Mao and the CCP as the iconic figure of the 
‘New Culture Movement’ (1919) whose spirit would rescue China’s character of 
revolutionism from withering (Mitter 2004: 208). The accumulated revolutionary 
romanticism in the society first captivated the students in both urban and rural arenas. 
For this part of the society, the Cultural Revolution did not mean a narrowing of 
freedom but a much more widened platform for political expression on its opening 
stage. In urban schools and universities, the Cultural Revolution was adopted as a 
chance to finally settle disputes and social standoffs among students, cadres and 
workers. Maurice Meisner has correctly recorded that ‘the political divisions that 
appeared in the student movement in the summer of 1966…were eminently rational 
expressions of conflicting social interests’ (Meisner 1999: 312). Cases have also been 
documented that under Liu Shaoqi’s centralization of economic control, pessimism 
and cynicism among the students dispatched to the countryside became endemic since 
1962 (Liu 1998: 65). Under the scheme of economic recovery, a new number of urban 
graduates that could not be absorbed by the re-inaugurated urban commercial and 
industrial sectors were sent back again to the rural area as part of the central planning 
for releasing urban unemployment. For this group of students, they could not feel as 
optimistic as their counterparts did in the 1950s. The tragic scene of economic 
stagnancy across the countryside made them feel increasingly bored by the plain rural 
life. Many of them viewed the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution as a relief of their 
suppressed political enthusiasm. Some students published posters against their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 In making these operas, Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, a retired actress had made her way to the 
politburo.  
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randomly identified ‘capitalist roaders’ and some even went all the way to Beijing to 
ask to be ‘baptized’ by the Cultural Revolution (Liu 1998: 66).  
However, urban revolutionary romanticism was only a by-product of Mao’s 
substitutionist effort revolving around the peasantry. The essence of the Cultural 
Revolution was to relieve the geopolitical pressures on China by re-mobilizing the 
peasant for a more autonomous developmental path, especially when China witnessed 
Brezhnev’s military operation in Czechoslovakia and the two countries ran into a 
border conflict over Zhenbao/Damansky Island in 1969. Under the Soviet pressure, 
Mao’s substitutionism became more comprehensive and multi-dimensional for it was 
not only substituting the peasantry for the urban worker in industrialization, but also 
China’s vast undeveloped territory for the coastal industrial centres on the grounds of 
national security. First, Mao had inaugurated the massive ‘Third Front’ construction 
that aimed to transfer defence-related industries to the western provinces of the 
country in order to lower the risk of primary urban industrial centres being destroyed 
in war (Naughton 1988: 369-372)74. Second, Mao continued to prepare the local 
militias for a potential guerrilla war against the US and the USSR by allowing them 
more autonomy and arms (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 75). Third, Mao had set up massive 
rural industries that had later become the Town and Village Enterprise (TVE) as a 
crucial institutional foundation of the 1979 economic reform (Yang 1996: 213).    
These policies had produced several contested results. The accelerated empowerment 
of local militias and other forms of mass organization had been causing frictions with 
the central organization of the Party and the PLA since 1967. At the beginning Mao 
did not stand in opposition to any of these ‘rebellions’ (zaofan) as long as they were 
targeted at the bureaucracy. However, the expansion of such conflicts had finally 
shaken the authority of the PLA, which was a bitter fruit for Mao to swallow. In the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Actually the Third Front Construction started before the outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1964. For a detailed review of the construction see Naughton 1988. Notably, 
there has been little ongoing debate on the issue of the Third Front Construction, Barry 
Naughton’s paper is critical of the movement on economic grounds, arguing that the 
industrial projects were too expensive and inefficient. But it is still undeniable that the policy 
was of great geopolitical significance when the US-USSR ‘super-power condominium against 
China seemed a very real possibility’, and China’s industrial centres, concentrated on the 
coastal areas seemed increasingly vulnerable in this conjuncture (Naughton 1988: 369). 
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summer of 1967 the Cultural Revolution reached its ‘high tide’ in Wuhan, one of 
China’s most populous industrial cities. Local Red Guard organizations were in strife 
with the PLA regional commander Chen Zaidao, and over 184, 000 rebels were 
wounded and murdered in the incident (MacFaquhar and Schoenhals 2006: 214). 
This incident had then intensified factional struggle within the Party in which some 
‘ultra-leftists’ officials were pushing a movement of ‘seizing the small handful from the 
army’ (ibid). When arming the local militias had finally resulted in the confusion about 
the Party’s commandership over the army, the Cultural Revolution was thus running 
counter to Mao’s initial intent. Thus by 1969 Mao had realized that the Cultural 
Revolution should be halted, and in order to look for an alternative way out of the 
geopolitical deadlock, Mao began to pursue a rapprochement with the US under the 
claim that ‘the Soviet Union as a ‘social-imperialist’ country had replaced the US as 
the ‘bastion of reactionary forces in the world’’ (Chen 2001: 242). When Lin Biao, 
Mao’s handpicked successor clashed his plane in Mongolia on his exodus to the Soviet 
Union after a failed coup d’état planned by his son, the major counterforce to the Sino-
US rapprochement within the Party had disappeared and the way for the US’s 
‘informal recruitment of China into the anti-Soviet alliance’ (Hobsbawm 1995: 246) 
had been well paved by early 1970s.   
To halt the so-called ‘spontaneous tendencies towards capitalism’ in the countryside, 
Mao implemented the policy that dramatically reduced the percentage of private 
household plots restored in Liu-Deng’s time. By reorganizing the rural communities 
into brigades and other militarist units, peasants were encouraged to mobilize human 
labour power as much as possible when modern technology was absent. Industrial 
factories were organized in military units that combined functions of distributing 
foods, educating the masses and building small-scaled arsenals, factories of fertilizer 
and hydraulic projects and so on. During the Cultural Revolution, all levels of 
government from the village to the province had their autonomous financial and 
industrial system outside the central command. Especially in the villages, each of the 
rural industrial units contained a full range of functionalities. Like what a Chinese 
idiom described, “a sparrow may be small but it has all the vital organs” (Gan 2007: 
28). In 1969, the leading rural industrialist, Chen Yonggui from Dazhai village in 
Shanxi was appointed member of the CCP’s Central Committee and later promoted 
to the Politburo. The myth and legend of the expanded rural industrialization was 
197"
"
"
197!
then romanticized by the propaganda machine to echo the heated atmosphere of 
populism and revolutionary utopianism in the urban area.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The Chinese Revolution is of world-historical significance in the sense that it has 
witnessed the peculiar nexus between peasant activism and socialist transformation. 
China’s revolutionary experience has reversed the conventional understandings of the 
conditions of socialist transformation by presenting a case of the peasant reconstructed 
the agency of socialist socio-political formation which is assumed to belong to 
advanced industrial societies. As Trotsky has noted, ‘a peasant is also capable of 
raising itself to a socialist viewpoint’. Unlike Eric Hobsbawm’s assumption that 
progressive peasant movements could only be ignited against the backdrop of wider 
nationalist campaigns, China’s case has demonstrated that the peasant as the driving 
force of the revolution would be able to ‘unite the worker’ movements, and the urban 
movements in general, with the peasant war’ (Trotsky 1976: 579-583) under a 
proletarian regime conceived in the peasant community. This groundbreaking 
reversal of the terms of socialist revolution was rooted in China’s enduring condition 
of backwardness under which both the bourgeoisie and the working class were ‘kept in 
an oppressed and amorphous condition’ for the intersection of traditional political 
accumulation and the geopolitical pressures of capitalism (ibid: 582-583). Under this 
circumstance, the peasant’s political agency was brought to the fore by the avant-garde 
Communist Party as an alternative force of modern transformation; and this 
substitutionism was propelled by varying geopolitical context in which the discourse of 
‘national salvation’ was created and reproduced.  
 
U&CD’s conjunctural analysis of the Chinese Revolution has also shown that the 
peasantry made its way to the centre of China’s modern transformation through a 
single process that has combined democratic revolution, national liberation with the 
socialist transformation of agrarian social property relations. This combined 
development arose from the imperative of fighting an asymmetric, guerrilla war 
against the Japanese army under China’s severe condition of backwardness. However, 
in Mao’s dialectical perspective, the condition of backwardness which had generated a 
‘a disintegrating society, so diseased that it had become incapable of solving the urgent 
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problems of the nation or the living conditions of the people’ (Belden 1970: 3) 
provided the Communists an ideal platform of guerrilla resistance against the 
geopolitical pressures of modernity. Apart from the structural possibility, the 
mobilization of the peasant was also determined by the transformation CCP’s agency. 
The CCP inherited the Soviet model of ‘political control over the army’ whereas it has 
negated the tendency of alienation between the state-administration and society of the 
Soviet model by introducing the ‘fusing with the mass’ strategy.    
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Chapter 6 Conclusion: The Limits of Classic Social Theories 
an Alternative International Theory of Social Development  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter recaps the whole thesis by showing how China’s specific experience of 
peasant-based socialist transformation could possibly broaden our understanding of 
patterns of modern social development. I will emphasize in particular that by 
theorizing China’s revolutionary experience under the framework of Uneven and 
Combined Development, the longstanding dichotomy of Sinocentrism and 
Eurocentrism in sinological studies and historiographies of modern China could be 
resolved by reconstructing China’s modern revolution as a internationally generated 
combined development. Concerning that the key problem in extant sinology is that China’s 
modern revolution is viewed as either China-made or West-made (Levenson 1968; 
Cohen 1984), it is crucial to note that U&CD highlights the co-constitution of both 
Chinese and western social forms in the communist state-formation. This perspective 
based upon U&CD’s ontology of ‘interactive multiplicity’ would in turn avoid over-
emphasizing any single factor of history, and effectively rule out the problem of 
anachronism and linear notion of development caused by Sinocentrism and 
Eurocentrism. This chapter will further show that what underlies the dichotomy of 
Sino-centrism and Eurocentrism in extant accounts of modern Chinese history is an 
internalist conception of history, the Marxian mode-of-production analysis inter alia, 
which tends to view social development as a self-constitutive process. U&CD’s critique 
of the mode-of-production analysis exemplifies how an international conception of 
social development could overcome the problems caused by internalist social theories.  
 
6.2 Peculiarities of the Chinese Revolution: peasant socialism as a 
combined development 
The central finding of the thesis is the peculiar pattern of China’s modern revolution 
that the peasant, which is regarded by traditional Marxist theories as ‘rural idiots’ and 
‘potatoes in a sack’ (Mitrany 1951), could act as a crucial agent of socialist revolution 
in a society like China where there was no meaningful bourgeois and working class 
formation. The particular phenomenon of ‘peasant socialism’ in China’s revolutionary 
experience has entailed two ground-breaking developments. First, the peasant who 
has been transformed into a new form of historical subject, namely the ‘guerrilla 
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revolutionary’, has undertaken a series tasks that was done by bourgeoisie and workers 
in pre-existing experiences in other societies. These tasks include anti-capitalist and 
anti-imperialist struggles in different historical conjunctures. The reason that Chinese 
peasants could do these tasks is that they have been transformed into a new form of 
agency which has dramatically differed from not only their premodern form (Wolf 
1969), but also other forms of proletarian class in advanced industrial societies. 
Notably, unlike the Russian experience in which the peasants were given a 
revolutionary programme by the youthful proletariats in urban workplace (Trotsky 
1980: 8), the Chinese peasants have conceived their own revolutionary programme 
more actively in restoring the order of rural society. Though the Communist Party has 
played a significant role in assisting the restoration of peasant society with some forms 
of Soviet institutions, it is noteworthy that the Communist cadres were themselves 
peasants recruited from the vast countryside under the transformed social property 
relations which has combined military service, political education and agricultural 
production in one unified historical process (Meisner 1989; Selden 1995). Via this 
combined development known as ‘fusing with the masses’, the Chinese peasant has 
become the active subject of socialist revolution.  
 
Second, it is significant that the peasant’s involvement in the Chinese Revolution has 
determined a unique ‘socialist’ direction subject to ‘national salvation’ not only in the 
New Democratic stage before 1949, but also the stage of socialist construction 
afterwards. The socialist dimension of the Chinese Revolution is what the Neo-
Weberian historical sociologists, Theda Skocpol inter alia have failed to theorize. 
Conventionally, socialism is understood as a nominal concept masking exploitation or 
political domination over the peasants (Wolf 1969; Duara 1985; Esherick 1995), 
however, socialism itself means a transcendence of the capitalist social order which is 
based upon the dispossession of peasants and the self-generation of propertyless wage-
labours (Marx 1977; Brenner 1972; Burham 2006), and if the Chinese Revolution has 
generated any modern socio-political order aspiring to developing the society without 
taking these steps, it has presented some socialist elements which means more than 
political domination under a new mask. In the Chinese Revolution, it is noticeable 
that the peasant has been significantly empowered during the Yenan period with 
agricultural surpluses redistributed within the local communities. Since the Yenan 
model has erased the structural alienation between the state administration and 
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agricultural production via the ‘fusing with the masses’ movement (Schurmann 1968), 
revolutionary cadres as representatives of the state have become more deeply 
embedded in rather than super-imposed upon daily rural life; also through this 
process, the peasant has found a way to join the state-administration by becoming a 
revolutionary cadre via receiving political and ideological education without 
detaching himself from producing and redistributing agricultural surpluses. Under 
such a communal social property regime, no clear demarcation between public and 
private properties (Li 2008) and no obvious separation between the political and 
economic activities (Wood 1971) have been initiated in China’s case. Therefore, the 
state has managed to connect itself to the peasant communities by first becoming the 
peasant, and then integrating the peasant more organically to the state by changing 
himself into a revolutionary cadre, a new form of agency known as ‘guerrilla 
revolutionary’ who is both ideologically renovated in a socialist rather than 
premodern, vernacular direction, and economically still tied to the practice of local 
communities. This particular structure of social property relations, and its specific 
process have also played a significant role in China’s post-revolutionary 
industrialization. Under the intensive geopolitical pressures from the Soviet Union in 
the 1960s, Mao Zedong has re-activated the Yenan model of socialist movement to 
create a specific set of ‘rural industrial units’ which has redistributed industrial capitals 
accumulated in the 1950s to the rural-local level on the basis of communal ownership. 
These ‘rural industrial units’ have then become the Town and Village Enterprises 
(TVE) as a fundamental institution that have maintained the socialist direction of 
China’s development in the time of marketization. Throughout this process, it is 
notable that there has never been a process of radical privatization and dispossession 
of rural lands; and no equivalents of wage-labour has been produced in China’s 
history of industrialization. Why the communal ownership of land can be maintained 
as a consequence of China’s modern revolution? The reason can only be sought in the 
revolution as a combined development. China’s specific course of Revolution of 
Backwardness headed by Mao Zedong and his Communist Party has been a process 
of restoring order of rural society for the purpose for national unification. 
Horizontally, it is because that the historical tasks of national unification and rural 
restoration were both undertaken by the peasant proletariats, thus empowering and 
invigorating the peasant became crucial to the consolidation of state-power; and 
vertically, it is because that the pre-existing legacies of China’s modern transformation 
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since the Self-Strengthening Movement has taught Mao and the CCP how weak the 
power of China’s bourgeoisie was, and how catastrophic the previous modernization 
projects have brought to the Chinese nation by over-exploiting the peasants.  
 
6.3 Closing the Sinological debate on ‘China-made’ and ‘West-
made’ with an international conception of social development 
Here we have come to a deeper question of on what basis China’s modern history 
should be conceptualized. The aforementioned ‘combined development’ of China’s 
peasant socialism has brought to us a critical problem of what should be identified as 
the driver of modern Chinese history. On the empirical level, the category of 
‘combined development’ is able to provide us with a picturesque of how different 
forms of social force have correlated to recreate the peasant into a new agency of 
socialism; however, this does not rule out the danger that Uneven and Combined 
Development stays as a descriptive device on a low empirical level. How can we 
effectively construct a general theory of social transformation with reference to 
China’s particular experience of peasant socialism? Here I will start by showing how 
U&CD can operate as such a theory with its ‘international conception of social 
development’, and how U&CD’s critique of China’s modern development could bring 
a closure to the debate in sinology about whether modern Chinese history was China-
made or West-made (Levenson 1968; Esherick 1995:48; Cohen 1984, 2003).  
 
Recalling Marx’s remarks on the (im)possibilities of socialist revolution in a traditional 
peasant society, it is apparent that Marx’s negative metaphor of ‘potatoes in a sack’ on 
the peasant’s passivity in history has reinforced the longstanding assumption of the 
pattern of Chinese history in American Sinology, that China is presented as a ‘no-win 
situation’ where ‘modernizing change taking place without the West becomes 
unthinkable; equally unthinkable is the possibility that change other than modernizing 
change can be historically important’ (Cohen 1984; see also Cohen 2003: 185-199, 
my italics). In like manner, Fairbank further argues that the ‘core perceptions’ of the 
Chinese civilization changed more slowly despite the Chinese elites were at some 
points willing to give up traditional tenets (Fairbank 1986: 25-26). This is consistent 
with Eisenstadt’s assumption that for every major civilizational entity (especially an 
‘axial civilization’ like China), there stood some impervious socio-cultural orders at the 
core that melted the western impact into air (Eisenstadt 2000: 1). Both the ‘dynastic 
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cycle’ and the ‘impact-response’ paradigms are built upon these assumption which 
have generated two mutually propelling theses of Chinese history. The first thesis is 
what has been characterized by Joseph Esherick as ‘domination after domination’ 
(Esherick 1995: 48-50) assuming that the Chinese peasant, as a highly backward actor 
of history would not deviate from China’s pre-given developmental trajectory which 
has involved no thinkable ‘modernizing change’. In this sense, socialism is only a way 
that the state ‘forced idlers and paupers into productive work’ (ibid: 48, Keating 1989: 
188-189). The second thesis is that the socialist revolution, if it qualifies as a significant 
modern change, has gained the momentum of progression only with external 
assistance (e.g. Theda Skocpol’s concept of ‘world time’; see Esherick 1995: 51). This 
thesis has reduced the meaning of ‘socialism’ to only a simple replica of Stalinism under 
the Soviet tutelage. Similarly, authors thinking in this line would also tend to 
emphasize the sweeping force of global capitalism after 1979 in transforming China 
into a neo-liberal state (Harvey 2005).  
 
The ultimate problem of these theses is that they could not properly conceptualize the 
meaning of socialism in China’s particular context of peasant society. Socialism is 
treated as either a meaningless guise of backward tradition or identical with Stalinism 
which is no long relevant to contemporary China after the Soviet Union has 
collapsed. Notably, though understanding traditional China as changeless and history-
less has been discredited by recent sinologists, the renewed effort made to excavate 
China’s self-generated history based upon circumstantial reading of Confucianism 
seems to be equally fruitless for interpreting the peculiar ‘socialist’ revolution. Joseph 
Esherick has correctly highlighted the problem by saying ‘[p]olitically, the CCP has 
certainly been an autonomous actor at least since 1935. But that political 
independence is not inconsistent with the notion that Mao and other CCP leaders 
would find the experience of the Soviet Union highly instructive, even essential, in 
their own search for a Chinese road to socialism’ (1995: 52). With this argument, it 
now seems to be clearer that a dialectical understanding of China’s opening to 
modernities and its autonomous ‘road to socialism’ squats at the centre of the 
aforementioned debate. As Paul Cohen has repeatedly highlighted:  
‘[t]his ambiguous relationship between ‘tradition” and “revolution’, in 
which tradition appears not merely as a barrier to revolution but also as a 
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repository of assets for its facilitation, energizing, and legimitation, has also 
characterized some interpretations of Mao Zedong himself’ (2003: 67) 
However, the problem could be even more complicated than a matter of the 
respective percentage of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elements in the configuration of 
modern China. Most importantly, the un-theorized question is the so-called ‘some 
interpretations of Mao Zedong himself’-why Mao has come to intentionally 
reinterpret a series of modern and traditional categories, socialism inter alia? Here, 
the question has become how to conceptualize the incentive of China’s modern 
revolution; or what was the most significant question defining the CCP’s agenda 
which required solution most urgently?  
 
In previous chapters, I have attempted to situate this question in world history by 
drawing out the longue dureé evolution of China’s condition of backwardness-it was 
the nomad-sedentary interaction that had created an increasingly vulnerable 
peasant under centrifugal state-power (chapter 3). Also, it has been shown that the 
universalizing force of global capitalism of the nineteenth century had worsened the 
situation of the peasant by accelerating the decline in state-authority; in this context, 
China’s modern revolution has emerged as a ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ aiming 
to resolve the socio-political conflicts (e.g. the Taiping Rebellion) caused by the 
imperial state’s ‘loss of heaven’s mandate’ in protecting the peasant (chapter 4). 
Notably, China’s interaction with other forms of society has also created a toolkit of 
modernization (privileges of backwardness) for the elites. Specific geopolitical 
contexts would test the adaptability of these tools and compel the elites to re-
determine more suitable strategies of ‘Revolution of Backwardness’ (chapter 4-5). 
Specifically, the Communist Party has deciphered China’s backwardness by 
successfully marrying national salvation/survival with restoring rural order by 
empowering the peasant (chapter 5). In further consolidating the newly founded 
regime under the geopolitical pressure from the Soviet Russia by industrializing the 
country, the Chinese Communist Party has further differentiated their particular 
version of socialism from the Soviet model by reinforcing the social property regime 
sprouting during the revolutionary period (substitutionism, chapter 5). All these 
experiences have suggested that China did have significant change before 
encountering the West as a result of evolution in an international realm of social 
constitution; more importantly, though the West operated as an important driver of 
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modern history, the particular consequence of modern transformation is 
nonetheless co-constituted with China’s specific agenda of solving problems of her 
longue dureé development. Because China’s reception of modernity was not a matter 
of emulating the western way of life (e.g. democracy, capitalism) but solving China’s 
own problem of ‘backwardness’, it is necessary that modernity would be locally 
modified or even negated in China’s particular context. It is Marx’s original belief 
that the texture of modernity is intrinsically heterogeneous, which means the need 
for ‘more than one’ narratives of directions of modern development. Perry 
Anderson has highlighted in his Origins of Postmodernity that there has always been a 
‘conservative reflux’ within modernism, namely the ‘age of postmodernism’ in 
Arnold Toynbee’s terms which was marked by two developments: ‘the rise of an 
industrial working class in the West, and the bid of successive intelligentsias outside 
the West to master the secrets of modernity and turn them against the West’. On 
the long list of anti-western modernists were there ‘Meiji  Japan, Bolshevik Russia, 
Kemalist Turkey and-just born-Maoist China’ (Anderson 1998: 4-5). Though it is 
recognized that Maosim aspires to established western categories such as 
‘industrialisation, modernity and socialism’ as solutions to China’s national crisis 
(Knight 2008: 60), Maoism is viewed by practitioners of the post-modernist 
aesthetic programme as an exemplar of a drive to look for alternative approaches to 
‘modern life’ (Dirlik 1997: 3-4; Anderson 1998: 6-12). The peasant is certainly 
regarded as a ‘generator of postmodernity’ in this process while Mao has perceived 
the northern Chinese countryside as the most potential reservoir of energy of anti-
imperialist struggles (Dirlik and Zhang 2000: 3).  
 
Therefore, Uneven and Combined Development could close the debate between 
China-made and West-made conceptions of modern Chinese history by 
highlighting the interaction between Chinese and western forces in constituting 
social transformation. The agenda as well as the methods of the Chinese Revolution 
were both evolving social realities produced by such interaction. The contradiction-
cum ‘combined development’ has epitomized Marx’s remark that ‘[i]n our days 
everything seems pregnant with its contrary’ (Berman 1982: 21) which could not be 
understood by either the Sinocentric or the Eurocentric historiography. How could 
U&CD’s critique of Sinology and Chinese historiography contribute to wider 
sociological theories?   
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6.4 The ‘mode-of-production’ analysis, the problem of ontological 
singularity and the significance of international conception of 
social development.  
This thesis starts by making a general argument that China’s peasant-based socialist 
revolution cannot be understood by extant IR and sociological theories for their 
common problem of ‘anachronism’: a syndrome of ignoring the complexities of 
‘time factor’ in constituting social transformation. It is however ironic that historical 
sociological scholars such as Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol who proclaim 
to have revolved around historical specificities have also committed the error of 
anachronism (Burawoy 1989: 769) due to their under-theorized conception of ‘the 
international’75. It has long been the central task of historical sociology to bring 
‘history’ back to the analysis of social development (see Lawson and Hobson 2007), 
but why does anachronism remains paradoxically in many existing historical-
sociological accounts76? My answer to the question is that the pathology of 
‘ontological singularity’ underlying historical sociology has presupposed a uni-linear 
notion of social development, and such a notion will inevitably rule out the 
possibility of envisaging the twists and turns of historical development for treating 
social development as determined by a series of ‘static, self-constituting, 
autonomous and reified’ entities (Hobson and Hobden 2002: 7). With the lessons 
taken from the experience of the Chinese Revolution, I will show that the orthodox 
‘mode of production’ analysis is a typical example of viewing social development as 
determined by a certain structural entity which will inevitably result in 
anachronistic analysis. Uneven and Combined Development’s major contribution 
to social theories thus lies in its ‘general abstraction’ predicated upon ontological 
multiplicity and interactivity, which enables a dynamic understanding of social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Barrington Moore's emphasis of world history can be found in the epilogue of his Social 
Origins: social revolutions were 'much more clearly successive historical stages', and 'as such, 
they displayed a limited determinate relations to each other' (1966: 414); see also Theda 
Skocpol's use of 'world time' (1979: 23).  
76 This paradox exists in sinology as well when a discipline aspiring to the historical variances 
of Chinese socio-political order has ended up viewing the Chinese history as static and 
changeless.   
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development as a spirally ascending process. This provides a powerful antidote to 
the extant IR and sociological theories.  
 
As for most of the extant analyses of the causes and consequences of the Chinese 
Revolution, the ‘mode of production’ analysis squats at the root of their methods even 
if some of these authors are not Marxist. ‘Mode of production’ is identified by many 
authors as the fundamental ‘general abstraction’ from which concrete analysis of a 
society’s patterns of development can be derived. Though ‘mode of production’ has 
not been given consistent definition, it is clear that this concept manifests itself as a 
series of clearly outlined collections of production relations which will give rise to 
more specific social, political and cultural forms as concretions of the general ‘mode of 
production’. A typical case of this method is the orthodox Marxist conception of the 
‘realist moment’ of geopolitics which claims that the capitalist international modernity 
should be understood as ‘the historical subsumption of interstate competition ‘under 
that between capitals’’ (Callinicos 2007; see Rosenberg’s critique in Rosenberg and 
Callinicos 2008: 87-89). For authors like Callinicos, capital accumulation as the 
‘theoretical core’ of the mode of production theory operates as the sociological 
‘organizing principles’ for understanding other concrete forms of socio-political orders 
which includes modern state-formation, geopolitical relations and even the ‘uneven 
and combined’ pattern of the globalization of capital (Callinicos 2007; Ashman 2009; 
Anievas and Allinson 2009 etc.)77.  
 
Sinological accounts have promised to capture the historical specificities of the 
Chinese development beyond any theoretical abstraction. It is ironic that Sinology has 
never been void of the problem of anachronism for its fetishism of the particularities of 
China’s tradition (Cohen 1984; 2003: 48). The key problem here is that such tradition 
as the starting point for understanding China’s historical evolution has been treated as 
no different from the concept of ‘mode of production’ which revolves around a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 It needs to be noted that some Marxists' analysis of uneven and combined development also 
has difficulties explaining transformation under some modes of production. For example, 
Anievas and Allinson insist that pre-capitalist epoch had no 'wholesale transformation' which 
is consistent with Sinology's claim that there was no significant change in ancient China, see 
Anievas and Allinson, 2009, 'The uses and misuses of uneven and combined development: an 
anatomy of a concept', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 47-67.   
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misidentified category as ‘general abstraction’ from which all levels of particularities 
are derived. The typical case can be found in the idea of ‘Oriental Despotism’ which 
has foregrounded many explanations of cultures and socio-political forms. Oriental 
Despotism, as a expression of a deeper ‘Asiatic mode of production’ is predicated 
upon a generalized understanding of economic production of the Chinese society as a 
‘hydraulic society’, in which man had to respond to ‘arid, semi-arid and particular 
humid environments’ via ‘hydraulic’ constructions that could be only realized by the 
state as the sole proprietor (Witfogel 1957: 1). The ‘absence of private property’ as a 
derivative of the hydraulic condition is thus deployed for further addressing China’s 
other socio-political forms including the centrality of state-bureaucracy, the functional 
significance of literati examination, the lack of ‘transcendental tensions’ of 
Confucianism and even the so-called ‘strong resemblance’ between Maoism and 
premodern imperial order. This analytical process survives no empirical scrutiny 
because there have been plenty of ‘private property’ in pre-capitalist China and 
‘transcendental tensions’ in Confucius’ original texts (see Liu Xiaofeng 2007: 85; 
Pomeranz 2001; Brook 1999: 125; Anderson 1979: 491). It is noteworthy that recent 
Sinolgoical studies have made substantial efforts to jettison the baggage of the static 
notion of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ having recognized its empirical blindness. 
However, their methods have made no substantial difference in the sense that they are 
still furnishing the particularities of the internal structure of the Chinese civilization 
without moving beyond it; thus they are still working around the concept of the mode 
of production rather than providing any alternative departure of ‘general abstraction’. 
As Friedrich Tenbruck has correctly argued, all sociological elaborations over ‘static’, 
‘morphology’ or ‘structure’ were only ‘means towards the more accurate estimations 
of ‘dynamics’ in the service of prediction’ with the ‘core assumption that every societal 
formation is the outcome of a preceding one’ (Tenbruck 1994: 75). Because the 
‘preceding structure’ is theorized on a self-constitutive basis, a uni-linear conception of 
social development is unavoidable. Thus no matter how much efforts have been made 
to give more historical nuances to the concept of ‘mode of production’ on the 
descriptive level, the aforementioned situation ‘did not change even when uni-linear 
‘progress’ was superseded by less ambitious and multi-dimensional ‘social change’’ 
(Tenbruck 1994: 75; see also Nisbet 1969; and Rosenberg 2006: 329). With the 
present case of China’s peasant-socialist revolution reinterpreted by Uneven and 
Combined Development, I will argue that the solution to all the aforementioned 
209"
"
"
209!
variances of anachronism in Sinology and historical sociology is not to continue 
furnishing the particularities of ‘mode of production’, but to replace such a self-
constitutive concept with an alternative ‘general abstraction’ from which non-linear 
historical development can be derived. Uneven and Combined Development can 
provide such a solution by resolving the fundamental problem of ‘ontological 
singularity’ which gives rise to uni-linear notion of development and corresponding 
anachronistic explanations.  
 
The problem of ‘ontological singularity’ has been regarded as one of the basic 
premises of classic sociological theory. ‘It is this concept of the internal history of 
societies that underlies the rise of sociology’ (Tenbruck 1994: 75). Justin Rosenberg 
has highlighted the methodological internalism as the origin of a lacuna in classic 
sociological theories which leaves ‘international phenomena’ unexplained (Rosenberg 
2006: 310). Rosenberg has further defined the method of ‘internalism’ as an 
expression of an deeper ontological problem of ontological singularity,  
‘Sociological theory, it argues, has in the main operated with a conception of 
society as a singular, unitary and self-contained…Theorization of any given 
type of society has thus generally proceeded by first modeling its inner 
relational composition (its social structure), and then examining how its 
iterated reproduction in this form gives rise to immanent sources of 
development and changes’ (2013: 188) 
Hereby, Rosenberg has made it very clear that the uni-linear notion of development is 
a consequence of the internalist mode of social analysis which focuses only on the 
inner composition of a social structure with clearly defined boundaries78. It is 
inevitable that such mode of theorizing will lead to anachronism because the 
modeling of social-relational composition at a given point of history can be applied to 
social development in a much wider time-span; for example, the understanding of 
Confucian texts in its original form can be applied to Mao’s contemporary use of 
Confucianism as a way of ‘suasion and coercion’ (Wolf 1969) without noting both the 
historical mutations of Confucianism itself and Mao’s dramatic negation of it in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Such boundaries are always coterminous with those of nation-states in modern time, see 
Daniel Chernilo, 'Methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy: classical resources 
for their critique', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1.  
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completely different spatio-temporal context. The irony has thus emerged that though 
such historical accounts aspire to historical specificities, they have no conceptual 
devices for theorizing the accumulative development of history apart from allowing 
the characterization of a certain point of history to be replicated to other contexts.  
 
Notably, this observation does not mean that anachronistic analysts have not 
recognized any changes over time on the empirical level; it rather means that they 
lack the theoretical device, or a proper ‘general abstraction’ that allows them to 
theorize such changes progressively. Theda Skocpol has certainly realized the 
historical reality that the internally determined developmental trajectory would 
deviate and reorient from time to time, and she has announced that such deviations 
and reorientations, which cannot be understood by theorizing the preceding social 
structure(s) should by no means by regarded as just ‘certain fortuitous circumstances’ 
(Skocpol 1973: 29). Skocpol has no problem figuring an independent, external realm 
of explanation such as geopolitics with her ‘summate analytical skills’ (Burawoy 1989), 
however, her failure of tackling anachronism is caused by a problem interdependent 
with internalism in classic sociology. As Rosenberg has noted in a much earlier text, in 
Skocpol’s works, ‘‘the international’ intruded powerfully into her sociological method 
without, however, itself being grasped as a sociological phenomenon’ (Rosenberg 
2007: 454). ‘The international’ treated as the remit of ‘the social’ can only lay out 
some structural context for the rise of a certain political agency such as the peasantry; 
it nonetheless sheds no lights on the specificities of such varying political agency in 
longue dureé development. Implicitly, what determines the nature and character of the 
peasant revolution is still some preceding social structures operating similarly to a self-
contained ‘mode of production’ (see Skocpol 1979: 263-283).  
 
Here, the problem is clear that the conception of ‘mode of production’ or any other 
social reality based upon the internalist mode of analysis in classic sociology is not by 
itself a ‘theory of change’. It is noted by some Marxists themselves that modes of 
production, such as capitalism always possess some elements irreducible to any 
corresponding ‘cores’ of the mode. Social systems such as market relations are 
substantial elements of both feudalism and capitalism, and ‘these exists not exogenous 
to capitalism, nor as pockets of decline, but as an intrinsic and structured part of a 
wider system’. The transformation of a social form thus needs to be understood in that 
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‘wider system’ because modes of production, such as capitalism ‘neither evolve 
mechanically from what precedes, nor do they necessarily dissolve it’ (Foster-Carter 
1978: 50-51). The so-called ‘wider system’ under which ‘multiple temporalities’ 
coexist to determine the patterns of a specific socio-political order requires an 
alternative ‘general abstraction’ that can give rise to an non-linear and accumulative 
conception of social development.  
 
Uneven and Combined Development can successfully grasped the sociological core of 
the wider world-historical system beyond any singular, self-constitutive modes of 
production by postulating ‘multi-societal interaction’ as the rational ‘general 
abstraction’ of social development. On this basis, the analytical process of Uneven and 
Combined Development has become to examine a series of interaction among 
different social forces and the totality of these networks of interaction. In Marx’s 
original formulation of ‘the method of Political Economy’, it elicits a reciprocal 
process of concretizing the ‘general abstraction’ by mapping specific determinations, 
and then tracing them back to an ‘enriched totality’ (Marx 1973). As for China’s case, 
the peasant’s political agency as the pivot of modern transformation is not derived 
from any general abstractions such as the ‘peasant’s passivity’ or the stasis of 
Confucianism which occupied the centre of the concept of ‘mode of production’; 
instead, it has stemmed from China’s premodern condition of ‘nomad-sedentary co-
constitution’ which gave rise to an imperial bureaucracy superimposed upon 
agricultural households and the peculiar structure of ‘developmental agrarian state’ 
(Perdue 2005); this has configured the potential political agency of the peasant as 
‘bolstering the state-authority in order to promote social wellbeing’. Also, the modern 
revolution was not incentivized by the sweeping force of capitalist mode of production, 
but by the intersection of China’s internal decline of state-authority and the 
universalizing force of imperialism. This intersection gave rise to a combined 
development that China’s premodern elite class was actively assimilating the 
‘privileges of backwardness’ from the industrial society to withstand the ‘external whip 
of necessity’ (Trotsky 1973: 20-23, 1980: 4-7); and more importantly, such a 
combination entails a relocated class relations that the rivaling regional militarists 
instead of a unified bourgeois class became the agency of China’s industrial 
modernization. This reconfiguration of class relations generated a particular 
conjuncture of crisis to which the communist revolution was compelled to respond. 
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The same conjuncture has also informed the communists that urban-based 
industrialization and capitalist liberal-democracy could never resolve China’s crisis of 
backwardness. Thus by critically inheriting and negating the pre-existing 
modernization projects, the Communist Party has mobilized the peasant to substitute 
for the bourgeoisie and the worker for democratic revolution, and mobilized the 
peasant’s human capability for advanced production force as a departure of socialist 
revolution (D’Mello 2009).  
 
From the entire trajectory of the formulation of China’s peasant socialism, it is notable 
that temporalities in both long and short terms are mobilized as a complex 
explanation to the multi-faceted peasant socialism. On one hand, there has been an 
enduring political agency of the peasant of marrying social egalitarianism with 
building a strong centralized state-The Self-strengtheners, the KMT and Mao’s CCP 
have all inherited such a tradition. On the other hand, however, there were always 
some very specific conjunctural crises to which the elites mounted different 
revolutionary responses; for example, the Anti-Japanese struggles and the KMT’s 
failure of modernization urged the formation of the CCP’s ‘fusing with the mass’ 
strategy and guerrilla warfare. Interactions among variegated social forms has not 
only produced a series of enduring social realities such as the peasant’s political 
agency, the general context of modern revolution and the constant imperative of 
resolving backwardness, but also a spirally ascending trajectory in which an ongoing 
historical process was interrupted, superseded or intersected by additional processes 
stemming from other social spaces; for example, the CCP’s bourgeoning working class 
movements in the 1920s was terminated by the KMT’s project of developmental state, 
whereas, the CCP then entered a single process fusing national liberation/anti-
imperialism and rural restoration (Deutscher 1964: 189-195). For both the existence 
of multiple temporalities and the complexities of developmental trajectories in specific 
conjunctures, multi-societal interaction remains as the only rational ‘general 
abstraction’ from which ‘breaking down of conventional succession of historical stages 
can’ be derived. Therefore, by replacing the ontologically singular ‘mode of 
production’ under which social development is self-constitutive and uni-linear, the 
theory of Uneven and Combined Development has presented an international 
conception of social development in which non-linear, accumulative evolution is an 
emergent property of multi-societal co-constitution. The enduring problem of 
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anachronism can thus be successfully resolved. 
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